Monday, May 25, 2026

The 1980 Gwangju Uprising: An Account by an 11th Brigade Paratrooper (1987) Part 1

Paratrooper accounts of the Gwangju Uprising

Account by an 11th Brigade paratrooper (1999)

Account by a 3rd Brigade paratrooper (1996)

Account by an 11th Brigade paratrooper (1987) Part 1

Here is another account by a paratrooper from the 11th Brigade, originally published in 1987. Since it is 30 pages in length, I will divide it into two parts. The original source is:

윤재걸 편, 『작전명령 화려한 휴가: 광주 민중항쟁의 기록』 (서울: 실천문학사, 1988), 30-60.

Yun Jae-geol, ed., Operation Order Splendid Holiday: A Record of the Kwangju People’s Uprising (Seoul: Silcheon Munhaksa, 1988), 30-60.

Note: He uses the term 광주사태, or Gwangju Incident, as it was known before democratization. The "K" he addresses his account to is rendered "K형" in the original. His account is dated November 25, 1987.

The first half of this account is tricky because he mixes up the dates when he was deployed to Gwangju writing May 18 instead of May 19, but also seems to mix up May 19 and 20 as well. When I am certain of the date (using standard chronologies and referring to the other 11th Brigade paratrooper's account), I have written it in; otherwise I add a question mark to the date.

* * * * * * *

The “Splendid Holiday” That I Was Sent On

—Memoir of an Airborne Trooper Deployed During the Kwangju Incident

 [Editor’s Note]

This is a memoir by a Special Forces noncommissioned officer who volunteered for the ROK Special Warfare Command in 1976 and was deployed to Gwangju in May 1980. It recounts his direct experiences and actions from the scene with honesty. Except for correcting spelling errors, it is presented exactly as written in the original.

K, as you know well, I volunteered for the Special Warfare Command in 1976 and served for over ten years before I was discharged. I was deployed as a martial law soldier during the Gwangju Incident—a moment in history that still lingers bitterly in the hearts of many citizens—and even sustained minor injuries there. Though I was only a humble noncommissioned officer, I want to recount my actions from that time truthfully, without exaggeration or lies. What the public most wants to know now seems to be:

1) How many people actually died?

2) Why was there such violent beating?

3) Were all the rumors and hearsay true?

4) Who were the people in Seoul giving the orders and leading at the time?

5) After the incident, what compensation, if any, was provided to civilians, soldiers, and police who were killed or injured?

K, I believe reading my memoir may help clarify some of these questions for those who remain curious about the Gwangju Incident. I also write this as a way to seek forgiveness, even if only slightly, for my wrongdoings at the time. I ask for your understanding that I cannot disclose the names of my comrades or commanding officers.

When President Park Chung-hee died in one of the most bizarre incidents in history, killed by his own right-hand man, I was serving as a senior NCO and barracks commander enduring a hard and grueling military life in a deep mountain valley in Gangwon Province. That night, I had returned from 2:00 am to 4:00 am perimeter sentry duty when another soldier, just off shift, told me about President Park’s assassination via radio. I couldn’t believe it at first. But our unit, being far removed from the capital on the eastern front, didn’t react with any noticeable unrest or changes. However, the number of ideological training sessions about loyalty to the state and maintaining order increased significantly, with a particularly marked increase in "Chungjeong [loyalty] Training" (at the time, this meant riot suppression drills). K, as you know, few soldiers enjoy military training. The Special Warfare Command is the spearhead of the army, trained to infiltrate enemy lines during all-out war to sabotage key facilities or assassinate targets, then escape and return to friendly areas. Because of this, our training was extremely demanding and specialized. 

In any case, our unit remained calm. But on December 12, 1979, at 9 PM, we were placed on emergency alert. However, about four hours later, the alert was lifted. That night, rumors spread through the base that General Jeong Byeong-ju, commander of the Special Forces, had been arrested. Though I was only an NCO, and just one point in the hierarchy, there was a lot of talk in the barracks. They said a mutiny had taken place. On December 13, Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun issued a statement claiming the military remained stable and focused on its duties. But among the soldiers, there was frustration and resentment, especially about who had orchestrated the mutiny and how the arrests had been carried out.

The year ended, and from February 1980 most regular training was suspended and riot suppression drills took over entirely. At the main gate of our battalion, one regional team (a Special Forces organizational unit, commanded by a captain or major, with around 14 officers and 100 men) would play the role of rioters, while another team played the defense force. The two sides would clash in endless drills, pushing and pulling. 

In early April, our unit received orders to move to the capital region. As you already know, K, the structure of political power had shifted following the December 12 incident. I sensed that some unavoidable conflict would erupt as the new regime took shape. In mid-April (I forget when), around 8 pm, we were deployed in trucks borrowed from the infantry. As we left, we said tearful goodbyes to our wives and children. About a hundred trucks carried our brigade down winding mountain roads, and with their headlights on, the tail of the convoy looked like a long snake. We arrived at Bupyeong Station by train from Chuncheon early in the morning, then moved to a base near Gimpo Airfield and settled in. From that day, the riot suppression training resumed. CS gas was released by circling 500MD helicopters, and the training was much harsher than anything we had experienced before.

At that time, student protests were spreading daily across Seoul and other cities. Among the soldiers, a strong resentment toward students was growing. We asked ourselves, “Whose fault is it that we left our homes to suffer like this?” and anti-student sentiment flared. During training, our officers emphasized that, if deployed, we were to beat protestors brutally with batons on every part of the body except the head. Why were such harsh orders given? To this day, I can't rid myself of that question.

K, let me digress for a moment to explain the structure of the Special Forces. I believe this will help readers better understand what happened in Gwangju. About 80% of the Special Forces personnel are long-term NCOs or officers. This is because enlisted soldiers leave after fulfilling their mandatory service, while NCOs serve a minimum of four years and undergo six months or more of intensive training, making them more battle-ready and consistent. Also, when they reach their prime fighting age, unlike conscripts, they don’t get discharged. They undergo constant physical training, martial arts, taekwondo, and outdoor drills so they’re well-conditioned to survive behind enemy lines.

Back to our time in Gimpo. Nightly ideological education by commanders, daytime harsh training with CS gas and armored cars, the repeated process of packing and unpacking gear every night for potential deployment, the homesickness from not seeing our families, the poor food – all of these turned our hatred toward the students into a boiling rage, and we were consumed by foolish mindset that we would take revenge for our suffering by beating them.

In May, though I don’t recall the exact date, the president of the transitional government (whom we derisively called the “pushover”) left for the Middle East to negotiate for oil, and from that point, tension in the unit rose. Almost nightly, we boarded vehicles to deploy, only for the orders to be canceled at the last minute.

Around 5 pm on May 16 [SIC – May 17], President Choi Kyu-hah returned a day early. Our brigade commander had gone to Special Forces Headquarters. Around 11 pm he returned and gave the deployment order. At midnight, we left the base together with the 1st Airborne Brigade. The line of military vehicles stretched endlessly. The red light from the commander’s jeep’s nameplate flickered as we moved out, and everyone said, “We’re finally deploying.” Soldiers were filled with pride, curiosity, and burning hatred toward the students who only demonstrated. We arrived at Dongguk University. 

Although curfew was in effect from midnight, some drunken civilians still wandered the streets. We detained a few of them and arrived to find the university gates locked. The campus security guard, unaware of martial law, told us to wait while he made a call. When he said that, one of us angrily barked, “This bastard wants to get beaten,” and we forced the gate open ourselves.

K, that moment marked the arrival of tragedy. A tragedy of history. A tragedy of our people. Today, even if people don’t know ‘Korea,’ they know Gwangju. That night, the Defense Security Command and the KCIA rounded up all major dissidents and political figures. At Dongguk, our unit set up 24-man tents on the large parade ground, while others began searching the campus and nearby buildings. In military operations, it’s basic practice to sweep the area around your encampment. But the search at Dongguk was different. The orders were to arrest on sight any students still on campus. I was assigned to sweep the greenhouse with about 10 others and found four students still studying there. We shouted at them in informal speech, “All of you, come out.” They replied, “We’re graduate students, just studying,” and showed us ID cards. But without any hesitation we kicked them with our boots and took them to our camp.

By the time we lay down to sleep in our tents, it was 4 am. After a brief rest on the cold ground, we woke up for morning physical training and searched the school again. At the main gate, I saw several detainees who had been dragged to the security office basement and beaten nearly to death.

K, I won’t claim I acted moderately or refrained from violence during the Gwangju Incident. I was no different from the others. But I write this now to reveal the truth. If the people were to demand punishment for my role, I would accept it. 

I swear before the heavens, however, that I never once fired a gun. Except for the key people who gave the orders, I believe all of us who went to Gwangju, whether soldiers or civilians, were victims. That’s why I write this. I’ve since taken off my uniform, but even today, when I meet fellow veterans who were there, none of us can speak of it to our children or friends. We carry it as a burden of shame.

Later that afternoon, word came that the situation in Gwangju was worsening. We were ordered to move. Even though we moved like well-trained machines, strictly following orders, complaints were building up among us. Discontent was growing between officers and enlisted men due to indecisive and inconsistent command. One battalion flew from Seongnam to Gwangju by helicopter, while the remaining troops moved to Cheongnyangni Station by vehicle. Watching our unit's vehicles disregard traffic lights and pedestrian crossings, I had the ominous feeling that a storm was coming. When we arrived at Cheongnyangni Station, a train was already waiting, and it felt surprisingly luxurious. Normally, when the unit traveled, it was by dirty, slow local trains, but this time – perhaps because of martial law or pure chance – it was as clean as a first-class express. As we rode to Gwangju, we joked among ourselves that we were being treated exceptionally well. The train, running express, made only one stop in Daejeon (to change locomotives) before continuing to Gwangju's new station, where we arrived at dawn. 

K, we didn’t know whether the ongoing demonstrations in Gwangju were led by students or were following orders from Kim Dae-jung. But one thing was certain: a storm was slowly rising in the southern city of Gwangju. The new station in Gwangju seemed no different than usual. The square in front of the station, empty in the early morning, was welcoming us with nothing but military trucks. As we boarded vehicles and drove through the city streets, we saw soldiers from the 7th Airborne Brigade stationed in pairs or threes, guarding key buildings. They waved at our vehicles with relief and excitement as reinforcements had arrived. Occasionally, we also saw personnel from the 31st Division on guard duty.

We arrived at the main field of Chosun University around 4 a.m. Tents had already been pitched during the day by the 31st Division. Each company was assigned one tent, and as we lay down, we fell into sleep like people who had dropped dead. We woke at 6 a.m. as usual, had breakfast, and were ordered to assemble in full combat gear for a show of force throughout the city. This meant personal rifles, bulletproof vests, helmets, gas masks, a single CS gas canister for riot control, bayonets, ammo belts, canteens—everything. 

After being confined to base for such a long time, undergoing intense loyalty drills, and having barely slept in recent days, this unit was already steeped in hostility toward students and civilians. Even though we had not participated in the Busan-Masan incident before the October 26 assassination, we felt pride in how other Special Forces units had forcefully suppressed it. So sending this heavily trained and emotionally primed unit to conduct a show-of-force march across Gwangju was, I believe, a serious misjudgment by the commanding officers.

We wore bulletproof helmets (reinforced plastic versions of standard steel helmets), special forces fatigues, (so-called ‘jump suits’ with camouflage resembling reservist uniforms), M16 rifles, ammo belts with 1 pouch and 4 magazines (each with 20 rounds), Special Forces-issued boots (with sharp lines, not given to other units) and carried riot batons that were about 60 cm long (often mistakenly believed to be metal or reinforced with steel, but were actually made of ash or birch, felled and carved in civilian workshops in early April before our unit moved from Gangwon Province to Gimpo; these were made when the trees were full of spring sap and thus became as hard as metal, with diameters of about 5–6 cm). The mesh visor attached to our helmets was made of wire and could be flipped up or removed if not needed. Though our gear was complex, it was much lighter and more mobile than the standard riot control equipment used by police. K, truthfully, even at that time, none of us expected the Gwangju incident to end in such tragedy or escalate into something so immense.

Around 10 a.m. on May 18 [SIC 19], we boarded about 100 vehicles—one per company—from the field at Chosun University. At the front was an APC, followed by the battalion commander’s vehicle. Inside the APC was a soldier from Gwangju familiar with the local roads to guide us. All personnel wore white gloves, held their rifles upright, and were under strict orders: no talking, no smiling, no joking. Our convoy drove past Chonnam National University’s main gate, then through Geumnam-ro, the intercity bus terminal, and stopped in front of the Asea Theater. That’s when a radio message came through: remove the berets and put on bulletproof helmets. We already knew from our training that this meant dismounting and preparing to suppress a demonstration. The convoy turned left at Yangdong Arcade and sped down Geumnam-ro, stopping in front of the Tourist Hotel. The street was scattered with stones, but there was no sign of protesters. We were told to stay in the vehicles because the demonstrators had already fled.

A few minutes passed—maybe two to four—when the command came: “Dismount.” To our ears, this order sounded like, “Ruthlessly beat any young man you find.” That moment, around 10:30 a.m. on May [19], marked the beginning of the tragedy on Geumnam-ro. As we got out of the vehicles, the demonstrators had already scattered. Fueled by a need to vent our anger and with no protesters in sight, we began searching nearby buildings—hotels, cafés, barbershops. I remember going with seven or eight others to search a small inn behind the Tourist Hotel, I think it was called Midojang. The metal front gate was locked. No matter how much we knocked, no one answered. One soldier climbed over the wall and opened the gate from inside, and as he did, several workers came out all at once, insisting no one else was there. 

Honestly, it would have been better if they had escaped through the back. But instead, someone shouted, “These sons of bitches have no fear!” and started kicking them with taekwondo moves—double kicks and such—while others began beating them with batons.

As I mentioned earlier, the riot baton was incredibly solid and heavy—so much so that even a light strike could break an arm if someone tried to block it with their wrist or forearm. In just two or three minutes, four or five hotel staff who had been wearing white dress shirts and bow ties were now sprawled across the cement floor, their clothes scattered and torn. We picked them up and lined four of them against the wall. Just then, the local area commander, a major, arrived. There was no distinction between officers and enlisted men when it came to beatings. The major ordered them to kneel, then kicked each of them in the face with the full force of his military boots.

Life was something terrifyingly fragile. Their faces were crushed, blood poured out, and their heads slammed hard against the cement wall from the impact of the boots. But no one fell unconscious. They remained upright, though their faces were disfigured beyond recognition—too brutal to look at. Meanwhile, two or three soldiers from our search group were checking each room and pulling out any young person they found, ordering them to line up outside. More than ten young men, in their twenties and thirties, gathered in a double-file line with terror on their faces. One man in his mid-thirties pleaded with us, saying he was on his honeymoon. But there was no room for conversation with us. It didn’t matter. Beatings were indiscriminate, and arrest was the only outcome. The bride came out in tears, begging for mercy, but there was neither compassion nor hesitation. Once a civilian was caught, the first thing that happened was a beating—supposedly to prevent escape, or to “crush their spirit.” The next step was always to strip them to their underwear. Their hands were then tied behind their backs using their own belts. With their stripped-off clothes in their bound hands, they were dragged to the side of the truck we had arrived in. There, they were grouped with others—thirty to forty people at a time—in the middle of Geumnam-ro street, and forced to lie down on their backs, then on their stomachs, then roll left, roll right—harsh physical punishment meant to humiliate and break them down. After that, they were lined up in double-file behind the truck. Then came the hardest part—boarding the truck while their hands were still tied. With their hands tied behind their backs, they had to climb onto trucks so high that even an ordinary adult would have struggled to board them. The detainees behind would shove and hoist the person ahead upward by the head and body, while the person boarding scrambled desperately onto the truck. It was a terrifying ordeal—so brutal it pushed the limits of human endurance. Once inside the truck, two or three communication soldiers were waiting. They ordered, “Keep your heads down, heads down.” The reason was simple: if detainees looked at each other, they might regain courage—or realize there were only a few of us Special Forces soldiers—and they might resist as a group or try to escape. If anyone dared lift their head or glance at another person, they would be struck hard across the back with a club by a soldier positioned above. The truck would then take them to the sports field at Chosun University. But the suffering didn’t end there. As soon as the truck honked and arrived at the parade ground, administrative clerks, kitchen staff, and security personnel who had stayed behind gathered, each wielding a riot baton, ready and waiting. And then, taken from the truck, they were made to line up again, and the punishment drills and beatings began anew. The beatings were so brutal they could not be put into words. Then we were detained in the gymnasium building.

At both the front and back doors, 4 to 5 guards were stationed, and inside, another 4 to 5 men would beat them again. After a brief wait, they were sent to the 31st Division at Sangmudae [a military base on the city's outskirts]. Whether they had participated in the protests or not, they were dragged away simply for being young. Once caught, we were subjected to extreme beatings and punishment drills three to four times — the ordeal was so intense it went beyond human limits, a suffering unbearable for any human being.

After finishing the roundup at Midojang Inn, I entered a building whose name I cannot remember well, but which had a wedding hall on the second and third floors. We searched under the chairs in the restroom and banquet hall, but there were no young people there. Whenever we moved around or entered buildings, we always went in groups of two or three. This was to prevent someone from wandering off alone and instead suffering harm himself.

When we failed to find anyone in the wedding hall, Lance Corporal Lee became enraged. Since we had not found anyone in the wedding hall, he took a female employee with him and went back into the bridal dressing room. Like a madman, he smashed dozens of cosmetics with his riot baton. After that, leaving another person behind smashing the plate glass with a riot baton, I came back out onto Geumnam-ro street, where they were saying we were withdrawing and ordering us to board the vehicles.

At around 12 o’clock we arrived once again at the athletic field of Chosun University, unloaded our gear, and were almost finished eating lunch when a siren sounded. It was the signal for an emergency assembly. When we returned again to Geumnam-ro, two privately owned vehicles with South Gyeongsang license plates and two bicycles were burning all at once, and the crowd that had been demonstrating up until then scattered in panic at the sight of us chasing them with armored vehicles and at the double-time march.

Up until that point we had been full of courage and confidence. We were filled with the simple mentality of soldiers — the foolish thinking that “if you beat them, they will be suppressed,” and “Koreans have to be beaten.” The crowds on Geumnam-ro, trembling with rage because of the merciless beatings that morning, would flee whenever we advanced just a few steps toward them. From this point onward began the suppression method of chasing, pushing, and being pushed back.

While we blocked the road across the center of Geumnam-ro and stood guard, the demonstrators kept throwing stones and slowly approached us. Even though stones were thrown at us, we did not budge and simply stood there holding our riot batons, and the demonstrators seemed quite frightened by this. Some of my comrades stood motionless even after being struck by stones on their bodies, while in some cases stones struck the wire mesh covering their faces and shattered it. 

After standing there for 30–40 minutes, the demonstrators began shielding themselves with public telephone booths and the like while pushing forward until they came within 20–30 meters directly in front of us. Then, when the regional unit commander shouted from right behind us, “Charge forward!”, we ran with all our strength. At such times, even though stones came flying from the demonstrators like rain, we neither dodged nor feared them and chased them to the end. And when we struck them from behind with riot batons, most would collapse. Then we would trample mainly on the legs of those who had fallen with our military boots. That way they could not run away and would lose any sign of resistance. Then once again we stripped off their clothes, tied their hands behind them with belts, formed groups of two or three, loaded 20–30 at a time onto vehicles, and subjected them again to severe beatings and punishment. I think it was at this time that the stories arose saying, “They stripped women naked and hauled them away.” Because restrictions on long hair had already been abolished, when people looked down from buildings and saw long-haired individuals wearing only underpants, with heads bowed, boarding vehicles, even I, if I had been an ordinary citizen, would certainly have thought the same thing.

K, by continuing the arrests and beatings in this manner, many young people who were completely innocent and simply passing by suffered harm. Also, I think that the demonstrators who had actually been protesting in an organized way were probably not arrested very often. Up to that point buses and taxis had still been operating fairly well, though there were places where traffic was partially blocked.

However, from then on there was a noticeably large increase in ordinary citizens joining in. Wearing motorcycle helmets, they threw many stones at us, aiming for our legs whenever we chased them. But we paid no attention. We chased them to the very end, even into the alleys. Into houses or bathrooms, wherever they went.

At that time (around 4 p.m. on May [19]), I chased two demonstrators on Geumnam-ro, and they turned into an alley and fled into some shabby house. I was at the very front, with three or four of our men following behind me, and when we reached the house they had fled into, they had already hidden themselves and disappeared. Still wearing my military boots, I entered the inner room, where there were three people: an elderly grandmother, an older woman who seemed to be her daughter, and another woman.

“Where did the two young bastards go?”

“We don’t know.”

“They didn’t come here.”

So I said, “If you’re lying, you’ll die,” and terrified, they pointed toward the toilet outside. As I approached with another member searching around the house in order to check the toilet, the toilet door suddenly burst open and the two demonstrators started running into the alley again. “Catch those bastards!” I shouted as I chased after them and threw the riot baton I was carrying. It struck one in the back of the head, and he collapsed, unable to run away. Blood kept flowing from his head. The other demonstrator was caught by the rest of our men, who continued chasing him. Had his hold on life not been exceptionally tenacious, he would already have died....

When we returned again to the Chosun University drill field, Captain Yun, the company commander, told me to assemble the company. Not understanding why, I asked what was going on, but he became angry, saying, “I said assemble them!”   

To the assembled troops he said that we were not beating them hard enough and ordered us to beat them more harshly and mercilessly. Then he called out Private Lee (this soldier was from Gangwon Province, a very innocent private who knew nothing of the realities of the military). Saying that this soldier was not beating people at all, he shouted, “Get down!” and then struck him ten times on the buttocks with the riot baton he himself was carrying. I still cannot forget the expression on his face in pain. I hated the company commander to death for beating his own subordinate even all the way down in distant Gwangju. And my hatred toward the demonstrators only grew stronger.

It was here that the rumor first began spreading among the demonstrators, around 6:00 p.m. on the [19]th, that “they selected only Gyeongsang-do soldiers and sent them here to wipe out the Jeolla-do people.” In fact, there was no military unit in the entire armed forces composed only of Gyeongsang-do men, and even at the time of the incident there were many troops from all over the country, especially from Jeollanam-do and Gyeongsangnam-do. The units were absolutely not organized by selecting only men from Gyeongsang-do. As you know well yourself, K, I too was from Jeollanam-do, and there were many soldiers from Jeolla Province.

Even now, I think that on the afternoon of the 18th, while suppressing demonstrators on Geumnam-ro, there were soldiers shouting and yelling in Gyeongsang-do dialect, and that this was why people mistakenly thought they were all Gyeongsang-do soldiers. It was an exhausting and difficult day, and looking back now, a cruel one. But at the time, to us immature young men, it felt like something to be proud of. When we gathered among ourselves, we would boast proudly about where and how we had beaten people, or how bravely we had fought somewhere. K, I was no exception.

That afternoon (the [19]th), the Jeonnam-Jeonbuk Martial Law Subcommand announced by broadcast that a curfew would be imposed throughout Gwangju from 9 p.m. until 4 a.m., but it was useless. Around 8 p.m. that night, our regional unit, with about 70 to 80 men, encountered demonstrators in front of the intercity bus terminal, and there broke out the kind of hand-to-hand fighting I had previously only heard about. Up until that point, I had not seen with my own eyes any soldier draw a bayonet or fix one onto an M16 rifle. In front of the public terminal it was a terrible and terrifying battle against determined demonstrators. The demonstrators held wooden clubs, stones, and bricks in their hands, while we held riot batons. But even so many citizens could not overcome us, who were well trained. Of course, on our side as well there were seven or eight lightly wounded men, but the demonstrators all fled, leaving behind about ten injured people who had failed to escape in time. We again beat and stomped those injured demonstrators with riot batons before withdrawing once more to the front of the Geumnam-ro Tourist Hotel.

Although there were more than 2,000 men from the 7th Airborne Brigade’s two battalions, the 11th Airborne Brigade, and other units, because they were scattered throughout the entire city of Gwangju carrying out suppression operations, there seemed to be far too few troops, and there was also the sense that they were quietly waiting for reinforcements.  

A little after 10 p.m., if not elsewhere then at least in front of Geumnam-ro, the demonstrations ceased. Around 11 p.m. we lay down on the ground around the buildings on Geumnam-ro to rest our exhausted bodies. Before long, we fell into a deep sleep. At dawn we assembled again and waited around Geumnam-ro for breakfast, but then orders came to withdraw once more to Chosun University. While withdrawing on foot, we were ordered to return to our original positions, and while moving back toward Geumnam-ro we again encountered demonstrators. That day was the 19th [SIC 20th], our second day after deployment.

Our harsh suppression methods were the same that day as well. The suppression operations were no different at all from the day before. That day, while I was walking along the sidewalk on Geumnam-ro, someone threw a flowerpot from the rooftop of a building toward my head. A huge flowerpot fell and shattered barely about 10 centimeters in front of me. When I looked up at the building, someone on the third floor quickly hid himself after throwing it. From that day onward buildings began pulling down their shutters and major shops started closing. That building too lowered its shutter, and I began kicking it and striking it mercilessly with my riot baton, trying to catch the citizen who had tried to smash me with the flowerpot. From inside the shutter I could hear the sound of glass shattering. Shortly afterward the shutter opened, and a man who seemed to be the caretaker opened the door. Two men were ordered to guard the building entrance, while three of us searched up to the third floor, where in a third-floor toilet we found four or five young people trembling violently. After giving them a barrage of blows with riot batons and loading them onto a vehicle for detention, we saw that the whole city of Gwangju was now overflowing with demonstrators, and little by little we too began to feel fear.

Without even eating breakfast, our eyes were bloodshot, exhaustion overwhelmed our entire bodies, and we were so tired that we could hardly remain standing even for a moment. From that day onward rumors began spreading that “they mixed hallucinogens into alcohol and made them drink it; that’s why their eyes were bloodshot.” There was absolutely no truth to the claim that alcohol mixed with hallucinogens had been given to us, and as can be seen from this account, the reason our eyes were bloodshot was that we had gone days without sleep. Around lunchtime that day we withdrew briefly to the Chosun University campus in order to eat. 

Before eating, I went toward the Chosun University gymnasium looking for a faucet to wash up, and inside the gymnasium there were hundreds of detainees wearing only underpants, kneeling with their heads bowed. Among them, one young man about twenty-three or twenty-four years old suddenly sprang to his feet and shouted furiously, “You sons of bitches, kill me then!” His entire body was covered in dragon tattoos. Then an NCO from brigade headquarters who had been serving as a guard said, “Fine, I’ll kill you,” and began striking his whole body with all his strength using a riot baton. The young man quickly could not endure the pain and collapsed again. When the NCO shouted, “Kneel!” the young man immediately obeyed and knelt down. The NCO then raised the baton with both hands and brought it down from above with all his strength, and the young man fell forward and soon became motionless. Besides him, there were another two or three people in the corner who were almost at the point of death.

I could not bear to watch that scene. Finishing the meal halfheartedly, we assembled again at Suchang Elementary School. There we received further instruction again. The contents were things like: “Never move around alone,” “Act in groups of two or three,” and “Continue to respond forcefully.” When we came out of the school, demonstrators had already gathered around the area and a stone-throwing battle had begun. We were not afraid of the stone-throwing at all. Even if stones hit our bodies they caused only minor injuries, and we wore bulletproof helmets on our heads.

The tear-gas grenades that each of us had carried — one round per person — had already all been used up on the first day, and because they were bothersome almost no one carried them anymore. Instead, we too used the method of throwing stones at the demonstrators. K, isn’t it absurd? Suppressing demonstrations with such primitive methods. But there was nothing else we could do. Up until that day the demonstrators still feared us, and whenever we surrounded and approached them even slightly, they fled desperately as if their lives depended on it. In front of Suchang Elementary School we drove back the demonstrators, then advanced again toward the area in front of Asea Theater, taking control of the road in a four-abreast horizontal formation.

In front of Asea Theater we again encountered demonstrators, and another clash broke out. After driving them back, we advanced again toward Gyerim-dong, when a signalman suddenly received an urgent radio message. It said that in front of Gwangju High School, the operations officer who had been directing troop deployments and demonstrations-control operations by APC armored vehicle radio had become isolated and surrounded together with the APC, and that we were to come quickly. Our team (nine men) ran there with all our strength, and then we heard the sound of an M16 rifle firing more than twenty rounds on automatic in succession. It was the first gunfire since our deployment to Gwangju.

(This gunfire occurred when a captain, the operations officer, was returning to Chosun University from the Gwangju High School area in an APC armored vehicle. After becoming surrounded by demonstrators and having the front windshield intensely smashed with stones, the terrified APC driver accelerated, but the APC jumped onto the sidewalk and struck a roadside tree. When the APC’s front collided with the sidewalk railing and became immobilized, the demonstrators collectively set fires underneath the APC and opened the hatch on top, throwing in Molotov cocktails. Those inside barely extinguished the flames with blankets and such, and when they faced the danger of suffocating from smoke, the operations officer exposed himself outside and fired warning shots with an M16. In the process, a high-school student was struck in the neck and became the first death from “gunfire.”)

[Note: This incident actually took place May 19; records state that a demonstrator was wounded but none were killed.]

When we arrived, cries of agony could be heard from an alley in front of a house, and inside the APC there were more than twenty boxes of live ammunition for guard duty, tear-gas grenades, and other items scattered about chaotically. Two or three soldiers inside looked terrified. A vehicle arrived and towed away the APC, and we took up positions at the rotary in front of Gwangju High School. Fortunately, from that point rain began to fall. There was nowhere to shelter from the rain, we were hungry and cold, and it felt as if everyone in the world was looking at us with eyes burning with hostility. K, try to imagine our condition. We waited there in the rain in front of Gwangju High School.

42 However, although there were no more demonstrations in that area, demonstrations continued elsewhere. That day as well the curfew was supposedly to begin at 9 p.m., but even then demonstrations were still continuing in other places. After 9 p.m. that night, operations began to detain curfew violators.

I formed a team with two sergeants, three men in all, and while we were conducting inspections a vehicle arrived. When we stopped and checked it, it turned out to be a 31st Division vehicle already transporting weapons from the outskirts of Gwangju and various government offices to the 31st Division. Shortly afterward, a motorcycle came speeding through the rain at a frightening pace from the direction of Sinyeok. One sergeant from our team stepped forward and raised his hand to stop it, but the rider accelerated even more in an attempt to flee, struck the sergeant, and then crashed himself not far away. The sergeant fell unconscious, and I chased after the rider and mercilessly beat the now-injured man with a riot baton. We pounded on the door of a nearby hospital and had him treated and examined through the night, and fortunately they said that aside from a slight leg injury there was nothing seriously wrong with him. But K, the man we had beaten escaped from the hospital at dawn. He left only the motorcycle and his identification behind. If he had not been utterly terrified, would he have fled in that injured condition? Suddenly I began to wonder why we — no, why I — was acting this way.

The rain was still drizzling that morning. As I sat on the hospital stairs enduring the exhaustion throughout my body and my hunger, the three days I had spent in Gwangju up to that point passed through my mind like a panorama. I wanted to see my aged mother, who lived only thirty minutes away by bus, and eat a delicious breakfast of white rice and doenjang soup. I wanted to collapse in a warm room and sleep deeply. Everything in my thoughts was rushing back toward home. How long was this situation going to continue, and how was it ever going to end? At that time all 800,000 citizens of Gwangju regarded us as enemies, even small shops did not want to sell us cigarettes, and because we were suppressing demonstrations while surviving only on bread and constantly running around, our bodies had become utterly drained and exhausted. We were supposed to eat at Chosun University, but from the [20]th onward vehicles could no longer travel because of the demonstrators.

That morning (the 20th [It does seem the following events all took place May 20]), while we were making do with bread for breakfast, orders came over the radio. We were told absolutely not to beat the demonstrators, but only urge them to go home, and also to tell the citizens that “North Korean Communist forces are now standing by preparing to invade the South, and intelligence has been received that a special 8th Corps is planning to land by warship at Mokpo and advance on Gwangju.” When we once again went out on foot to Chungjang-ro, an enormous demonstration had begun again. Overhead, a 500MD helicopter carrying the brigade commander checked the situation of the demonstrations, and whenever he ordered us to move to some location because demonstrators were gathered there, by the time we ran there a massive demonstration was already underway.

The method of suppressing demonstrations in the city had no concrete plan or system whatsoever; it was an old-fashioned method in which, depending on the situation at the moment, if we were told there were demonstrators somewhere we chased after them, and when they dispersed we rested briefly at that location until being told to move out again to some other place.

On Chungjang-ro we shouted to the demonstrators, “The troops who beat and brutalized you until yesterday were replaced overnight — we are new troops,” while urging them to go home and telling them about the current situation regarding the North Korean Communist forces. But people shouted back, “Don’t lie!” “You murderous bats are the same ones who’ve been here from the beginning!” “You’re from unit ○○○, aren’t you?” “Two people died in front of the public terminal yesterday!” Countless rumors and facts alike flew about, and far from going home, the demonstrators, seeing how restrained we had become, approached and surrounded us from alleys on all sides, putting us in a dangerous position. When we tried to push them back with riot-control batons from one side, the demonstrators were already armed with clubs and wooden staves, and some citizens even carried baseball bats and iron pipes. There a terrifying clash began with the young demonstrators. Although it lasted only about two or three minutes, it felt like several hours. I too was struck on the waist and shoulders with wooden clubs and found it difficult even to walk.

Though the clash between us and the demonstrators was brief, many on both sides were injured. And during the fighting there, seven or eight demonstrators who failed to escape and were captured could not get away from us and were beaten so miserably with riot batons that they could not get back up.

It was already impossible to persuade the citizens calmly with words. Perhaps if things had been handled calmly and through persuasion from the beginning it might have been different, but for us suddenly to change overnight and try to suppress things gently was, even in our own minds, absurd. We too had now become afraid whenever we clashed with the demonstrators. And because we wanted to survive, we became even more vicious, and when colliding with large numbers of demonstrators, cases increasingly occurred in which people were struck indiscriminately anywhere — even on the head — with riot batons. The demonstrations now seemed endless. And we too had become utterly exhausted. It was completely different from when we had first gone out to suppress the protests.

As we continued pushing back the demonstrators, we came as far as the Provincial Office on Geumnam-ro, where fortunately there were police forces behind us. If the police had pushed the demonstrators toward us, the crowd might have scattered, but instead the police were driven backward, with the result that they opened the way for the demonstrators. One of our men called over a police officer, and an older policeman (a superintendent) came over. Even now I sympathize with the feelings of that elderly superintendent, who could say nothing as the regional unit commander cursed at him — calling him “this bastard” and “that bastard” — in front of the policemen under his command.

By lunchtime the demonstrations only continued to grow larger. Chants and songs such as “Pig ○, step down!”, “Tear ○○○ to pieces!”, “Martial law troops, withdraw!”, and the national anthem seemed to shake heaven and earth.

K, it was agonizing. And I wanted to leave Gwangju. All 800,000 citizens shouted that we were men who deserved to die. But we could not even continue eating properly, and now, in order to survive, we had to oppose the citizens as a means of self-preservation.

In front of the Provincial Office we could no longer actively push back the citizens; instead we had become reduced to merely standing there and watching the demonstrations. The police had already collapsed. The older policemen showed no aggressiveness in suppressing the demonstrations. Moreover, they were heavily burdened with riot batons, shields, and other equipment, so they could not move quickly. In a way, the police reaction was only natural.

At around 2 p.m., suddenly countless vehicles came racing down Geumnam-ro at terrifying speed with their headlights on and horns blaring. We had no way to stop them. We had no tear gas left. We had no choice but to block the vehicles with our own bodies. Fortunately, the police still had tear gas, and when they threw it we began hurling our riot batons at the front windshields of the cars. From the beginning we had not worn gas masks because they felt suffocating. Even the smell of tear gas had become bearable. As all our men stood motionless in front of the advancing vehicles, the more mild-mannered citizens could not bring themselves to run us over, and so they stopped their cars.

Another fierce struggle unfolded there. Citizens continued to suffer injuries in large numbers, but injuries also began occurring among us as well. There was hardly a single member of the unit who had not been struck somewhere on his body.

Trying to suppress the demonstrations with a little over 2,000 Special Forces troops and police forces mobilized from Jeollanam-do was hopeless from the start. No — even if hundreds of thousands of troops had come to Gwangju, they would not have been able to calm the fury of the citizens. The anger of the citizens had grown too great. Demonstrators now included everyone, young and old, men and women alike. In their hands they carried anything that could serve as a weapon. In a sense it was only natural. The citizens had been horrified by the beatings we inflicted from the beginning, so it was inevitable.

By evening the demonstrations had spread across the entire city. They would sing the national anthem, and when it ended they shouted, “Martial law troops, withdraw!” By then the demonstrations had grown so enormous that withdrawal seemed unavoidable. It felt as if the huge wave called “the citizens” was about to overwhelm the tiny boat called “the martial law forces.” Even then, however, it seemed that in Seoul they had absolutely no understanding of the seriousness of the situation. It seemed they thought only of their own interests and desires, unaware of the desperate condition of their subordinates, who were starving and on the verge of collapse before the demonstrators. Commanders began requesting reinforcements and recommending withdrawal over the radio. But as far as I know even now, no withdrawal order appears to have been given.

However, it seemed they had decided to withdraw temporarily to Chosun University. An order was given that “all troops are to board the vehicles waiting on Geumnam-ro,” and as we slowly withdrew toward Chosun University, thunderous applause erupted from the citizens. There was not a single person — young or old, man or woman — who was not clapping, and they were that delighted.

By chance, the vehicle I boarded was following at the very rear. Countless citizens, including what appeared to be young high-school students, followed behind the truck, handing cigarettes up to us sitting on top and shouting “Long live the martial law troops!” as they continued following us. At that moment the morale of the officers and men fell sharply. It felt as though we were retreating as a defeated army, and it was shameful as well. That was how it felt at the time.

But, K, that too turned out to be a mistake. We reached the front of Chosun University and sent away only the vehicles, then dismounted in order to reenter the city. At that moment two fire engines seized from the fire department came racing straight toward our men at terrifying speed with their sirens blaring. The battalion commander shouted for everyone to get out of the way, and the fire trucks simply sped past us. Fortunately everyone avoided them safely, and there were no casualties. Throughout the city, black smoke and flames lit the streets as brightly as daytime. At that point orders came directing us to move in front of the MBC broadcasting station, because the Munhwa Broadcasting station building and the tax office were said to be burning. By the time we ran to the broadcasting station, the building was already engulfed in flames. We heard that demonstrators had thrown Molotov cocktails at it, but when it failed to catch fire they set a taxi on fire and pushed it into the building to ignite it. Nearby, at the Goldstar Center, several people busily carried out electronic goods. Fortunately, APC armored vehicles were at that time attached to our regional unit. (There were two of these armored vehicles; our unit did not possess them originally, and they had been temporarily detached from the 31st Division.) These APCs became a great source of strength for us. Conversely, they were an object of fear for the demonstrators. They could collide with any vehicle without damage and could charge directly into the demonstrators.

As we faced off with the demonstrators in front of the broadcasting station, an order came saying that police officers had been surrounded in front of the tax office and were in danger, and that we were to come quickly. When we ran there, four or five hundred policemen were fleeing in our direction. The demonstrators were pursuing them, and when we advanced and charged forward, the demonstrators in front tried to turn and retreat, but those behind them did not know what was happening at the front, and so fierce fighting broke out between the two sides.

Even the fleeing police joined forces with us, and the area in front of the tax office literally became a “sea of blood.” The demonstrators were filled with rage, and we fought back against them. From this point on, for the first time I saw our men carrying bayonets in one hand and riot batons in the other.    

The demonstrators were also armed with knives, sickles, steel pipes, and the like. They had painted the areas around their eyes, noses, and mouths white with toothpaste and fought a terrifying close battle with us. Before we knew it, the protest had changed into the aspect of hand-to-hand combat on a battlefield. Our unit also suffered a continuous stream of wounded, but conditions did not permit moving the wounded to hospitals, so only emergency treatment was administered at the Sangmugwan [martial arts athletic hall] in front of the Provincial Office. Up to that point, I did not see any dangerously wounded people with my own eyes. However, among the demonstrators, it could be seen that there were seriously wounded or dead people lying on the dark road. But the demonstrators quickly carried them off somewhere.

When we advanced again toward the Munhwa Broadcasting station, demonstrators riding in one Gwangju Express bus charged straight at us, so an armored vehicle rammed into it, causing a collision. The bus jumped onto the sidewalk and smashed into a building shutter, entering into the building itself. When the bus came to a stop, our group surrounded it and a merciless beating of the demonstrators began. Some officer or enlisted man began stabbing with a bayonet. There were personnel whose white gloves became red with blood. A little later, another bus charged toward us. This time, we picked up stones that had been thrown by the demonstrators and hurled them all together at the driver’s seat. All the windows of the vehicle shattered, the vehicle stopped, and once again......

Inside the express bus were the driver and a female attendant. They said they had come down from Seoul and that the demonstrators had hijacked the vehicle and forced them to carry the demonstrators to this place, so we told them to go. But this vehicle was again hijacked by the demonstrators in front of the tax office, and it pushed through the police blockade. Two riot policemen tried to evade it, but while attempting to escape toward the front wall of the tax office, the vehicle charged forward and struck them in the front part of their bodies, killing them instantly at the scene.

They were the first casualties among the military and police that I personally witnessed.

Advancing again toward the Munhwa Broadcasting station to suppress the demonstration, when we approached, the demonstrators no longer retreated backward. There seemed to be no end to the demonstrators. At that moment, the operations officer riding in the armored vehicle ordered, “Load live ammunition into the caliber .50 machine gun.” When the soldier driving the armored vehicle loaded the live rounds, he suddenly pointed the gun barrel toward the sky and opened fire into the air.

The sound of gunfire in the night sky was like the sound of artillery being fired. Reverberating between the buildings, it was enormously loud, completely unlike the gunfire heard in the field. The demonstrators who had scattered for a moment immediately began gathering again. The method of suppressing the demonstration was for us to pick up and throw back the stones thrown by the demonstrators.

Exhausted beyond measure, whenever we had even a brief moment, we collapsed onto the ground. We were in a state where it was difficult even to remain standing for a moment. From this time onward, the commanders began tearfully requesting over the radio to higher headquarters, “Please give the order to open fire.”

“We submitted countless requests saying, ‘All my subordinates are going to die,’ but they were ignored, and instead only the order to ‘hold the line’ was issued.

We were told, ‘Withdraw to the front of the Provincial Office,’ so we abandoned the Munhwa Broadcasting station and withdrew to the front of the Provincial Office. In the end, the result was that only the Provincial Office was being defended.

The endless demonstrators, bodies exhausted to the limit, hunger, lack of sleep, the shouts of the crowds, burning vehicles and buildings — everything around us was literally hell itself.

While we were standing guard in front of the tax office to prevent the demonstrators from advancing, suddenly the sound of a high-powered microphone began echoing from the front.

‘Citizens of Gwangju, let us all tear those bastards of Unit ㅇㅇㅇ to pieces!’

‘Murderous ㅇㅇㅇ, withdraw!’

‘ㅇㅇㅇ, bring my child back alive!’

To the citizens beneath the night sky, this woman’s voice was enough to send chills through the body, making them feel sorrow, resentment, and rage with their entire being. Her voice was also so beautiful that at first I thought perhaps a female announcer from the burned Munhwa Broadcasting station was angrily making propaganda broadcasts, and many comrades thought the same thing as I did.

‘Police officers, police officers, aren’t you the staff of the people? And aren’t you people of Jeolla Province as well? Let us join together with you police officers and tear all those bastards of Unit ㅇㅇㅇ to pieces.’

It was propaganda broadcasting that deeply moved the heart. So both our personnel and our commanders persistently pursued the idea of sniping and killing that woman, but because she was surrounded by demonstrators, it was impossible to shoot her before dispersing the crowd. And it seemed that woman was moving in that direction while saying, ‘Let’s go to Shinyeok’ [the new train station].

We who had been guarding the front of the tax office pulled back, and the police instead blocked the front line. We went to the front of Sangmugwan for a brief rest. There, with police officers’ equipment, wounded military and police personnel, completely wrecked vehicles, and everything else, it was literally hell. The two riot policemen who had died earlier were still lying there on the sidewalk in front of the Sangmu building wrapped in blankets.

I tried to rest inside Sangmugwan, but because it was filled with riot police and large amounts of equipment, there was not even a place to sit, so I came back outside. But outside too was crowded with people, leaving nowhere suitable to sit. Fortunately, beside the two corpses there was a bit of space, so I lay down beside the bodies. They were unfamiliar corpses, but I felt no fear or disgust whatsoever.

My only wish was simply to lie down and get some sleep.

Lying there and looking up at the night sky, the stars were twinkling brightly, and the smell of tear gas, the droning sound of fire engines, the shouts of the demonstrators, and especially the propaganda broadcasts of that woman named Jeon Ok-ju caused even us to fall into thoughts of our hometowns. I also came to regret that we had treated the citizens of Gwangju with such merciless brutality up to that point.

At the sound of the propaganda broadcasts, I too wanted to leave this place and go home. I did not know for whom or for what reason I had to do this in my own hometown.

When I closed my eyes, far from sleep coming, due to anxiety, nervousness, and longing for my father, my mind instead became clearer and clearer. Who could have predicted that after President Park was assassinated, such a terrifying situation would arise? During our school days, when one said ‘the President,’ we thought only of President Park, but now that such a horrifying situation had occurred, feelings of fear and dread began to dominate me. Sleep would not come, so I asked the comrade lying right beside me whether he had cigarettes, and he sat up saying he had bought some during the daytime. As we sat smoking, that comrade, the comrade beside him, and others — five of us in all — began talking about our feelings. Everyone was thinking exactly the same as I was. And none of us knew how this situation would end, and we believed that all of us soldiers, up to the rank of sergeant, would probably be punished.

Around 3 a.m., orders came for us to assemble because the Geumnam-ro side as seen from the Provincial Office was dangerous. There were enormous crowds of demonstrators. From that point onward, all we did was remain in confrontation; we could not even think about either active or passive suppression. We merely stood in threatening postures to prevent the demonstrators from approaching any further. Around 5 a.m., the police forces defended the line again and we began resting once more. When the police became exhausted, we took over; when we became exhausted, the police took over. That was how we passed the night.

[Part 2 will cover May 21-27.]

* * * * * * *

This account, though it confuses chronology and dates for May 19-20 somewhat, is useful in explaining the training the paratroopers received after the 12.12 coup, and the equipment they took with them when they deployed. We are also given more of a sense of the involvement of the 31st Division (who were guarding posts the morning of May 19, and had set up tents for the 11th Brigade).

He describes beatings at Chosun University on May 19 that he did not see himself but instead witnessed the next day. He also says they took 80 rounds with them on May 19, which is different from the 3rd Brigade, who carried empty weapons into the city the next day (except for officers armed with side arms). 

As he did not see any women being stripped, he considers it a ‘rumor’ that possibly derived from men with long hair who had been stripped to their underwear seen from above (and behind). The record shows, however, that some women were indeed stripped to their underwear when taken prisoner.

As I noted in the last post, it's hard not to notice the difference in (apologetic) tone between this author (and Lee Gyeong-nam) of the 11th Brigade, who carried out beatings of innocent citizens and were present at the mass shooting at the Provincial Office, and that of 3rd Brigade veterans who arrived once the uprising was in full swing and were not present at the Provincial Office. As this author put it,

I’ve since taken off my uniform, but even today, when I meet fellow veterans who were there, none of us can speak of it to our children or friends. We carry it as a burden of shame.

Friday, May 22, 2026

The 1980 Gwangju Uprising: An Account by a 3rd Brigade Paratrooper

Following Monday's post sharing a translation of an account of 5.18 written by a paratrooper from the Special Warfare Command 11th Brigade, here is an account written by paratrooper from the SWC 3rd Brigade. 

According to a veteran of this brigade I've met who served in Gwangju (he was drafted as punishment for his student protest activities), the 3rd Brigade was considered among the best of the SWC brigades, and was involved in the suppression of the Busan protests of October 1979. Due to their reputation and experience, they were stationed in Seoul when martial law was expanded on May 17, 1980, and only arrived in Gwangju on May 20, the third day of the uprising, by which point the protests had grown large and combative to the point that, as the veteran put it, “They were driving cars at us! It was like everyone had lost their minds.” 

I first found this account at this blog (and it should be here, but for some reason isn't). The original source is:

3공수여단 12대대 작전병 출신의 실명수기-『내가 겪은 광주사태』 『전투는 있었지만 학살은 없었다』 / 김치년 (월간조선, 1996. 04)  pp. 422-443  

“Memoir Under the Real Name of a Former Operations Soldier of the 12th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Brigade — ‘The Gwangju Incident I Experienced’ / ‘There Was Combat, but There Was No Massacre,’” by Kim Chi-nyeon, Monthly Chosun, April 1996, pp. 422-443.

The article was written during the trial of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo in 1996.

*******

Experience in Suppressing the Busan-Masan Uprising

As someone who now finds himself labeled as a “subordinate of a murderer who committed treason,” I want to express, through writing, the perspective of a conscripted soldier in the martial law forces. Just as not all protesters were heroes, we who carried out our duties under martial law should not be seen as criminals. The current situation, where the causes of the incident have been interpreted only through a political lens, has left many of us paratroopers unconvinced. The soldiers deployed on-site had no political affiliations and often made sacrifices under the burdens of duty. So why must we be treated as if we were guilty?

Now that even former presidents have been arrested, and with public sentiment empowered as it is, who will step forward to testify on our behalf? Many of those who served in our 3rd Airborne Brigade have stayed silent because they remain in the military or fear losing their livelihoods after discharge. I was once among the latter. After starting a business, I eventually went bankrupt, crushed by the very system of the Fifth Republic.

However, bankruptcy ironically gave me a sense of relief. I felt someone had to honestly recount the things we endured and shed blood doing back then. I now believe this is part of fulfilling that duty. I hope other special forces veterans who remember those days will also continue to speak out.

Above all, I believe it is important to clearly understand the origin of the Gwangju Uprising. From the perspective of a martial law soldier, our views on the protesters were largely shaped by the Bu-Ma Uprising (Busan-Masan, 1979). The 3rd Brigade, which I belonged to, along with the 5th Brigade, participated in the suppression of the Bu-Ma protests on October 18, 1979. From our point of view, it was a successful operation.

But it is noteworthy that the 3rd and 5th Brigades, who had that suppression experience, were not initially deployed to Gwangju. The 7th Brigade, which had no prior experience, applied excessive force by superficially imitating the tactics of the 3rd and 5th Brigades, worsening the situation instead. There was a significant difference between the units.

The 3rd Airborne Brigade was airlifted from Seongnam Airfield to Busan aboard C-123 aircraft. We were issued our precise operational orders inside the plane. Our commander gave a brief instruction: "A very serious demonstration is taking place in Busan, so we are to carry out the loyalty operation exactly as trained.”

Upon arrival in Busan, we pitched tents for quarters at the Dong-A University stadium and began preparations for a show-of-force operation. Our gear consisted only of rifles, 70 cm batons, cumbersome protective netting, and gas masks. We rode in 2.5-ton military trucks wearing white gloves and drove through the corners of the city. This display alone was enough to impress the authority of the airborne troops on citizens. Though some demonstrators threw stones at our vehicles, we simply stared forward and completed our three-hour city tour, after which we returned to base and ate dinner.

Soon after, we were deployed near Busan City Hall, where the brigade commander (then Brigadier General Choi Se-chang) issued a very strict order: "Do not respond to anything without command." As we held our positions, the number of protesters gradually decreased after 8 p.m.

Around 9 p.m., when only 300–400 demonstrators remained, an order to suppress the protest was finally given. The operation ended in just 20–30 minutes. I cannot confidently say that the baton blows we delivered were less severe than what the 7th Brigade used in Gwangju. If suppression was unavoidable, it had to be done decisively. Whether strong or weak, the difference could not be controlled. Yet, the outcome was different from Gwangju. In Busan, there were sporadic protests, but they were suppressed smoothly. The two-day operation yielded effective results, and no further protests occurred.

From this, we can see the difference between the suppression of the Bu-Ma and Gwangju incidents.

First, during the Busan suppression, and likewise in the 5th Brigade’s operation in Masan, no operations were carried out during the daytime, minimizing clashes with civilians. Nighttime suppression targeting key demonstrator groups allowed for swift operations, and even if there was bloodshed from baton strikes, it wasn’t to the extent that it would provoke bystanders like in Gwangju. As such, the protest in Busan quickly collapsed.

Second, those arrested during the Bu-Ma incident were civilians and were immediately handed over to the police, which helped avoid direct conflict between civilians and the military. In Gwangju, there were hardly any police left to receive detainees.

In Gwangju, bloodshed occurred during daylight hours. This naturally enraged the entire citizenry. How could someone not become enraged when their child or friend bleeds before their very eyes?

I believe that Korean society at the time accepted both protesters and martial law troops as necessary evils. Protests needed to happen, and national security and public order had to be preserved. Therefore, to portray suppression as entirely wrong and protesters as absolute heroes is, I believe, unfair. If we now categorically deny the legitimacy of suppression based on the outcome alone, are soldiers like us not also citizens of the Republic of Korea?

My opinion is that the mishandling of the suppression by the martial law forces should have been judged in court. Likewise, the protesters also bore responsibility. If we continue to politicize the situation while ignoring both of these aspects, it may long remain a source of conflict within Korean society.

Meanwhile, after the Bu-Ma incident subsided, the 3rd Airborne Brigade, stationed in Seoul, was deployed to Gwangju on the early morning of May 20, 1980. At 1 a.m., five battalions assembled at Cheongnyangni Station and headed to Gwangju by train. By the time we departed, the 7th and 11th Brigades were already in operation there.

At 7:00 a.m., when we arrived at Gwangju Station, we saw some of the 7th Airborne troops sitting on the station square having breakfast. They looked extremely tired and worn out. Having already experienced the Bu-Ma Uprising, we felt sorry for them. In contrast, we looked relatively relaxed.

We immediately proceeded to Jeonnam National University, had a meal brought in from a nearby unit, and then prepared to move into the city. The 1,392 troops of the 3rd Airborne Brigade who participated gathered in the university auditorium (possibly a gymnasium), where they listened to a speech from Brigadier General Choi Se-chang.

He said: "The situation in Gwangju is much more serious than the Bu-Ma Uprising. No matter what crisis arises, do not respond without orders. Since communist agitators are joining in and worsening the situation, all commanders and soldiers must carry out the suppression operation with extreme caution. Except for CS gas (handheld tear gas) and E-8 launchers (64-round tear gas launchers), nothing else is to be used. Again, do not respond without direct orders."

When we first entered Jeonnam University, most of the slogans written around the campus were in red letters. The messages read: “Release Kim Dae-jung,” “Down with Chun Doo-hwan,” “Stop Exploiting Farmers,” and so on. The soldiers, including myself, believed this to be the work of “pro-communist elements.” These days, after 1987, even if red slogans or content aligned with North Korean propaganda appear on university campuses, people are desensitized—but back then, it wasn’t like that. National security was a top priority in the political atmosphere, so red slogans on campus were shocking to us. I believe the protestors were responsible for this. Even if they were protesting for Kim Dae-jung’s release, did they really need to use red paint? And why choose slogans like “Stop Exploiting Farmers,” which were sure to be misunderstood as pro-communist?

Among the slogans were names unfamiliar to low-ranking soldiers like myself. One of them was “Chun Doo-hwan.” At the time, we thought of him as merely a powerful figure in the military. We had no idea he was commanding our unit, nor could we imagine he was in our chain of command. This shows how distant Chun Doo-hwan actually was from us in reality. At the time, the only mindset we had as a special operations unit was, “I will never forgive pro-communist activities on the land I defend. I will protect my country.”

Let’s briefly look at the composition of our unit back then. The 12th Battalion of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, deployed to Gwangju, had about 50 officers and 250 enlisted soldiers. Among the officers, around four—including Battalion Commander Kim Wan-bae, the operations officer, and the headquarters company commander—were graduates of the Korea Military Academy. Around eight were ROTC graduates, and the rest were from the Army Cadet Academy. This suggests that few officers were familiar with university culture. Of the 250 enlisted soldiers, about 25 were warrant officers, 80 were sergeants, 120 were corporals, and only about 25 were regular privates. Most of the NCOs had only a high school education, and fewer than 10 had attended college (even two-year colleges).

On the first day, our unit finished eating and was then deployed near the Jeonnam Provincial Government building. The battalion's senior NCO, supply officer, operations NCO, and I stayed at the university to organize the battalion’s operational log. I also managed the “security-use live ammunition” that had become a major issue. Even then, as now, airborne units carry live rounds during training, either for anti-infiltration or security purposes, stored in ammunition boxes managed by the battalion HQ. These ammunition boxes still exist in airborne battalion HQs across the country. However, on May 20, those rounds were stored at HQ, not issued to individuals.

Thus, when we were first deployed, only the battalion commander carried a loaded pistol. The rest of the troops were equipped with unloaded rifles, bayonets, 70 cm batons, gas masks, two CS gas canisters, and steel helmet liners. Of these, the most cumbersome were the M-16 rifles and gas masks. The gas masks issued at the time were substandard, allowing tear gas to seep in rather than keeping it out.

At the battalion HQ set up in the university campus, I operated the P-77 radio and recorded the battalion’s operational situation. The 12th Battalion of the 3rd Airborne was stationed near Gwangju City Hall as a mobile strike force. Until about 3 p.m. that day, the situation was merely a standoff. According to updates from brigade HQ, the initial overreaction by the 7th Airborne troops had generated strong public resentment, making it hard to regain control. Moreover, rumors were already spreading throughout Gwangju—claims that only Gyeongsang-do soldiers had been deployed, or that paratroopers were raping married women, drinking alcohol, or taking drugs. These rumors, reportedly gathered by undercover police, were enough to incite intense public outrage.

The battalion commander, a Jeolla native, was so alarmed by these regionalist rumors that he ordered, “Place Gyeongsang-do soldiers at the rear of the formation so they don’t provoke Gwangju citizens.”

I, not being deployed to the frontline, heard these absurd rumors through the radio and scoffed. Seriously? We were raping married women? In a war-like situation, leaving formation to do such a thing would be a death sentence—what kind of lunatic would do that? Especially in a unit composed of teams of just 12 people, two officers and ten enlisted men, how could anyone pull that off?

Furthermore, during the most intense demonstrations that day, most of our troops couldn’t even eat dinner. The food truck had been blocked by protestors and returned without delivering meals. There was no way exhausted and hungry soldiers had access to drugs or alcohol.

I shook my head as I recorded these ridiculous rumors in the log. But even 16 years later, these absurd rumors are still widely believed. It’s disheartening. Worse, it seems that those spreading such claims think it makes them part of the “heroes of Gwangju.” It’s truly appalling.

Meanwhile, as I was sorting through the rumors, the situation room began receiving increasingly alarming reports:

The number of protestors is rapidly increasing.

The opposition is armed with sticks and metal pipes.

Minor injuries from rock-throwing are occurring frequently.

CS gas is completely depleted.

Requesting more E-8 tear gas launchers.

We must carry out at least minimal self-defense.

These reports were sent to brigade headquarters, and soon a new operational order was issued:

"Begin suppression operations under the concept of self-defense, but only against protestors who cross the blockade line."

However, the situation continued to deteriorate. Reports kept coming through the radio:

All tear gas has been depleted.

Injuries are rapidly increasing.

The number of protestors in our battalion's area is estimated to be about 5,000.

All units must regroup and not disperse.

Around 7 p.m. on May 20, our 12th Battalion received an order from the brigade commander to support the 15th Battalion of the 3rd Airborne at Gwangju Station and to protect the KBS Gwangju Broadcasting Station. We moved to Gwangju Station and joined the 15th Battalion. As dusk fell, reports began pouring in that our outnumbered unit was being pushed back. It felt like a nightmare. We were supposed to be the most elite unit in the Republic of Korea, having gone through intensive training and demonstrations. But the reality was that we were being overwhelmed. Communications grew increasingly grim:

Vehicles are charging toward us.

Around 8 p.m., reports of vehicle attacks came in one after another. Then, by about 10 p.m., reports of casualties arrived:

Casualties have occurred.

A staff sergeant from the 16th Battalion has been killed.

A soldier from our battalion was also run over and injured.

The soldier who was run over and killed at that time was Staff Sergeant Jeong Gwan-cheol (posthumously promoted to Sergeant First Class). He had been scheduled to be discharged in a month. Moreover, his wife was nine months pregnant. News of his death caused uncontrollable anger among the fellow NCOs.

About 20 minutes after we received the radio report of injuries, the wounded were evacuated. One of them was Sergeant Jang from the 6th company, whose leg had been crushed by a vehicle. According to him, a vehicle suddenly charged at them, and he couldn’t get out of the way in time. He said the vehicle drove erratically in a zigzag toward the troops, and as more soldiers were injured, the unit panicked and scattered, while the situation on the ground grew increasingly violent.

Two civilians were also transported alongside Sergeant Jang. They were the driver and assistant of a cargo truck with Gyeongsang Province license plates. They said they had been beaten by protestors at a gas station just for driving a Gyeongsang-tagged vehicle. They looked terrified. Both had their clothes torn and were covered in blood; one had his head wrapped in a bandage. Seeing their condition left me speechless.

Around this time, desperate voices from junior officers began coming through the radio:

We have no way to control the situation.

We’ve lost contact with the adjacent battalion.

Give us blank cartridges.

At the very least, give us live ammunition to stop the vehicles.

The urgency in their voices was unmistakable. All tear gas had already been used, and riot batons were proving ineffective. About 20 minutes later, brigade headquarters gave the order to use blank cartridges and live ammunition, with several conditions:

1. Only officers at the company commander level or above would be issued 30 rounds each. (Each airborne battalion has 16 companies, organized into 4 area companies with 4 companies each. These are referred to as “teams,” and the team leader is typically a captain.)

2. Live rounds could only be used to stop charging vehicles.

3. Absolutely no shooting at human targets.

4. Any use beyond warning or vehicle-stopping purposes would be strictly punished.

An official telegram with this directive was sent, and I, the operations soldier at the time, relayed it to subordinate units—I knew these details better than anyone.

Meanwhile, our battalion sent an ammunition box containing M-16 rounds, tracer rounds, and blank cartridges to our area of operation, accompanied by brigade personnel.

The live ammunition distributed from our unit was divided and sent to two locations. One batch went to the Sinan-dong underpass, where the 16th Battalion was facing off against protestors. Around 20 headquarters personnel and an intelligence officer delivered roughly 100 rounds of security-use live ammunition to them. The ammunition transport group, led by the brigade operations officer, headed toward Gwangju Station and encountered hundreds of protestors along the way.

The transport team struggled through resistance from the citizen militia to secure a path and eventually reached Gwangju Station, where the 12th and 15th Battalions were located. At this time, the 11th Battalion of the 3rd Airborne was surrounded by protestors near the empty lot of the Sintak Bank on Geumnam-ro. Under orders to regroup at Gwangju Station, they broke through the siege by firing tear gas and moved to join the 13th Battalion near Gwangju City Hall. Around 11:30 p.m., they finally reached the station.

At this point, a woman was driving around in a small Titan truck with loudspeakers, broadcasting propaganda. (I later learned her name was Jeon Ok-ju.) Her psychological warfare messages were relayed to me. Here’s what she was saying:

Two citizens have been killed at the Gwangju provincial office.

Citizens of Gwangju, rise up and drive out the ruthless airborne troops.

Another citizen has been killed near Gwangju Station.

They will never shoot at us.

Citizens of Gwangju, do not fear death—rise up!

As I was writing this report, I noticed the expressions on my fellow soldiers' faces—they were visibly shaken by the psychological warfare broadcast by the woman named Jeon Ok-ju. Her psychological operations were actually intimidating soldiers like us, who were trained in special warfare. My comrades unanimously insisted, “That woman is making the situation worse—we need to kill her.” One noncommissioned officer even said to Captain Son, the company commander at the time, “If you won’t shoot her, give me your gun. I’ll do it.” But in the end, no soldier opened fire on her.

Our unit regularly trained for operations targeting a region in North Korea. Our missions involved infiltration, psychological warfare, initiating protests, and broadcasting propaganda over loudspeakers or distributing leaflets—in short, we were trained for irregular warfare. Yet we were being psychologically outmaneuvered by a civilian militia’s propaganda. In my view, the Gwangju Uprising was a kind of irregular war between the citizen militia and the South Korean army. Ironically, soldiers trained in unconventional warfare were being outplayed by amateur citizen forces.

The first day of the 3rd Airborne Brigade’s operations in Gwangju—May 20—continued until dawn the next day. When we had arrived at Gwangju Station that morning, no one expected such a situation to unfold. Everyone seemed to be hoping it wasn’t real. After regrouping at the station and trying to disperse the protestors, our unit, along with the 31st Division's security troops* and 4 to 5 plainclothes police officers who had been guarding KBS, received orders around 2:00 a.m. on May 21 to retreat to Chonnam National University. Shortly after, we received word that the KBS Gwangju station was on fire.

To this day, I regret that the suppression at Gwangju Station is referred to as a "massacre." At the time, we had no idea how many civilians had been killed by gunfire. But if it had truly been a massacre or indiscriminate shooting, surely dozens, even hundreds, would have been killed or wounded. According to what I heard from my fellow soldiers that day, they had fired not at people but into the air as a warning.

In fact, a July 1995 report from the prosecution stated that four people were killed and six wounded by gunfire that night. One NCO from the 3rd Airborne Brigade had been killed after being run over by a vehicle, and several others were injured. If soldiers had deliberately fired with lethal intent after those injuries, why would the death toll have stopped at four? I still don't understand why we have been branded as murderers.

Some argue that it was wrong not to have assigned ordinary infantry units to suppress the Gwangju uprising. But I doubt whether they would have exercised the same restraint. Even in such an explosive situation, we did not engage in indiscriminate shooting. Why does no one see that as a reason the death toll remained at four?

I believe that in life, people sometimes find themselves on opposing sides unintentionally. Just as we didn’t volunteer to become suppression forces, the citizen militias likely didn’t volunteer to be in that position either. But it is truly regrettable that now, the act of suppression itself is being condemned unilaterally.

At the same time, the fear experienced by the paratroopers deployed on the ground that day was indescribable. When the soldiers returned to Chonnam National University after facing death all day, they all looked shell-shocked. The most terrifying thing for them was hearing someone yell, “A car is coming!” Anyone who has ever stood in front of a car zigzagging toward them knows that there is no soldier who can feel safe in that moment.

One mischievous NCO yelled “A car is coming!” to his exhausted comrades who had collapsed on the floor. Instantly, every single one of them sprang up and dove for cover, believing it was real. The prank ended with the joker being heavily scolded by his comrades. It might sound silly, but watching this scene gave me a strange feeling. It showed how all day long they had used every ounce of strength to stay alert and protect themselves from charging vehicles. For them, “vehicle attack” had become a kind of trauma.

At dawn on May 21, aside from a few security guards, most of us got some sleep in a lecture hall. Around 5:00 a.m., a siren sounded. It was a fire truck brought in by the protestors. They surrounded Chonnam National University looking furious, as if they would devour us. The sun was just beginning to rise. At that moment, gunfire was heard from the protestor side. Then came a telegram reporting that the citizen militia was now armed, followed by an order to issue 10 live rounds to every soldier in the battalion. The ammunition boxes stored on base began to be opened.

The protestors, armed with rifles, drove military jeeps while waving Taegeukgi flags, moving back and forth in front of the main gate. They wore masks, carried rifles on their shoulders, and fired warning shots into the air. They, too, couldn’t recklessly shoot at us. It was only then that I realized they were carrying carbines.

At this point, live ammunition was distributed to all ordinary battalion members for the first time, and the message was clear—it meant we now had permission to fire if necessary. From a distance, the protestors came in various appearances. Some even wore reservist uniforms. Back then, airborne troops wore uniforms very similar to those of reservists. Later, claims emerged of atrocities such as rape committed by airborne soldiers. I now wonder whether the victims might have mistaken reservists for airborne troops. I still vividly remember the protestors dressed in reservist gear at the university gates.

The morning of May 21—exactly one day after we had arrived in Gwangju—was spent entirely inside Chonnam National University. From 5:00 a.m., protestors gathered in front of the university gates with trucks, fire engines, buses, and even armored vehicles.

At the time, though we described the situation as a standoff, in reality, we were surrounded. The protestors had already raided an armory and armed themselves. Compared to the roughly 1,400 members of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, they had assembled a force several times larger.

Around noon that day (May 21), the protestors rammed vehicles into the university’s front gate and forced their way in. We had to retreat approximately 300 meters behind the gate, unable to hold our position. Outwardly, we were an imposing airborne force, but inwardly we felt we were on the verge of death. Until our retreat to Gwangju Prison around 2 p.m., we had to continue an intense exchange of tear gas with the protestors.

During that confrontation, when protestors charged us with armored vehicles and trucks, we had no choice but to open fire. This was the first instance of live fire by the 3rd Airborne Brigade at Chonnam University. The soldiers who stopped the vehicles pursued the fleeing protestors into residential areas and arrested them.

Later, I learned that after the shooting in front of the university’s gate, out of a crowd of about 40,000 protestors, three were killed by gunfire and three were wounded. Two of the arrested protestors who were sent to Gwangju Prison later died from blunt force trauma.

I don’t know what to say to those who died. In this situation, I can only say that everyone was a victim of tragedy. One of the deceased was later confirmed to be a woman who was eight months pregnant. A warning shot must have taken her life. But why was she in such a chaotic scene in that condition?

Even so, using her death to claim that “paratroopers shot a pregnant woman to death” is no different from exploiting the dead for propaganda. I believe none of the soldiers who fired that day knowingly aimed at her. Nevertheless, the media, politicians, and the majority of the public have come to portray all paratroopers as brutal killers.

Whenever I hear things like that, I, and many other paratroopers, feel completely demoralized. We’re supposed to throw ourselves into enemy territory in wartime—but should we still be expected to do so while being treated this way? Why did we endure such grueling training?

While we were confronting the citizen militia, we received a telegram stating that an attack on Gwangju Prison was underway and that many political offenders were imprisoned there, making it imperative to defend the facility. At the time, we had about 20 captured protestors. Most had been stripped of their shirts, and had labels like “driver” or “protestor” written on their backs in marker to classify them. A considerable number of them were people who had been captured after charging forward in vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

These protestors, along with some wounded and a small number of soldiers, were loaded onto vehicles and sent ahead to Gwangju Prison. The rest of us soon began marching on foot along the Honam Expressway. This was around 2 p.m. on May 21. The group that went by vehicle transported the detainees in a military truck.

There was something strange about this conflict from the beginning. For the protestors, we were clearly the enemy—but to us, the protestors didn’t feel like clear enemies. Aside from a few so-called “ringleaders,” we didn’t harbor hostility toward the protestors as a whole. And even the term “ringleader” was vague. Although we were surrounded and under psychological pressure at the provincial office and university gates, we refrained from indiscriminate fire. I think it’s because, deep down, we all held back from fully recognizing the protestors as “the enemy.”

When citizen militia members charged toward us waving Taegeukgi flags and singing the national anthem, how could we tell who the enemy was? That’s why we held our fire. But once the “ringleaders” were arrested, the anger we had been suppressing finally exploded. Of course, the people on the receiving end must have felt wronged—but we felt the same.

After leaving Chonnam University, we marched in double file along the Honam Expressway for about 30 minutes. Suddenly, someone shouted from the rear, “A truck is coming!” When we turned around, we saw two 2.5-ton military trucks speeding toward us while firing LMG-30 machine guns. Our troops, who had been marching on both sides of the highway, dove into the roadside ditches. None of us could return fire—it would have been like firing at our comrades across the road. The trucks took some fire from the lead troops but managed to escape unharmed.

We hurried to Gwangju Prison, and our battalion was deployed on the right side of the prison entrance, facing Gwangju city and adjacent to the expressway. Meanwhile, the neighboring 3rd Airborne 15th Battalion arrived at a gas station in front of the prison. While exchanging duties with the 31st Division, they were ambushed by two high-speed buses armed with carbines, and one of their troops was injured.

Shortly thereafter, a helicopter arrived, delivering rice and some ammunition, and evacuating the wounded. Soon after, members of the joint investigative unit arrived and took custody of the 20 or so captured protestors. Many of them were seriously injured.

One protestor who crawled out of an armored vehicle still reeked of alcohol and had “driver” written on his back. He had been severely beaten before being evacuated. The armored vehicle he was in remained parked in an open lot for some time.

Inside the armored vehicle I checked, there were a couple of rice balls, a bottle of soju, and a Taegeukgi (Korean flag). The young man inside, who looked to be in his twenties, was still drunk and shouting at the top of his lungs, screaming things like “Long live the Republic of Korea! Kill me, you bastards!” It was truly ironic—both sides were claiming to defend the Republic of Korea while turning the situation into a living hell.

At the time, the intelligence agents from the joint investigation team who arrested and interrogated them never revealed who incited these people or why. That remains a mystery for the martial law troops, including myself. The dominant explanation is that the citizens, outraged by excessive repression from day one, spontaneously rose up.

But those of us who were on the ground found it hard to fully accept that view. It’s difficult to believe that people would hijack an armored vehicle and charge at domestic troops—not foreign invaders—willing to die in the process. Moreover, not one of the captured vehicles lacked alcohol bottles, and none of the captured drivers ever clearly explained their motivations. This remains a puzzle to me.

Around 5 p.m., just as we finished setting up defensive positions at the prison, a jeep and a bus charged toward us. They were armed and opened fire, but no one in our unit was hit. Likely because we were trained to respond instantly and correctly to gunfire. After the brief firefight, the bus fled and the jeep, riddled with bullets, stopped on the highway. We didn’t move for 30 minutes.

When no one emerged from the vehicle, we approached it. Inside, we found two young men wrapped in the Korean flag, dead with guns in their hands. I don’t know if this was typical of every vehicle the militia used, but this jeep also contained bottles of soju, gimbap, rice balls, and ammunition magazines. The bodies were photographed by administrative soldiers and then wrapped in straw mats and moved to the area behind the prison. I suspect this may have sparked later rumors about mass graves near the prison.

During the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising, martial law troops photographed all the casualties during recovery. I accompanied those doing this work. After photos were taken, the bodies were temporarily buried, marked on a map, and labeled with signs. These remains were reportedly later exhumed after the uprising ended. I recall seeing a photo of a dead 11th Airborne Division soldier whose body had been horrifically mutilated by the militia. This wasn’t just a democratization movement—it was a war.

That night, we were provided with our first real meal: just one rice ball and some salted shrimp, but it tasted incredible. Up until then, our unit had only survived on emergency rations—compressed rice, wheat, and chocolate. Not long after eating, buses and military trucks once again charged toward the road in front of the prison’s open field. A firefight broke out as night fell.

That evening, in an area guarded by a neighboring unit, four civilians were hit by gunfire while riding in a pickup truck through an active firefight zone. Two of them died. Interestingly, they had been shot with carbines—meaning they were killed by militia fire. But you wouldn’t call this “massacring civilians by the militia.” In the same way, I don’t think it’s accurate to call every tragic event during the Gwangju Uprising a “massacre” by the Airborne Division. However, most of the investigations felt one-sided, and it seemed they were designed only to avoid upsetting public sentiment in Gwangju. How can that be a fair investigation?

That night, we remained in our individual foxholes without moving and continued to exchange fire five to six times until dawn on May 22.

On the morning of May 22, a tattered bus riddled with bullet holes stood alone in front of us. It had sandbags piled on both sides, acting like an improvised armored vehicle. Blood stains on the floor suggested wounded occupants had retreated.

If someone had been shot by an M-16 and died in a ditch while fleeing, people would say, “The Airborne troops killed someone and dumped the body in a ditch.” Or if the body had been buried hastily by comrades and later discovered, it would become “a secret burial site.”

I wonder what happened to those militia members who boarded that bus or truck and attacked the prison. We don’t know each other’s names or faces, but we were on opposite sides of the same event at the same time and place. I hope one day we can meet and confirm the facts.

Apparently, even the prosecution didn’t conduct such investigations. Even the Ministry of Defense hasn’t made efforts to support soldier morale or clarify the truth. I can only hope someone will one day set the record straight. In today’s climate of something like a people’s tribunal, saying this might get me lynched...

On the morning of May 22, our commanders received harsh criticism from higher-ups:

“You engaged in firefights all night and didn’t capture a single person—just wasted ammunition. How can you call yourselves an airborne unit?”

“From now on, only designate sniper companies and implement strict fire control.”

One thing I want to make clear: About half of us, including myself, never fired a single live round and returned our full 10-round allocation when we withdrew to Gwangju Airfield. I didn’t fire because, as a support soldier, I wasn’t needed during limited skirmishes. In a unit largely composed of career soldiers, people like me were treated like the youngest siblings. The professionals always took the lead in dangerous situations.

Yes, there were some issues with identifying targets, but most of us hadn’t slept in nearly two days, and apart from scattered gunfire, we spent most of our time trying to sleep in our foxholes. On the second day, dedicated shooting teams were formed, so there wasn’t even a chance to shoot.

The morning of May 22, we towed a bus that had been left in front of the prison. Not long after, gunfire rang out again. On a small hill beyond the main road—nicknamed “Sugar Hill” after a large white sugar advertisement—bullets came flying. About 50–60 militia members were firing toward our unit from that direction. Our battalion commander selected the most senior platoon leader’s 6th unit to conduct a counterassault. We called it “Operation Sugar Hill.”

After about an hour, we managed to capture the hill. The biggest reason we succeeded was the support fire from M-60 machine guns positioned on both sides of the prison rooftop. I don’t know how many militia casualties there were.

Once the 6th unit was rotated out and we finished lunch, a military truck came charging at the prison gate. Our rooftop M-60s opened fire and riddled the truck with bullets.

Four men jumped from the truck and tried to flee. One was shot by a sniper; the other three crawled away toward nearby houses. (A civilian passing by in another truck was reportedly wounded by gunfire and later died from complications.)

When we retrieved the truck, we were shocked to find it loaded with two crates of dynamite and four or five grenades. If they had exploded, they could have destroyed the prison gate. It sent chills down our spines.

The next day, May 23, there were a few more firefights, but the militia attacks gradually weakened and finally all but disappeared.

At approximately 12:30 p.m. on May 24, we handed over the defense of the prison to the 62nd Regiment of the 20th Division and headed for Gwangju Songjeong-ri Airfield in their vehicles. From the day we arrived at the Gwangju airfield, we resumed map-based training exercises as a strategic special operations force, in preparation for infiltration into North Korea.

If you were a soldier, speak the truth before history

The testimony of Lee Seong-u, reported in the March 1996 issue of Monthly Chosun and broadcast by SBS, closely resembles the scene at Songjeong-ri Airfield. He testified, “When I arrived at Seongnam Airfield early in the morning, I saw corpses covered with white cloths. There must have been dozens.”

At the time, while our unit was housed in one of the hangars at Songjeong-ri Airfield, members of the 11th Brigade were stationed in a neighboring hangar. The 11th Brigade had suffered significant casualties after being mistakenly fired upon by troops from the Army Training Command during their withdrawal operations outside Gwangju. About 15 coffins, covered in white cloths, were loaded onto transport planes with ceremonial rifle salutes by members of the 11th Airborne.

This funeral took place in the late afternoon. Lee’s unit, also stationed at the airfield, likely witnessed this from a distance. I believe, as suggested by a psychiatrist, he may have confused this scene in his memory. Our own brigade lost one man, who was transported by C-123 transport aircraft under the same procedure.

Three days later, on May 27, our brigade’s 11th Battalion, 1st Company, participated in the operation to recapture the Provincial Government Building. I only heard about it secondhand from fellow soldiers, as I did not participate in any such operation myself and therefore cannot describe it in detail. What I have written so far is simply what I recall with relative accuracy from over 15 years ago.

College students, high schoolers, civilians, prosecutors, and even the president have joined the militia’s campaign—and it still hasn’t ended.

After being discharged, I completed both university and graduate studies. Campuses in the 1980s overwhelmingly reflected the narrative of Gwangju as a victim. I had opportunities to see things from their perspective, and I reviewed as many of their sources as I could. But if you try to reconcile both sides’ accounts, they don’t form a coherent picture.

The record of the Airborne Division’s actions is like a torn-up photo. If you try to piece it back together, it begins to look more like a photo from a war. On the other hand, the Gwangju citizen narrative lacks the realism of a photograph—it feels more like a cartoon. Yes, the victims are real and numerous, but the alleged organized resistance is hard to find. Were we fighting phantoms?

Although it may look like we won the ten-day battle, the truth is that we’ve been losing the propaganda war ever since. First it was the citizens of Gwangju, then university students across the country, then high schoolers and ordinary people—and now it seems even the prosecution and the president are using the issue.

The Gwangju Uprising was a war!

No matter what anyone says, I want to emphasize that the ten days of conflict were not a democratization movement—they were a war.

In this irreparably scarred chapter of 1980, I remain one of the direct participants. Had I misinterpreted this event on a personal level, I might have ended up in a mentally unstable state like Lee Seong-u.

After being discharged and returning to school, I once visited the Mangwol-dong cemetery in Gwangju. I went in search of my own sense of reconciliation and humanity. I still believe that was the right thing to do—and I will always believe it. I’ve tried to maintain the same attitude toward those who died as Airborne troops. But now I feel even more compassion toward those from the Airborne Division. It feels like the world has lost its balance.

Wounds must be stitched shut if we hope to heal. Only then can new skin form and grow stronger. But as things stand now, I feel like the wound is only festering deeper.

— Kim Chi-nyeon


* The 31st Division is based in Gwangju and serves as a regional defense division for Jeollanam-do. It began occupying certain locations on the city's outskirts on May 20, 1980.


Kim's account is unique due to its description of his unit's suppression of the Busan protest (which is not as well-documented as 5.18 and about which rumours circulated at the time claiming a handful of protesters had been killed; a death in Masan is the only one to have been confirmed). In comparing the 3rd Brigade's tactics in Busan, he also describes what the 7th Brigade failed to do in Gwangju, including waiting to carry out suppression operations after dark (and after curfew) and driving soldiers throughout the city for hours as an intimidation tactic. The latter was carried out, according to a US Embassy cable, in Seoul on May 21: "In Seoul a truck convoy loaded with Special Forces troops with fixed bayonets has been passing through the streets. It is moving slowly and has the air of a parade or a show of force."

Soldiers of the 3rd Brigade may have a different perspective from those in the 7th and 11th Brigades because by the time the 3rd Brigade arrived, things had escalated (at the hands of the other brigades) to the point that the protesters had become an increasingly organized resistance capable of inflicting injuries and, once vehicle attacks were utilized, even deaths upon the soldiers. (His story of  the prankster shouting “A car is coming!” and causing every single one of the exhausted soldiers to spring up and dive for cover clearly illustrates the toll this tactic took on them.) This is summed up by his assertion that "the ten days of conflict were not a democratization movement—they were a war." From his unit's experience (which did not include being inside the city during the cooperative 'liberated Gwangju' phase of those ten days), this point of view makes sense. As well, since they were not involved in the mass shooting at the Provincial Office on May 21, and comparatively few of them were involved in the final assault on the Provincial Office, there may have been both literal and psychological distance between their own experiences and the moments during the uprising that led to the most casualties, which may have contributed to a suspicion among them that some of the more violent acts attributed to the paratroopers were exaggerated. (The veteran I talked to assumed a number of shooting deaths were caused by untrained members of the citizens militia, for example.) This is no doubt due in part to the fact that the majority of instances where paratroopers fired randomly and caused loss of life, or beat people to death or near death when the soldiers' lives were not at risk, did not involve the 3rd Brigade. This applies also to Kim's refusal to consider the possibility of (what is now well-documented) sexual violence against women.

Kim and the veteran I spoke to both seem to perceive the 3rd Brigade's gunfire as self defense. Kim asks, for example, in regard to the shootings at Gwangju Station on May 20, "If soldiers had deliberately fired with lethal intent after those injuries [and the death of a soldier due to vehicle attacks], why would the death toll have stopped at four?" According to the numbers Kim put forward above, 30 rounds made available to each of the 16 company commanders in his battalion suggests there were at least 480 rounds available for use at Gwangju Station. Though updated figures indicate that seven died there, it's clear they had the means to shoot many, many more people than they did, a fact that fuels Kim's displeasure with the use of the word "massacre." 

One notable discrepancy with the standard record of what happened is his statement that, in addition to using vehicles as weapons, demonstrators at Chonnam University had already armed themselves with rifles by the morning of the May 21. There is general agreement (and the May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission concluded) that armories were raided during the afternoon of May 21 after the mass shooting at the Provincial Office, so he may be simply misremembering this detail 15 years after the fact.

There is another account by an 11th Brigade soldier that is twice the length of this one that I will post eventually.