Monday, September 21, 2026

Arguments over the role of Peace Corps...in 1967


Jon Dunbar has an article at the Korea Times about the latest - and perhaps last - Peace Corps Revisit program, held on the 60th anniversary of the arrival of the Peace Corps in Korea in September 1966 - something I've written about before - during which 17 'K-1' Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) took part, along with other former PCVs.

Jon was kind enough to get me invited to an event last Friday where I got to talk to a number of K-1 (and later) PCVs, some of whom I'd been in email or online contact before. One such person was Charles Goldberg, though I couldn't remember how I knew his name until hours after the event, when I realized that my article from four years ago about the 1966 arrival of the Peace Corps in Korea ended with quotations from him (from a 1968 Stars and Stripes article); he'd actually reached out to me after reading my article years ago.

One person who came up in conversation was James Wade, who I've of course written about many times. It was mentioned that his 'Scouting the City' column (the subject of my first-ever Korea Times article) had reviewed the Peace Corps Korea newsletter Yobosayo, written and edited by volunteers themselves, so I looked through my archives for it. Here is the pertinent excerpt of “Scouting the City with Alf Racketts” by James Wade, Korea Times, December 16, 1967:

The Peace Corps newspaper put out in Korea called Yobosayo lends credence to the allegation that the PC is the most remorselessly self-analytic group in the world, or out of it. It is a lively sheet, though rather funereal in its layout and typography, and, unlike some other English tabloids distributed in Korea, it’s definitely not an official publication.

This paper has gripes, soul-searchings, protests, demands, arguments and spoofs, as well as hard news of in-group interest and helpful household hints for new arrivals in the boondocks. (We especially liked the story, complete with photo, of the PC dwelling along a rail line that put up a prominent sign “CLEAN REST ROOMS” for the benefit of arriving recruits.)

Both the japes and jeremiads are carried out in a light-hearted spirit characteristic of youth, bless their little hearts, and perhaps especially of the unique flavor of this particular portion of the present generation which may someday be known as “The Last of the Idealists.”

The heartening fact about these idealists, though, is that in far as one can judge from this little publication of theirs, their feet are pretty firmly planted on the ground.

Years ago I spent hours going through the Peace Corps Korea archive at the library website of the University of Southern California and made an index of all of the issues they hold and published it here. All good, at least until they reorganized their site and all the links were broken; I decided to provide a Wayback Machine link, but eventually these stopped working. Prompted over a year ago by Lenny Trudo (K-44), who kindly shared with me some later issues of Jam Pong not in the USC archive, I managed to download all of the available issues of Yobosayo (1966-70), The Noodle (1972?-74?; only 3 issues are preserved), and Jam Pong (1977-81) and put them online here.

During the conversation Friday night it was suggested Wade's review above was taking into account an article Charles Goldberg had written about Vietnam, though upon searching and finding it, it is more a consideration of the role of the Peace Corps - and individual volunteers - within the US foreign policy establishment (in the shadow of the ongoing war in Vietnam). This led to several responses by other PCVs, including future historian Bruce Cumings. I've reprinted them all below.

The first, from November 1967 (Yobosayo Vol. 2 No. 3), was written by Charles Goldberg:

Peace Corps' Burden 

Take up the White Man's burden-

The savage wars of peace.

Fill full the mouth of Famine, 

and bid the sickness cease; 

And when your goal is nearest,

The end for others sought,

Watch Sloth and heathen Folly

Bring all your hopes to naught.

Kipling spoke of the "White Man's burden" in an obnoxious way. He described "civilization's" new charges as "new-caught, sullen pеоples, half devil and half child," who cry, when "the light" is upon them, 

Who brought ye us from bondage,

Our loved Egyptian night?

What he describes, of course, is an important aspect of the Peace Corps experience. How many articles have we read, written in more gentle tones, about the frustrations of Volunteers trying to overcome the resistance to leave that "loved Egyptian night?" But, more importantly, are we not among those chosen to bring the "light" to Asia and the Southern Hemisphere?

For many of us in Peace Corps, the feeling is that we lack, or want no part of, the prerequisites needed to bring "the light" – the skills, a conviction that "the light" is good, a conception of what "the light" is. Further, it is a well-known virtue of Peace Corps Volunteers that they are open-minded, regarding "heathen" ways as first to be understood and even respected, even though they are not our ways.

For the most part, the people we encounter are quite friendly to us. They are receptive to us as people. And why should they not deal kindly with a person who wants primarily to sell only himself, and is eager to return their friendliness and to understand them? On this level, Kipling's harangue does not fit Peace Corps at all. But what I wish to examine is that which brought us here in the first place. On that level, I feel, Kipling describes us with brutal accuracy; and for those of us who deplore the self-righteous pietism of "The White Man's Burden," we must find the means to reconcile our being here with the forces that brought us here.

It is a commonplace that the man on the bottom of a large organization participates in the mobilization of forces largely beyond his control. In our case, the organization I refer to is not the Peace Corps, but the United States government. As members of Peace Corps, we represent a large-scale effort by the US government which is dubiously humanitarian. Peace Corps is a way of reaching people in other countries unlike anything which our government has utilized before. Through Peace Corps, it may be hoped by many, we are now able to direct our efforts to a stratum of the populace that has for many years been an important focus of communist appeal. We can be pointed to as an American expressions of general concern for the common man of Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

I would suggest however, that this concern is strongly subject to doubt. Peace Corps is wonderful public relations. It rounds out the diplomatic mission and puts it on a personal level. But, while we may place a high value on "mutual understanding," has our country's international posture reflected anything but the struggle for political control? The point is that Peace Corps' largely open-minded approach is belied by the political forces which brought it into being. In the international sphere, if not in the city or the town where the individual Volunteer is based, Peace Corps is fighting to tighten America's grip on the "Third World."

That great states should aspire to increase their power should perhaps be regarded as a given by the political realist. And some have argued well that the struggle for control has become idealized as a moral mission, an obligation to liberate underdeveloped pеоples from the stagnation of their backwardness. This naturally engenders a feeling of spiritual superiority on the part of the powerful country; and if you add to this a measure of compassion uncorrupted by understanding, you have the abhorrent pietism of "The White Man's Burden." In one of its aspects, which will be discussed later on, Peace Corps is somewhat of an antidote to this; but, in another way, and one that we may not be entirely conscious of, we are party to it.

In our quest for "mutual understanding," we hasten to make clear, we are apolitical; but whatever goodwill we have created, whatever stimuli we have given to development, there will always be a strange price tag attached: "Free! By the grace of Uncle Sam." In its affect, then, Peace Corps is a lever of foreign policy – and lever for manipulation. 

Two Levels of PC

My point is that the Peace Corps may be seen on at least two levels: on the one hand, the organization and its ideals (coupled with the Volunteer and his ideals); and on the other, the organization as it fits into the general picture of American foreign policy. On the first level, let us examine some of the ideals which we have all heard about or have articulated ourselves. There is the ideal of being of service to the people of other countries, helping them to develop skills and the changes of attitude needed to use those skills more effectively. Peace Corps as an effective means of bringing technological skills to others has been a subject of debate for several years. It is highly questionable whether very much can be done in this area. There is a good case, however, for Peace Corps as an instrument for helping to bring about needed changes in attitude. But, measured in terms of its achievements to date, I doubt that we have produced very much along these lines. The "Egyptian night" seems to be a running theme of most Peace Corps memories. Pending further investigation of what we have done and what we can do in this last area, I think it is not unfair to say that Peace Corps has not done very much to effect basic changes needed for development.

A second ideal is "mutual understanding," a broadening of perspectives in both individuals and nations. On a personal level, there is no quarreling with "mutual understanding." Both the Volunteers and the people they come into contact with are greatly stimulated by their being brought together, and the result is a large measure of personal growth on both sides. This, it seems to me, is the finest thing about the Peace Corps. By serving this function, it offsets somewhat the self-righteousness of the "White Man's Burden."

But, when we speak of "mutual understanding" in international terms, I wonder if we aren't letting our ideals run away with us. Hands across the sea have real meaning only when there is something in them. And from the viewpoint of a great nation, understanding the other fellow is the best foundation for getting control over him. A great diplomatist, Francis de Callieres, noted that the best way for one nation to gain influence over another was for its leaders to understand thoroughly the people of the other country and to peасеfully use this understanding to manipulate them. (De Callieres also said, I should add, that war should only be the last resort, when all other means of attaining one's ends have failed. He thought that belligerent embroilments were the mark of poor diplomacy.) But when understanding other countries means also that control over them is ruled out, then such understanding is certainly not needed. I have heard that it is quite difficult for ex-Volunteers to get jobs with policy-making branches of the State Department. Whether this be true or not, policy makers, certainly in the light of their actions, seem to have little need for those who disagree, no matter how well-informed the dissenter may be.

American Goodwill

Then, there is a third ideal: the exhibition of America's goodwill. Peace Corps has been quite successful at this; but goodwill can be used for any number of reasons – and the spreaders of the goodwill can also be so used.

I submit that there are these two levels of Peace Corps, and that for the run of general US policy it does not particularly matter how business is done on the other level. The only thing of importance is that Peace Corps is there, and that its ideals not only bolster America's image in the eyes of other, but also in the eyes of all Americans, common citizens and policymakers alike. The immense range of freedoms possessed by the individual Volunteer (including the new-won freedom to speak out against the war in Vietnam) speaks well for the willingness of high officials to take risks in order to insure the freedom and growth of America's young citizenry. But then again, is the risk so great? Probably not, when set against the impact of the Peace Corps ideal and the resoluteness of US policy. 

In this light, the recent incident involving Volunteers in Chile becomes an interesting case in point. It showed that Peace Corps has the freedom to grant privileges to its members which other branches of the government do not. But it occurs to me that the affairs of individual PCV's are not particularly the concern of those who make foreign policy. Even when Volunteers are critical, they do not endanger (or have not yet endangered) the impact of the ideal. Yet another twist is that while the Chilean Volunteers deplored the US presence in Vietnam, they failed to mention that they were serving essentially the same purpose by being in Chile the spread of American influence abroad. Of course, they disagreed with the means for attaining that end, but if they disagreed with the end too (and I rather suppose that they did), they might well have argued that the Peace Corps get out of Chile.

If the goals of US policy are the goals of "The White Man's Burden," we have reason to detest them. But if we accept (as I accept tentatively) that it is in the nature of great nations to have such goals, then we must talk about the most humane means to achieve them. Peace Corps has spread goodwill and broadened those who have come into contact with it. Whether it has achieved much of anything else is debatable. These accomplishments, however, are great in themselves, and they should certainly not be minimized. Still, other measures, other missions are needed to spread US influence to as many areas of these societies as possible. The Peace Corps is one of a number of such missions, and in this capacity it is a participant in the US quest for power.

Idealistic Image

The image of Peace Corps is an idealistic one, and, I think, its very function is to be idealistic. The individual Volunteer, however, should not fool himself by regarding himself, in no matter how sophisticated a way, as a seeker for international understanding. Nor should he think that he can effectively struggle against policies with which he disagrees by being a member of the Peace Corps. Peace Corps is not something unto itself. In fact, it puts the finishing touches to those self-same policies. The Volunteer in the field can learn a great deal, and so can those around him. He might also be able to be of some assistance. These are both practical ideals. But he can't do very much to change his own country.

Finally, I should say that my purpose in writing this was to propose an individual dilemma for the Peace Corps Volunteer. The dilemma is this: If the Volunteer agrees with his country's stance in the international realm, he faces no great perplexities; and if he is able to be utterly indifferent to it, he is blessedly free. But if he disagrees or has no desire to take up the "White Man's Burden," he is being used. For all his ideals and those of the Peace Corps, he is freely participating in the game of international power politics. He might refuse to support a certain war or another policy elsewhere, but he is helping to make strong the bases upon which such policies are founded. He is open to charges of hypocrisy, and he will have a hard time acquitting himself of them.

Charles Goldberg

* * * * *

A response printed in December 1967 (Yobosayo Vol. 2 No. 4), was written by Peter Lomhoff:

Peace Corps Unburdened

"While the country sickens for lack of moral leadership, a most remarkable younger generation has taken up the standard of American idealism.... Students who wrestle with their consciences about the draft, soldiers who wrestle with their consciences about the war, Peace Corps Volunteers who strive to light the spark of human dignity among the poor of India or Brazil, and VISTA volunteers who try to do the same for our own poor in Harlem or Appalachia are striving to keep alive the traditional values of American democracy.

"They are not really radical, these young idealists, no more radical, that is, than Jefferson's idea of freedom, Lincoln's idea of equality, or Wilson's idea of a peaceful community of nations....

"The spirit of this regenerative generation has been richly demonstrated to me in letters from student leaders, from former Peace Corps Volunteers and from soldiers fighting in Vietnam. ...

"If I had to bet my money on what is going to happen, I would bet on this younger generation of young men and women who reject the poverty and sham in their own country, who are telling their elders what their elders ought to have known that the price of empire is America's soul, and that the price is too high."

So spoke Senator William Fulbright in his speech in Honolulu on August 8 of this year. The senator's remarks suggest a partial resolution of the dilemma posed by Charles Goldberg in the November Yobosayo.

The Peace Corps is an instrument of United States foreign policy, yes, but the Peace Corps is also in some ways an anomaly. I believe that the long term and the short term effects of the Peace Corps' activities are contrary, whereas Mr. Goldberg has considered only the short term, and thus his dilemma has become needlessly gloomy.

But to explain. Mr. Goldberg sees the Peace Corps on two levels: first, the idealistic level on which the organization sees itself, and second, the realistic, or Realpolitik, level on which the Peace Corps functions as an instrument of the United States' quest for world domination.

As Mr. Goldberg says, on the idealistic level the Peace Corps has met varying degrees of success. International understanding on a personal level and the exhibition of American goodwill have been fostered with success; economic and social development have been rather less successful (though I suspect that in consideration of the small size of the Peace Corps with respect to the world's problems of development, the Peace Corps has done rather well, as the Columbia report on Peace Corps in Peru and other data suggest). This idealistic level is, however, beside the point. As Mr. Goldberg indicates, the Peace Corps' successes in this sphere would be more than adequate justification for the effort, were it not for the other level of Peace Corps, its role as an agent of American foreign policy.

Mr. Goldberg summarizes the argument well: "The image of Peace Corps is an idealistic one, and, I think, its very function is to be idealistic. The individual Volunteer, however, should not fool himself by regarding himself, in no matter how sophisticated a way, as a seeker of international understanding. Nor should he think that he can effectively struggle against the policies with which he disagrees by being a member of the Peace Corps. Peace Corps is not something unto itself. In fact, it puts the finishing touches to those self-same policies. The Volunteer in the field can learn a great deal, and so can those around him. He might also be able to be of some assistance. These are both practical ideals. But he can't do very much to change his own country....

"... if he disagrees or has no desire to take up the White Man's Burden, he is being used. For all his ideals and those of the Peace Corps, he is freely participating in the game of international power politics. He might refuse to support a certain war or another policy elsewhere, but he is helping to make strong the bases upon which such policies are founded. He is open to charges of hypocrisy, and he will have a hard time acquitting himself of them."

The argument is fine as far as it goes; the dilemma is one which many of us have worried about considerably. The only trouble is that the argument does not go far enough. It considers only the short run. Certainly, during his two years abroad, the Volunteer is supposed to be helping to promote peace by making friends for America and the American Way, and thus friends for the U.S. State Department. But in the long run, I think, the Volunteer by means of his Peace Corps service is helping, as Senator Fulbright has said, to promote values which are contrary to "an imperial destiny for America," and thus contrary to the current foreign policy of the United States.

I think, then, that the Peace Corps as an agency of the United States government is an anomaly. The fact that the Peace Corps, a fundamentally idealistic institution, exists now within the framework of the U.S. government is due not to the present United States foreign policy but rather to the inertia of institutions. The Peace Corps came into being by a fortunate historical accident, the accident of executive power for a short time being in the hands of men with some idealistic propensities, John Kennedy and his advisers. I think the present policy makers continue to support the Peace Corps primarily because of President Johnson's motto, consensus. If it's popular it is not to be questioned, and Peace Corps has achieved nearly the consensus of mothers and cherry pie. Also the administration and the majority of Congress are aware of the short run confluence of Peace Corps work and present policy but are at best (worst?) only distantly aware of their long run antipathy.

There is another, contrasting interpretation of the antipathetic relationship of present United States foreign policy and the long run effects of Peace Corps, as stated by Senator Fulbright: Peace Corps is in the mainstream of the great American traditions of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson, and the present American foreign policy is the anomaly.

In either case, I contend that Peace Corps in the long run militates against an imperial destiny for America, and it is time to explain these long run implications of the Peace Corps.

Basically, the long run effect of the Peace Corps is to develop broad minded and humanitarian attitudes among people who come into contact with the organization, both the Americans and their hosts, and then, by developing special qualifications in these people, enabling them to achieve positions of influence.

Volunteers often join the Peace Corps for idealistic reasons and, although the two years abroad often develops in a Volunteer a strain of cynicism and disillusionment, it is also true that during the two years many Volunteers change their career plans so as to continue the type of work they have been doing in the Peace Corps, such as teaching or community development. Volunteers also learn in a very vivid way how parochial is the point of view of most Americans, and how very strange or irrelevant American values and commonplaces can seem from a non-American point of view. That Volunteers tend to become more broad-minded and humanitarian as a result of their experience is attested by the frustration they feel at the indifference of their friends when they return home.

It is generally accepted as obvious that Peace Corps Volunteers are to some extent enlightened and "improved" as a result of their experiences, which is really saying no more than that learning is good.

Barring exceptional cases in which Peace Corps suffers an occasional fiasco, there is a similar effect on people the Volunteer contacts abroad. Working with and knowing an idealistic foreigner, even if he is one of the ubiquitous Americans, is presumably a broadening experience, and where Peace Corps succeeds in its avowed goal of changing traditional attitudes, the result may be the release of powerful social forces moving in directions quite contrary to the current trends of the United States government.

The classic example is the Dominican Republic, whose citizens in 1965 continued to aid and cooperate with Peace Corps Volunteers at the same time they were undergoing an invasion of U.S. Marines. PCV's and Dominicans were working together to improve public health while the Marines were shelling the capital.

In the Dominican Republic and in many similar cases in which the contrast of the constructive and the destructive is not so dramatic, people from two different cultures work together to do something both idealistic and constructive. The experience frequently leaves a strong impression on everyone involved and often leaves them less disposed to accept fatally whatever God and the government bring than they were before. They have first developed a concern for existing conditions and then seen beneficial change caused by conscious action. It is a vivid experience, and often leaves one with a mind to consciously cause some beneficial change again sometime, next time perhaps on a bigger scale.

Experience with the Peace Corps, then, changes people. It develops and reinforces ideas and attitudes which are contrary to the American quest for power.

At the same time Peace Corps experience confers peculiar qualifications which give Volunteers and their host country associates a competitive advantage over otherwise equally qualified people. For example, a person with skill in a second language or with knowledge of a foreign culture can often rise in a bureaucracy faster than someone without such special knowledge. It is true that returned Peace Corps Volunteers with an average age of 25 do not readily secure policy making positions in the State Department, but it is also true that the post-World War II American Military government of Korea was called the translators' government for a very good reason.

Returned Volunteers and their host country counterparts have not only the competitive advantages of special knowledge. They also have the advantages of whatever extra drive or determination may develop from the loss of the feeling of smug complacency which afflicts many American leaders and probably also many leaders in other countries who may not be aware of the social and political ramifications of rising expectations among their people.

These advantages will often lead not to high level government jobs but perhaps to positions in private organizations and in education. In any case, Peace Corps people are somewhat unusual, and their unusual qualities will, I think, frequently lead them to positions of influence which can indirectly and occasionally directly affect government policy.

Mr. Goldberg's dilemma is real; how can we rationalize opposition to American foreign policy and still be members of an agency of the Department of State? A partial answer may be that although we are doing Uncle Sam's bidding now, we and the people around us are growing and changing in ways which, in the long run, are likely to put us in positions to encourage and effect policies quite different from the present policies of the United States government.

Peter Lomhoff

* * * * *

A response printed in February 1968 (Yobosayo Vol. 2 No. 5), was written by Bruce G. Cummings, who a friend confirmed years ago is indeed the well-known historian of Korea.

Peace Corps Reburdened

I would like to intrude on the dialogue which Messrs. Goldberg and Lomhoff have begun, if such license may be granted to a relative neophyte in the Peace Corps game. Like our steadfast President, I choose to take a middle position not because Goldberg and Lomhoff represent extremes, but because certainty in American affairs went out with Calvin Coolidge. The issues they discuss are as yet unanswerable, in any final way.

A few points I would like to make, among others, are the following: that Peace Corps was not a "fortunate historical accident," but instead represents an American tradition in American foreign policy; that United States foreign policy is not simply a "quest for world domination;" that Peace Corps is not likely to fulfill the long run expectations which Mr. Lomhoff holds for it, because it "is not something unto itself," in Mr. Goldberg's words, and others have their own uses for it; and very simply that Peace Corps Volunteers may not be the same people when they have a stake in the system.

Mr. Lomhoff attributes the emergence of the Peace Corps to "a fortunate historical accident, the accident of executive power for a short time being in the hands of men with some idealistic propensities, John Kennedy and his advisers." On the contrary, I would say the Peace Corps was by no means a fluke of the Kennedy years, but a direct product of the liberal tradition in American foreign policy which exercises, in varying degrees, a hold over every American. Moreover, the Kennedy administration itself, looked at in the light of subsequent events, was not by any means wholly removed from the policies of the current administration, which Goldberg and Lomhoff deplore.

No matter what administration happens to be in power, there is always a vocal minority, and sometimes a majority, who advocate a kinder position toward the rest of the world, one not tainted by the exigencies of power politics. Sentiment for a Peace Corps type organization has been felt since the United States took an active role in world politics. Harry Truman's Point Four program grew out of such thinking. Were it not for the inclinations of Eisenhower and Dulles, such an organization could have emerged in the 1950s, for it had support at lower levels. For the fact is that the United States has always conceived of itself as somehow "different" from other great powers, and therefore called upon to take up more noble, humanitarian ventures. This utopian spirit has been enshrined in the twentieth century vocabulary as "Wilsonianism," but it was with us, in a less articulate form, long before Wilson.

The tenets of the liberal faith are easily stated. We distrust power politics. We distrust self-seeking. We don't understand the concept of "national interest," except where our own is concerned. In essence, we don't like the give and take of big power politics. We don't like wars, and once we get into them we like to get them over with as soon as possible, with little thought to the eventual political consequences of our military action – World War II is the classic manifestation of this. We envision the United States to be concerned with "principles" in foreign affairs, with no despicable objectives of material gain.

If the United States has not always been "liberal" in its actions abroad – and certainly it hasn't – still it has consistently articulated liberal goals as the end product of its actions. Americans ask normative questions about their foreign policy: how should it be conducted? What should our goals be? With such thinking being a part of the American scene for years, it is not surprising that the Peace Corps emerged especially after fifteen years of direct American involvement in world power politics.

With a lessening in cold war tensions, American blinders have been at least partially pulled back, and it is now a commonplace recognition that people with very high ideals can on occasion do very awful things. But more important, in recent years the liberal notion that military affairs can and should be separated from political affairs – that battles can be fought and won with little thought to the political – has been seriously modified. We have come to realize the importance of winning the political battles, too, and by now such thinking is enshrined in cliches about the "battle for the hearts and minds of the people." John Kennedy's notion of "flexible response" in U.S. defense posture, the Special Forces (trained in public health, political agitation, etc.) and, some cynics say, the Peace Corps, were outgrowths of the new emphasis on the "total" picture of conflict. The point was not to win battles only to lose the political spoils; the emphasis was world-wide.

In another light, the Peace Corps was only one aspect of the Kennedy administration, which included on other fronts the Bay of Pigs, increased involvement in Vietnam, continued C.I.A. manipulation of front groups (and governments?), and the dispatch of advisers and special forces to untold number of countries, among the other, more memorable marks of that administration. The point to remember is not that JFK was so different, but that Peace Corps is firmly in the liberal tradition of American foreign policy, which will periodically be heard as its advocates gain office, and as articulate men seize on its tenets to justify their actions. The reason that Peace Corps ideals seem so estranged from current policies may be found more in Johnson's inability to articulate his policies than in real divergence from the policies themselves.

At this point I would like to register a disagreement with both Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Lomhoff: both of them seem to take the "U.S. quest for world domination" as given, choosing instead to differ over the contribution made by the Peace Corps to this quest. It is an over simplification to speak of American foreign policy solely in these terms. For a great power, the United States has been surprisingly humanitarian and generous on the world scene since World War II; at the same time, in other ways, it has been surprisingly cynical and underhanded in pursuit of goals of dubious worth. But it is mythical to think of our foreign policy as either "a quest for world domination," or wholly removed from that goal and solely humanitarian. U.S. policy is a much more complex admixture of political, economic, and humanitarian goals, with a lingering myopia where communism is concerned. The U.S. has shown an interest in domination on occasion, whereas at other times it has foregone domination, to the detriment of its own interests. U.S. policy simply cannot be reduced to an easy, catch phrase. Arthur Schlesinger has often spoken of our foreign policy in terms of its accidental nature, the manner in which men and policies are shaped by events, and the endless capacity for simple human error in the process. Thus he dares to ascribe the blame for our huge involvement in Vietnam to "the politics of inadvertence." (The Bitter Heritage, 1967)

The American record has thus been uneven and spotty. We have prepared nations for self-government – to a much greater extent than did the French, for instance. And we have squelched national development in the bud. What seems to be "imperialism" is often caused by a very casual and unthinking acceptance of the notion that all nations desire to "modernize" on the Western model, and that Americans are the proper midwives for this process. At any rate, while the United States may possess "imperial dimensions," in Reinhold Neihbur's terms, it is not imperialistic.

Mr. Goldberg said that "Peace Corps is not something unto itself," and therein lies the central challenge facing the Peace Corps. To put it bluntly, while the Peace Corps itself encompasses people with goals and ideals that conflict with American policy, the goals held for the Peace Corps by those external to it – the uses to which others would put it – may, in the long run, be what posterity remembers of the Peace Corps. I would like, then, to relate a personal experience in which I felt decidedly "used," then go on to some general points on this subject, and finally treat Mr. Lomhoff's argument that Peace Corps will in the long run force change upon the American policy machine. It is difficult to discern exactly what other organs of the U.S. government think about the Peace Corps. Peace Corps has a good press and represents ideals that are hard to ignore. Thus one usually finds non-Peace Corps officials readily concurring in Peace Corps goals, if in an abstract way. But they often misunderstand its goals, thereby providing a key to the uses they actually have for Peace Corps. This phenomenon was entirely obvious at the show which "the American presence" put on for Korea III during our October orientation. With the sole exception of a political officer from the Embassy, they misjudged their audience, mentioned goals for Peace Corps Korea which they themselves dreamed up, and presented talks distinguished solely by their irrelevancy.

A man from USOM thought it nice that we were in Korea since "developing nations need a common world language." The man from USIS said he was glad to have us here "contributing to American foreign policy," and went on to give an anti-communist diatribe which, in any other situation, would have been "high camp." A third man presented a personal vignette, detailing the impossibility of Americans living with Koreans ("Koreans think it's strange if you try"). The military man gave us a full run down on battle plans should there be an attack – and allowed that "the Peace Corps serves a purpose" but his voice trailed off as he sought in vain to define that purpose.

It's easy to shrug off such displays as either "typical." or, on the other hand, unrepresentative. But the fact remains that none of the men had a notion of why Peace Corps had come, beyond its service to their own agency, or as a means to "round out the diplomatic mission," in Mr. Goldberg's terms. Moreover, it must be remembered that Peace Corps occupies a decidedly subordinate and dispensable position in the U.S. government hierarchy in comparison to USIS, USOM, or the Armed Forces.

Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Lomhoff, along with many others, share a belief that the Peace Corps should not be a tool to fight communism, and President Kennedy seemed to concur when he said we would help "the people in the huts and villages of the world...not because the communists are doing it…but because it is right." Yet much of the debate in Congress concerning the Peace Corps seemed to imply that such a goal is central. The May, 1966 issue of The Annals, devoted to Peace Corps, agrees that "Congress visualizes it as a weapon of American foreign policy against communism." They quote Hubert Humphrey as saying "This program is to be part of the total foreign policy of the U.S. to combat the virus of communist totalitarianism." Again, the goals of the Peace Corps notwithstanding, they would use it for their own purposes.

One goal that is freely concurred in by all is to put to lie the notion that all Americans are like... well, those who have gone before Peace Corps. As a refurbishment of the American image, Peace Corps has been very successful, as Mr. Goldberg made clear. But in doing so it makes the work of other, perhaps less "sensitive" Americans much easier. Bernard Fall has said in reference to Vietnam that the U.S. is "sleeping in the French bed, but dreaming different dreams." We're abed with "the American presence," albeit with different dreams. That Peace Corps dreams can be fulfilled, in the short run or the long run, is by no means a foregone conclusion.

Mr. Lomhoff's central point was that Peace Corps would, in the long run, work a change in American foreign policy and American attitudes. As a proposition, its proof must wait for "the long run" to run its course. But I simply can't be as optimistic as Mr. Lomhoff. As I have attempted to show, Peace Corps has been around before, in thought if not in practice. Similar causes, more costly and prestigious, and equally representative of American liberalism in foreign affairs (the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations) have not significantly lessened the hold of realpolitik on the U.S. machine. Considerations of power will continue to be the most important short term and long term determinant of U.S. policy.

Mr. Lomhoff feels that "the long run effect of the Peace Corps is to develop broad minded and humanitarian attitudes" among Peace Corps Volunteers and Americans in general. There is no doubt that Peace Corps Volunteers return home with a different perspective. But those who really need the treatment aren't getting it. Only a tiny fraction of Americans would ever think of joining the Peace Corps – indeed, among our generation, which Mr. Lomhoff is depending upon, a small percentage are actively interested in Peace Corps or related activities. Moreover, Peace Corps serves a public (and a Congress) which does not share its ideals in any but a whimsical way. All of this says nothing about the Peace Corps itself, and its intrinsic value. What I am saying is that Peace Corps is not new, it is not unique in American history, and its opponents are solidly entrenched.

There can be no satisfactory conclusion to this discussion. The issues are still in flux. But certainly Mr. Lomhoff has hit on the central challenge facing Volunteers when he predicts that "in the long run we are likely to be in positions to encourage and effect policies quite different from the present policies of the U.S." This is by no means a self-evident truth. Earlier idealists have been engaged in good works before they really had a stake in the system. Volunteers have no stake – they are two-year sojourners, with other, perhaps less noble fields beckoning after service. With careers and livelihoods at stake, will we be so quick to change the status quo? Or will we settle down in the "real" world our critics speak of?

Bruce G. Cummings

* * * * *

A follow-up to this series of articles was printed in April 1968 (Yobosayo Vol. 2 No. 7), though it was not written by a Korea PCV:

Peace Corps Reinterpreted

(The following are excerpts from a paper by Lewis Butler, a lawyer and former Peace Corps director in Malaysia.)

The original concept of the Peace Corps was to provide Volunteer manpower to countries that needed and requested it and to create mutual understanding in the process. The selection and training processes were designed to fit these aims. That design has not fundamentally changed, although the techniques have notably improved. Selection means picking, on paper, solid people with needed skills who would present a good picture of their country (the key question to references – Do you want this person representing the United States?), and judging those people in the flesh during about three months of training. Training, besides providing the selection laboratory, prepares the Volunteer to do a job and live successfully in a foreign culture. From the beginning the basic components of training – language, technical preparation, cross cultural studies – have been designed for these ends and remained the same, although with different approaches and emphasis from time to time.

Meanwhile, the Peace Corps has changed. Or rather, it never was the animal described in the Peace Corps Act. Yes, it provides good people inexpensively for important jobs, whether teaching or health work or agriculture or bridge and school building. This is a substantial contribution but not a unique one, and often not a lasting one. Nor does the "job" concept encompass all of the Peace Corps programs. Many, such as community development, do not fit in a "job" category. As for mutual understanding, the term in part connotes changing the American image abroad. From the beginning this struck most Volunteers as phony. It also suggests Volunteers returning to the United States and bringing first-hand information to their friends and communities about the countries they served in. This they do, but the effect seems limited and is often complicated by the inability and sometimes unwillingness of Volunteers to explain their experiences to those who “don't” understand.

What, then, has made the Peace Corps important? Is it as significant as we who are wedded to it believe? I suggest two not particularly profound answers to those questions.

Changing People

First, the Peace Corps experience, at its best, changes people. It changes Volunteers and the people they work with. It changes their attitudes and values. It reaches people emotionally and fundamentally rather than intellectually. It can motivate them, turn them on, or, to use an old word, inspire them.

No written description is needed or adequate to describe these changes to anyone reading this report. Sometimes, they are slight. Certainly many Volunteers are no more touched than they would be by a year at Stanford at Florence, and for them the words of the Peace Corps Act about mutual understanding are perhaps appropriate, as is the very academic concept of "adjusting" to another culture. But our very familiarity with what happens to so many dulls our appreciation. We forget how rare it is for people to become so entwined with those from another culture as to have it affect their basic view of life. We forget how vital such experience has become with the growing crisis and despair in human relations both in the United States and in other nations.

The changes in Volunteers we can observe. The changes in Nepalis or Malaysians or Nigerians we find much harder to identify. But we know that some acquire from Volunteers attitudes that are hard to come by in their own culture – hope, belief in their own abilities and worth as an individual, an honest view of their failings, a sense of service. While we understand little about what is needed for a country or community to influence its own destiny, we have seen that this kind of change is the first essential. And we know that Peace Corps Volunteers are among the few strangers in a foreign culture who can assist in such change.

In short, Peace Corps is in the business of building new people.

A New Institution

Second, and really as a by-product of the change in Volunteers and staff, the Peace Corps at its best is building a new kind of American institution in an era when the old ones are in deep trouble. The labels we use, such as "open society" and "university in dispersion" sometimes dull the substance. What we are getting at is that most of our universities, corporations, governmental agencies, unions, churches, and other institutions do not fit the human beings in them or the needs of the country. In all there is pressure for change, even revolution. The turmoil in universities requires no description. Corporations are moving toward less formal management communications, sensitivity training for competing vice presidents and appeals to the college prospect about business' contribution to society. Other institutions are in varying stages of upset and reform.

Peace Corps is an imperfect model of what institutions such as these must begin to look like and a training ground for those who would change them. It is proving, however inadequately, that the capacity for self-renewal can be built into even as unlikely an organization as a governmental agency. It is showing a doubting college generation that organization is not necessarily equivalent to stagnation.

The tools are well known to name a few: hospitality to dissent, individual responsibility, competition of ideas more than of people, trust, humor, the substitution of leadership for authority. Despite setbacks these tools have been used by Peace Corps with remarkable effect. It is still a place for people.

If these accomplishments are what has made the Peace Corps unique, then it must focus on them and judge its performance accordingly. It must consciously prepare Volunteers for this kind of Peace Corps.

The Functioning of Training

Focusing on these aspects of Peace Corps, maybe we should start by getting a new name for training. More than just a training session, it is the introductory period in which prospective Volunteers meet all the forces that make up Peace Corps and begin the process of change. The returned Volunteers are there and, for better or worse, they more than anything else represent the end Peace Corps product. Host Country Nationals are there, overseas and Washington staff members are there.

...We cannot ask for better Volunteers. Peace Corps has succeeded because people of average talent but above average desire want to do something worthwhile. We must make such Volunteers.

...The goal is not debate or conflict, though these may be necessary. It is to have the trainees understand from the day they enter training that they can and must take part in shaping the Peace Corps. An ex Volunteer said it simply:

"By participating here, the Volunteers realize how they can participate overseas. We came back to convince them of that."

* * * * *

So ends this series of ruminations on the Peace Corps' place in the world. On the same page as the above final article is one by Bob Baskerville that begins with his experience of buying a pirated edition of The Conquest of Happiness by Bertrand Russell; the third paragraph below has some pertinence to the discussion above.

In the Peace Market

In the Peace Market the other day, a relevant book title caught my eye: What Makes People Happy. I bought the book without haggling and carried it home to learn the secret. But when I had opened the wrapper, I realized I had been overly optimistic. The title actually read What Makes People Un-happy.

Like many other people, I suppose, I joined the Peace Corps because I thought it would make me happy to do so. Of course I didn't write that on my application form. I was afraid that those who make the decisions would think I lacked the necessary spirit of altruism and reject me. So I wrote that I wanted to make other people happy. That must have been the correct answer, because I got accepted.

[...]

Most of us came here to see what we could see, to sniff around, and to learn. It's a good idea to be honest about this. (If someone told me that he had come to my country to change my educational system and to eradicate the bad impression left by his fellow countrymen on me, I think I would watch him closely.)

Fortunately, the Koreans want us to be happy in their country, some of them are even anxious about it, and they seem to relax when we explain the advantages we derive by being here. (Have you ever noticed that people are more receptive to you if you explain that you came here to study Korean and to teach English than if you say you're here with some kind of peace-service cadre?)

Suppose there was a group of twenty-three year olds, away from home and experiencing all kinds of things for the first time, trying out their personalities and hair styles on a people patient enough to put up with them. An attitude of altruism might seem incongruous for them to adopt. And if they felt they should be out doing good things all the time, they might be disappointed by the puzzled amusement which greeted their efforts. But then there are always people who want to accomplish something...

Bob Baskerville


Cumings made the point that there were lots of different groups within the US government who had differing uses for the Peace Corps, and helping to create a good impression of America is certainly one of them, but the idea of telling someone you were there to "eradicate the bad impression left by [my] fellow countrymen on [you]" made me laugh at its clarity and bluntness.

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

How Magok's development is changing the area's history

For my latest Korea Times article, I examined how the development of the Magok area – which was fields of rice and vegetables when I first moved nearby in 2003 – has influenced the way in which the nearby Yangcheon area promotes its history. I’ll be leading a walk for RAS Korea through the local historical sites and museums that will end in Magok this coming Saturday; an earlier article of mine examines many of the sites we'll be visiting.

Magok has changed a great deal since I first encountered it. Here is a shot from June 2010 when the land was being raised over former farmland and a lake park was first constructed. (While I knew that the lake eventually became smaller, what I didn't know - until I looked at older satellite photos on Kakao Map, was that in 2016 the entire lake was drained and possibly filled in and then shifted eastward.)


As I noted here, in 2009 I visited the still under construction Magongnaru Station, which looked like this:

A few years ago I visited a friend in Magok and we went down escalators in a big shopping / restaurant area and walked straight into this station. It was with some shock that I realized the wall on the left above had been removed and connected to the newly-built officetel / shopping center.

Another shot from 2009 shows a solid wall in the center of the photo.

And here's a shot from a week or so ago. There are now windows there that open onto a huge below-ground open plaza:

And needless to say, this looks rather different than the fields of 16 years ago:

What was odd was how quiet this was, just a block from the lake park. There was no one here on a Saturday afternoon.

At any rate, it's been quite an experience seeing a entire section of the city arise from the earth over 16 years.

Wednesday, September 02, 2026

Jeffrey Miller's 'The Tree at Panmunjom'


On August 18, the 50th anniversary of the Panmunjeom Axe Murder Incident, The Korea Times published my review of Jeffrey Miller’s newest novel, "The Tree at Panmunjom," which is an excellent novel that vividly recreates that time period. As I put it, “It is at once an in-depth portrait of service on the DMZ, an examination of one young man’s growth and a Cold War geopolitical thriller.”

Miller first became interested in the DMZ in the mid-1990s and wrote an excellent article for the Korea Times based on interviews with many witnesses to the event. He reflected on the 50th anniversary of the incident in this article

As he wrote on his Facebook page,

I wanted the novel to be more than historical fiction. I wanted it to feel authentic. That meant spending months researching the military procedures, daily routines, and the atmosphere that surrounded the JSA during the Cold War. One of the greatest privileges I had while writing the book was interviewing Bill Ferguson, one of the American soldiers who had been there on that August morning in 1976. Bill generously shared his memories of the incident, the tension that filled the Joint Security Area, and what it was like to stand face-to-face with North Korean soldiers in a place where even the smallest misunderstanding could have deadly consequences. His recollections brought a human dimension to the history that no official report could ever capture, and they helped shape the authenticity of the novel. Although the characters were fictional, the events surrounding them were firmly rooted in history. My goal was never simply to recount a famous incident, but to honor the young men who served in one of the most volatile places in the world. They stood watch every day between two armies, carrying out their duties with quiet professionalism while never knowing whether an ordinary day might suddenly become extraordinary.

I also asked a few questions of him while writing my review. One was about his sources:

I read Wayne Kirkbride’s book [1984’s “Dmz: A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder”] years ago and that was one of the main sources; but most of what I learned about the JSA was from Bill Ferguson and back in 2001, Mark Lutrull (he passed away several years ago) [he was Captain Arthur Bonifas’s driver and guard who was absent that day]. Most of what I learned was what I used in my first article in 2001. 

I also surmised from the vivid scenes of planes taking off that Miller brought more than a little of his Air Force experience to the descriptions.

You’re right. In 1978 I was stationed at George AFB in the Mojave Desert and we had F-4’s, F105’s and F111’s. I worked in Maintenance Control (I worked as a liason between supply and maintenance to expedite parts from supply to maintenance so the aircraft could be fixed to meet the daily sorties). Every morning I’d watch one aircraft after another take off. They would take off in twos and threes. To this day, when I hear fighters screaming overhead, I’m like Pavlov’s dog, my ears perking up at the sound. So, yes, the scenes you were referring to were easy to write. 

As I said, I think it's an excellent novel, one that - much like his previous Korea-based novel, No Way Out - starts by focusing on one character before branching out into a much wider cast of characters and points of view, all the better to portray a particular moment in time.

Monday, August 24, 2026

A conversation with Mama Kim of Grand Ole Opry in Itaewon

Back in July the Korea Times published my article on an RAS 'night at Itaewon's Grand Ole Opry' during which its owner, Kim Sang-sook, better known to her customers as "Mama Kim," spoke about her life and experiences running a bar for more than 50 years.

If you visit when it's not so busy, Mama Kim is often happy to talk about the past - even more so when you're accompanied by someone from Texas, the birthplace of her late husband. On more than one occasion she has pulled out photo albums, showing, as in this case, a photo from the late 1970s showing all of the waitresses employed at the bar at the time.


The building housing the Grand Ole Opry was built (or was registered, at any rate) in 1967, a time when a number of buildings were constructed on and around "Texas Alley," as it was then called.

‘Texas Alley’ in the summer of 1969 / Courtesy of Rich Kent

As can be seen in the above photo, it was called the American Club in 1969. I found a reference to another club at its address in February 5, 1973 Dong-A Ilbo news article:

Five "Special Entertainment Establishments" Cited for Poor Sanitation; Ordered to Renovate Facilities

On the 5th, the Seoul Metropolitan Government conducted sanitary inspections of "special entertainment establishments" designated for the recreation of foreigners. Authorities issued warnings to five establishments with substandard facilities and ordered them to complete renovations by the 19th.

There are currently 13 such establishments designated for foreign recreation; the five that received warnings and facility renovation orders are as follows:

▲ Lucky (126-16 Itaewon-dong, Yongsan-gu) ▲ Club Midnight (737-32 Hannam-dong, Yongsan-gu) ▲ UN Club (127-1 Itaewon-dong, Yongsan-gu) ▲ Seven Club (136-45 Itaewon-dong, Yongsan-gu) ▲ Grand Hall (136-2 Itaewon-dong, Yongsan-gu)

The last club, "Grand Hall," has the same address as the Grand Ole Opry (and a similar name), though the sign on the Grand Ole Opry states that it opened in March 1975.

Other than Club Midnight in Hannam-dong, the other clubs were nearby. Lucky and Seven were at the bottom of the hill in buildings that still stand today, while UN was around the corner from where it stood in more recent decades (before closing in 2020).

All of the clubs (including 007, King Club, and Playboy) that were popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s are long gone except the Grand Ole Opry, making it something of a window to the past. Plus it still has its original 'special entertainment establishment' license meaning it can serve tax-free drinks that are much less expensive than its neighbouring establishments.

Friday, July 03, 2026

Uncovering stories (and photos) of Cheonggyecheon's restoration

For my latest Korea Times article I looked at the history of the uncovering of Cheonggyecheon Stream ahead of an RAS Korea walk I’m leading to a few (air-conditioned) museums on July 11. 

This is certainly not the first time I've written about the topic - I covered it 20 years ago on this blog here (where I criticized many of Lee Myung-bak's claims about the stream) and here, an a year later here.

A few photos below (taken by me) show how the area has changed over 23 years.

Cheonggye Expressway next to the shoe market at Dongdaemun, March 9, 2003.

Cheonggye Expressway next to the Peace Market at Dongdaemun, March 9, 2003.

I searched for aerial photos (here) and found this shot which shows the two pedestrian overpasses I took the photos from.

Cheonggyecheon’s construction proceeds at Cheonggye-2ga, August 2, 2004 (looking west).

Cheonggyecheon’s construction proceeds at Cheonggye-2ga, August 2, 2004 (looking east).

The same view at Cheonggye-2ga today gives some sense of the changes that have occurred over 22 years.

Cheonggyecheon’s opening weekend, October 2, 2005.

Cheonggyecheon’s opening weekend, October 2, 2005.

A shot of Yoon Do-hyun performing at Seoul Plaza on October 2, 2005, shortly before I passed by a very happy-looking Lee Myung-bak.

A year and a half after opening, bushes and grass had taken root, June 3, 2007.

Remnants of the old expressway, June 3, 2007.

An egret stalks fish at Cheonggyecheon's west end, July 17, 2021.

Almost 16 years after opening, trees cast shade near Supyogyo, July 17, 2021. When I walked by here two weeks ago, I tried to take the same shot but got rather confused when I couldn't find the 3 trees on the right. Unfortunately, they were cut down during the past year. 

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

A closer look at Sindang-dong's gentrification

For my latest Korea Times article I look at how Sindang-dong's gentrification has proceeded (or receded) over the past couple of years, since I wrote this earlier article. As today's article notes, I'll be leading a walk around the area for RAS Korea this Saturday.

For greater detail than what is listed in the article, here are the numbers for the trendy businesses that have opened around Sindang Station / Central Market over the years.


The area has seen its fair share of changes since I moved here eight years ago, but its identity remains intact, which is not always possible when gentrification comes knocking.

(I'll note there are some... odd edits in the published article to the draft I submitted. When defining what makes new businesses 'hip,' it was specifically Instagram, the social media of choice for the MZ generation, that I mentioned as their main means of promotion, not a generic "social media" presence. Mentions of "these businesses" in reference to trendy businesses were also changed in some cases to "new businesses," which is not at all the same thing. The list of new businesses in the area would be much larger, but a run-of-the-mill franchise haejangguk restaurant would not fall under the "hip" or "trendy" label (though I'll admit there's a certain subjective nature to deciding where to draw the line...).)

Wednesday, May 27, 2026

The 1980 Gwangju Uprising: An Account by an 11th Brigade Paratrooper (1987) Part 2

Paratrooper accounts of the Gwangju Uprising

Account by an 11th Brigade paratrooper (1999)

Account by a 3rd Brigade paratrooper (1996)

Account by an 11th Brigade paratrooper (1987) Part 1

Account by an 11th Brigade paratrooper (1987) Part 2

Here is part 2 of an account by a paratrooper from the 11th Brigade, originally published in 1987. The original source is:

윤재걸 편, 『작전명령 화려한 휴가: 광주 민중항쟁의 기록』 (서울: 실천문학사, 1988), 30-60.

Yun Jae-geol, ed., Operation Order Splendid Holiday: A Record of the Kwangju People’s Uprising (Seoul: Silcheon Munhaksa, 1988), 30-60.

* * * * * * *

The “Splendid Holiday” That I Was Sent On

—Memoir of an Airborne Trooper Deployed During the Kwangju Incident

[Part 2: May 21 - 27]

When morning came, the demonstrations became even more violent. Yet that morning, breakfast somehow arrived in front of Sangmugwan through the demonstrator crowds. All the officers and soldiers were eating, but since there were not enough spoons, I was not eating. Then a private first class handed me the spoon he himself had been eating with, saying, ‘Company commander, please eat.’ Even when I told him to eat first, he stubbornly refused. In the end, I accepted it, but before I had even eaten half, word came that the front line facing the demonstrators was dangerous and that we should quickly assemble toward the demonstrators’ side. Even the meal delivered after several days could not properly be eaten, and when we returned again toward the demonstrators, it had become utterly impossible to suppress the protest anymore.

Today was May 21. In front of the fountain at the Provincial Office, the large arch made for ‘Buddha’s Birthday’ and such things looked utterly out of place. During a brief standoff, I slipped away alone to Sangmugwan to drink water and met a policeman from my hometown there. I was glad to see him. For a short while we talked about our hometown. I was so happy and pleased, as though I had met an older brother.

Going back out again toward the demonstrators, I climbed onto a flower planter on the sidewalk and looked ahead. At the front of the demonstrators were large buses, trucks, and other vehicles positioned in confrontation, while we had two armored vehicles in the center of the road, and by chance our regional unit stood at the very front on both sides. The Special Forces troops stood in ranks about twenty men across, while police stood at intervals of about twenty meters. The morale and hatred of the demonstrators had reached an extreme. Conversely, our morale had fallen to an extreme low. No—everyone wore expressions of fear. In the hands of the demonstrators were sickles, saws, and all sorts of things that could become weapons. In particular, some demonstrators had attached sickles or knives to wooden poles, hooking sickles around our necks as we stood in the front line or pressing knives against our chests. Saying, “Hey, I sharpened this sickle well. Want me to yank it?” some young demonstrators would hook a sickle around my neck. At the time I did not feel shocked or frightened at all, but thinking about it now gives me chills and scares me.

By around 10 a.m. on May 21 on Geumnam-ro, the situation was already rushing toward something unavoidable. It was said that out of Gwangju’s population of about 800,000, some 400,000 citizens were demonstrating on Geumnam-ro or around the Provincial Office. Why had so many citizens gathered? In particular, there were many housewives and young women. The reason was simple. The hardline suppression had brought out a terrible force among the citizens. On the martial law forces’ side, hardline suppression had been ordered from higher command from the very beginning, and in my opinion the conception behind these orders was the foolish result derived from the hardline suppression during the Bu-Ma Incident, while the Gwangju Incident had already been conceived at the time of the 12.12 Incident.

In particular, because Gwangju, the capital of South Jeolla Province, had few outsiders living there, everyone was connected, and once connections were followed everyone knew one another, so people flocked one after another to Geumnam-ro in response to the martial law forces’ harsh suppression. As middle-aged women came carrying gimbap, rice cakes, and the like to distribute to the demonstrators, the demonstrators ate this food while quenching their thirst with beer and soft drinks piled high in vehicles, becoming extremely excited. From the air, helicopters conducted propaganda broadcasts and scattered countless leaflets appealing for restraint in the demonstrations, but there was not a single demonstrator who listened or looked at the leaflets.

After those of us positioned at the front switched places with the rear ranks, and the unit behind us came forward and moved beside the Provincial Office fountain, the commanders began distributing live ammunition. Only officers and sergeants were given ten rounds each. There was not much live ammunition. This was because we carried only the minimum emergency ammunition. We inserted the issued rounds into magazines and, so that we could fire at any moment, kept them in the side pockets of our trousers rather than attaching them to our rifles.

At this point an emergency meeting of the commanders began. The purpose of the meeting was: “We absolutely cannot drive back the demonstrators, nor can we break through this huge crowd, and if this many troops and police engage in close combat with these enormous numbers of demonstrators, it will be easy for half the military and police forces to be killed or wounded—so by what method can we drive them back?” Various sergeants, officers, and commanders attended, but no conclusion could be reached. They contacted Martial Law Command, explained the present situation, and proposed that “we be allowed to carry out authorized firing,” but were told that this was absolutely not permitted. Thinking about it now, that was only natural, but at the time it seemed unbearably cold-hearted.  [50]

Various methods were proposed. Among them, it was decided to adopt the following method.

The proposal was: “Using the M203 [grenade launcher] weapons carried by the sergeants, fire into intervals among the demonstrators, and in order to prevent vehicles from pushing forward, have snipers shoot the demonstrators driving the vehicles and then shoot the tires of the following vehicles.” Since there was no “order to fire” from higher command, the problem later would be responsibility. Fortunately, several commanders said that even if we were turned over to military court and even sentenced to death, we could not allow all our subordinates to be killed, so we should carry it out. But on the other hand, it was too enormous. If M203 rounds were dropped among the demonstrators, since they were like grenades with a lethal radius of five meters, and if not just one or two rounds but hundreds were fired, and if firing were carried out from the front, it was obvious that thousands would be killed or wounded.

For twenty to thirty minutes the argument continued. The conclusion was that we should wait a little longer for instructions from Martial Law Command. Again, by radio, they urged Martial Law Command to “issue an order to fire.” At that time students and several women came to negotiate. The students’ demeanor was extremely confident. Their conditions were roughly as follows: “The martial law forces must immediately withdraw from the city, immediately release all detainees through the Provincial Office microphone system, provide sufficient compensation for the dead, and apologize for the hardline suppression of the citizens of Gwangju.” However, the commanders replied that they absolutely could not comply. Then the representatives went to the Provincial Office saying they would negotiate with the provincial governor.

Again we moved to the very front of the demonstrators. At this time the demonstrators’ side already knew that we had been issued live ammunition. They asked us, “Did you receive live rounds?” We answered that we had. Now the distance between the demonstrators and us had narrowed to about five or six meters. The demonstrators in front did not seem to want to approach, but the demonstrators behind kept pushing them so that they were gradually forced closer and closer forward. At this time two armored vehicles were facing the demonstrators, but one of them pulled away because the situation on the Chungjang-ro side, where the 7th Airborne Brigade was confronting demonstrators, was said to be critical, and it went to support that area.

Now a single armored vehicle was left facing countless vehicles, and our hearts also became uneasy. However, having been issued live ammunition made us feel somewhat reassured. The terrifying confrontation between the demonstrators and the martial law forces continued. Both sides were careful not to inflame each other’s emotions. This was because if either side pushed or was pushed back, it would herald terrible bloodshed. By now it seemed that the police helicopters, which had been landing and taking off by the fountain carrying important documents and wounded personnel, had transported almost everything.

Around 1 p.m., the A.P.C. armored vehicle that had been idling in the middle of the road briefly stalled. This was because it had been running since morning and they were trying to cool the engine for a moment. This became an enormous problem. When the armored vehicle rolled back about one or two meters, the demonstrators all at once began charging forward with vehicles at the front. In an instant we turned and began fleeing toward the Provincial Office. Police and martial law troops alike fled toward the Sangmugwan building, and the Provincial Office line collapsed.

I ran toward the Nonghyup building and then tried to cross the road again toward Sangmugwan, when an A.P.C. armored vehicle driven by the demonstrators struck two soldiers. One of them seemed to have had his head crushed under the front and rear wheels, while the other was caught between the wheels and, suffering only minor injuries, lay collapsed there. The vehicle that the demonstrators had brought behind it could not bring itself to run him over, stopped briefly, seized only one M16 rifle, and then drove off in the opposite direction from the Provincial Office. The surviving soldier got up and crawled toward Sangmugwan, while right beside him I dragged the body of the dead soldier toward the front of Sangmugwan. When I looked at his face I could not recognize him, so I wiped the blood from his name tag and saw that he was the soldier who had handed me a spoon that morning at breakfast and told me to eat.

Seeing such a miserable death, tears burst from my eyes. I also felt rage toward the demonstrators. Many soldiers witnessed this scene. An excited officer shouted, “Open fire!” “Fire!” and all at once everyone loaded live rounds into their rifles and ran out toward Geumnam-ro. Then firing began. However, those thousands of gunshots were at first mostly warning shots fired into the air. As branches from the ginkgo trees lining Geumnam-ro fell to the ground, the gunfire, sounding like beans popping in a pan, continued for two or three minutes.

Sniper personnel headed toward Geumnam-ro, took prone firing positions on the asphalt, prepared to shoot, and began securing key buildings. At that moment, from a building beside the Jeonil Building, a young man came limping out, shouting, “You sons of bitches, kill me!” and sat down in the middle of the road only twenty or thirty meters in front of the snipers. When the snipers fired several shots, he collapsed to the side. When demonstrators hiding in an alley came out to retrieve the body, firing resumed and those demonstrators also fell.

At that moment a Daechang Passenger city bus carrying demonstrators charged toward us. As the snipers scattered out of the way, automatic fire began. The bus could go no farther and crashed into the fountain. This was because the driver had been killed...

Then, shortly afterward, an A.P.C. armored vehicle came charging forward waving the Taegukgi, with men bare-chested and white cloths tied around their heads, opening the hatch as they advanced. A sniper riding in our armored vehicle aimed and waited, and when it came within barely twenty meters, he fired the .50 caliber weapon. The men ducked their heads down, and the armored vehicle passed in front of the Nonghyup building and escaped. The police appeared to have retreated entirely into the Provincial Office; not a single one was visible. One demonstrator climbed onto the roof of the Nonghyup building carrying a rifle and fired at us below while exposing only his head, but when a sniper below, who had been aiming and waiting, fired, he fell from the roof.

Everything was a living hell. Casualties lay on the roads here and there. From that point onward, everyone except the snipers and minimum guard personnel was assembled, and orders came down from higher command to withdraw, meaning “escape and break out.” We were to withdraw in teams; not to expend all our ammunition, and if we were captured by demonstrators while trying to escape the city and faced being horribly killed, we were to use the distributed live ammunition to fire back. Those who still had ammunition were told to distribute even a single round each to soldiers who had none. Since I had not fired a single shot up to that point, I gave seven rounds to other soldiers and kept three rounds for myself. This was because if I were captured by the demonstrators, I intended to place the rifle muzzle against my chest and commit suicide on automatic fire. I did not particularly value my life nor feel fear. I only wished either to escape this place after seeing my mother one more time, or else to die.

Around that time, sounds slicing through the air — “swoosh, swoosh” — began passing by our side. It was machine-gun fire. The radio operator on the roof of the Provincial Office informed us that firing was coming from the roof of the Chonnam National University Medical School Hospital. There was a tremendous amount of firing, and it was coming from an advantageous building position. Several men volunteered. They said we should seize Chonnam National University Hospital and take away the machine gun. There were a little under two companies, about fifty men. But the commander told them to wait for a moment. Since we would soon be withdrawing, he said there was no need to go. Up to that point there had been no casualties from the machine-gun fire.

Around 5 p.m. the withdrawal began. One armored vehicle took the lead and another the rear, while all personnel stood along both sides of the road and withdrew toward Chosun University. The armored vehicle at the front continued firing its .50 caliber machine gun all the way to the front of Chosun University, repeatedly moving back and forth several times, while we retreated on foot. We returned fire at demonstrators who fired on us from alleys or from the rooftops of buildings as we withdrew to Chosun University.

When we arrived at the athletic field of Chosun University, dinner happened to be ready, and as we ate, gunfire poured into the grounds from all directions. However, as far as I know, there were still no casualties from this firing. At the Chosun University athletic field, live ammunition was distributed once again: sixty rounds per person. Carrying only the minimum equipment, all other gear was gathered in the gymnasium, the doors were locked from outside, and we withdrew over the mountain behind Chosun University.

Meanwhile, before this, all vehicles carrying administrative personnel and wounded men had needed to leave Gwangju and head to the 31st Division headquarters [at Sangmudae], but the city, and especially the major buildings in front of Chosun University, were already tightly guarded by armed demonstrators.  [53]

With an armored vehicle at the very front leading the way and numerous vehicles following behind, a firefight broke out there as well. Two or three martial law troops were killed, many vehicles had their tires shot out, and they eventually reached Sangmudae.

There, one sergeant later said that he and his driver had been riding in the third vehicle from the front. As countless shots were fired at the vehicle from all directions, he himself leaned half his body outside and fired at buildings and other positions while they drove along. Then the vehicle struck the curb on the side of the road and he was thrown outside, though fortunately he was not injured. When he climbed back into the vehicle, the driver had already died from a gunshot wound to the chest. He tried to drive the vehicle himself, but even the tires had been shot and it could no longer move. He repeatedly tried to stop the vehicles following behind, but none stopped, until finally he managed to stop the last vehicle and escape aboard it. He said that even now he had not forgotten his gratitude toward the driver who stopped for him.

As we retreated over the mountain behind Chosun University, firing had already begun from behind the martial law forces. The sound of massive gunfire rang out. Tracer rounds flew continuously overhead, and sirens wailed and buzzed. Gwangju had now changed into a city armed by the demonstrators. During the retreat we also encountered many police officers. They were exactly like us. They were simply anxious because they were unarmed. Some wore civilian clothes, some wore only military trousers, and some policemen had even taken off their combat boots and gone barefoot. Everyone seemed to be victims of an enormous disaster.

After crossing the mountain behind Chosun University, we rested briefly in what seemed to be a cemetery. Leaning between graves to rest for a moment, I ended up falling asleep. When I awoke, the main force had disappeared somewhere, and only six of us were still asleep. Fortunately there was a radio operator with us, and when we contacted the others by radio they tried to guide us during the night, but we could not follow the directions. Wandering around while trying to catch up with the main force, we ended up back inside the city again. Panic-stricken, we once more moved through residential alleys and climbed a small hill, where we spent the night. When morning came, we continued moving over the hills, searching only for places where helicopters were landing.

Two helicopters spent the entire day landing and taking off halfway up the mountain. Fortunately, by dusk we reached that place, where enormous quantities of live ammunition, grenades, food supplies, and the like were piled up like mountains. It was the brigade headquarters. It was also a natural fortress. It lay along the slopes of Mudeungsan on the road from Gwangju toward Hwasun. At the front, two armored vehicles had been concealed behind cover, while ambush positions had been set in the forests on both sides.

As we spent the night there, gunfire beginning around 9 p.m. continued until morning. It did not stop even for a moment. When morning came, two wounded farmers arrived on handcarts with gunshot wounds. One was a man about fifty years old who had been shot seven times across his body and was nearly dying. [54] Another was a high school student with a gunshot wound to the shoulder. After all of them were transported by helicopter to a military hospital, thoughts of my late father again became overwhelming. I missed my father, who had spent his whole life farming before passing away, and tears welled in my eyes.

Around that time a radio message came in saying that thirteen demonstrators had been shot dead on the road below the mountain and that three wounded people were being brought in. A short time later, two people were brought on handcarts, along with a second-year female high school student whose right hand had been shot, severing two fingers. They say human life clings stubbornly to existence. The two young demonstrators (up to then we had called the citizens “rioters”) had been struck by numerous bullets across their bodies, yet they were fully conscious and still alive. One young man in particular had even had a bullet pass through his eye and was still alive. The smell of blood was overwhelming.

I asked where they lived, and they answered, “Jisan-dong.” When I asked their ages, they said twenty-one and twenty-three. When I asked their occupations, one said he was a student at Chonnam National University, while the other said he had none. As fellow young men, they seemed terribly pitiful and tragic to me. I wanted to save them somehow.

Another sergeant came over and said, “These sons of bitches were demonstrating,” while beginning to search their pockets. In their pockets were around thirty carbine rounds and a few bloodstained bills. I thought they were waiting for a helicopter to transport them to a military hospital, but then a major arrived and said, “Why did you bring those bastards here? Hurry up and take them down and kill them.” A sergeant from the same unit answered, “Yes, sir,” and pulled the handcart back down the hill. I followed after him. I wanted, at the very least, for them to be sent to a hospital for treatment, and to prevent them from being killed.

Two or three minutes later I followed after them, but they had already reached the roadside and were untying the ropes that bound them. I said, “There’s no need to kill them. Let’s just send them back to the demonstrators.” The sergeant replied, “What’s wrong with you, bastard? You’re just like them.” He outranked me, so I could say no more. They lifted them down from the handcart and then fired three more shots each into their heads. There was no writhing, no screaming, no sound at all. Only their bodies trembled… Up ahead, people were digging a pit with shovels borrowed from nearby houses to bury the bodies.

That morning, May 23, around 8 a.m., one detachment (an infantry squad) guarding the road to block demonstrators attempting to advance toward Hwasun had spotted a minibus traveling from the Gwangju direction toward Hwasun. The squad had lay prone on both sides of the road, and when one soldier stood in the middle of the road raising his hand, the bus stopped and fired a carbine rifle at the officer who had raised his hand. At that, all personnel lying on both sides of the road had opened fire simultaneously. Of the eighteen people aboard (including three women), thirteen died in the bus and three were severely wounded (including one female high school student). Two, as mentioned earlier, were then executed, while two others escaped by breaking the rear bus window and fleeing. The bodies of those killed were buried together in a single pit that had been dug for that purpose. [55]

Arms and legs were visible, and flies gathered, drawn by the smell of blood. It was agonizing. My heart was so tormented and sorrowful at seeing who was shooting and killing whom in this way. Looking inside the bus, the seats and floor were soaked with blood. Tears flowed from my eyes. But I could not show tears in front of my comrades and my seniors and juniors.

Then personnel from our unit came again toward brigade headquarters in order to move ammunition and other equipment. That afternoon, on the 23rd, we were told that we would advance into Gwangju once again, so each man carried 560 rounds of live ammunition and one grenade as we prepared to enter. Orders were given to thoroughly maintain our weapons, and sectors to be secured within the city were assigned to each team. Our team’s sector was the Chungjang-ro intersection. We listened to explanations of the area from a soldier who lived in Gwangju, and after finishing weapon maintenance, one tank per battalion was assigned in support. The tanks would lead, with the rest of us following behind, and we were re-instructed: “Absolutely do not retreat.”

Already so many had been killed and wounded, yet once again terrible bloodshed was being foretold. It was obvious as fire itself that carrying 560 rounds of ammunition, one grenade, M203 launchers, and other fearsome firepower into the city again to seize control would lead to carnage. I almost wished to be wounded so I could leave this place. It was not because I was afraid or trying to avoid things. Rather, I simply did not want to see or hear about the people of my hometown falling in such a dreadful manner.

K, what would you have done at that time? Gathered in groups in various places, the soldiers talked only of how this time they would shoot and kill anything they saw without condition. In one sense it may have been foolish; in another, perhaps it was the natural reaction of comrades who had lost fellow soldiers.

We had been told to depart at 8 p.m. that day (the 23rd), but at 6 p.m. sudden orders came that we would not enter the city after all. Some soldiers felt deflated. At the time and even now, I think it was fortunate. From what I heard that night, the order to open fire had officially been issued effective from 8 p.m. on the 21st. But firing had already begun before that. That night too we simply remained in the mountains, and throughout the entire night the sound of gunfire never ceased even briefly. It was the sound of demonstrators infiltrating our area and firefights breaking out with the perimeter units.

From that day onward, orders from the Army Chief of Staff were broadcast throughout all of Gwangju over the radio. Everyone was told to surrender all firearms, and the “rioters” were ordered to turn themselves in. It was then that I realized I did not know who the rioters were, or who had massacred whom.

After spending that night awake, we were ordered to prepare for withdrawal and then assemble. We gathered on the road, and while waiting because the withdrawal vehicles had not yet arrived, a funeral bier loaded on a handcart was passing by. A certain major personally loaded live rounds into his pistol and inspected the inside of the bier, even opening the coffin lid. The mourners following behind could only weep silently.

A private car arrived, and when they inspected the trunk there were many bags inside. When the bags were searched, enormous quantities of banknotes, bankbooks, and jewelry emerged. By my judgment at the time, it amounted to tens of millions of won and a tremendous amount of valuables. By then, the direction toward Hwasun had already been blocked by the 20th Division, the Naju-Mokpo direction had been blocked by the Gwangju Infantry School, and the Seoul expressway entrance was also blocked by the 20th Division.

Vehicles from the 20th Division arrived, and we boarded according to organizational order: 1st Battalion, 7th Airborne Brigade, 2nd Battalion, brigade headquarters company, then 3rd Battalion [followed by the 11th Brigade in the rear]. To reach the 31st Division we had to pass briefly through the city. However, we discovered a side road that allowed us to avoid advancing through the city, but when we turned back to follow this road, our battalion unexpectedly ended up at the very front in reverse order. The armored vehicle that had been bringing up the rear now moved to the front, and we who had been following at the very back now became the lead element.

As we were about to take the side road from Hwasun toward Naju, .50 caliber fire suddenly opened from the armored vehicle. Those of us following behind also began firing while guarding the left and right sides.

Directly on the road leading from Gwangju to Naju, instructors and officers from the 31st Division Infantry School had established a blockade. They were armed with 3.5-inch rocket launchers (for destroying tanks), machine guns, Claymores, and the like. Apparently the squad serving as a listening post in front of this blockade force heard the gunfire and reported to their unit that rioters were advancing. At the time they had received intelligence that demonstrators wearing reserve-force uniforms were moving toward Mokpo, so they were already tense. When our enormous vehicle column appeared, they mistook us for demonstrators and fired a 3.5-inch rocket launcher at the armored vehicle. With a tremendous explosion that shook heaven and earth, I saw the infantry support .50 caliber gunner fly through the air like a bird before crashing onto the asphalt.

Then, continuing on, they fired accurately at every other vehicle — the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and so on. Our vehicle too was struck by a rocket round in the front. The entire front section of the vehicle disappeared (the driver was killed and the company commander severely wounded), and four or five men riding in the front screamed for help from their wounds. Together with the thousands of gunshots and grenade blasts, it was truly the hell of war itself. Up to that moment I had believed it was a fierce battle with demonstrators defending Gwangju.

We were ordered to dismount and search the nearby hills and houses. Leaving the wounded lying by the roadside, we advanced in firing positions while searching the hills, when I spotted a Claymore mine mounted on pine branches. Cold sweat burst from me. I had no idea when it might explode. I cut the Claymore’s wire with my bayonet. No one was there.

Again we crossed the ridge and descended toward the houses. When a certain sergeant arrived at one house to search it, a dog began barking. They even shot the dog, though it had committed no crime. Two small children and a man who appeared to be in his forties simply trembled in fear inside the room.

Meanwhile, in the village ahead, a farmer was wailing that three or four of his dairy cows had been shot and killed. It seemed the cows were his very livelihood.

[57] From the hills in that area, two young men suspected of being demonstrators were brought in. Their hands were tightly bound behind their backs, and their faces had been beaten so badly that they were unrecognizable. As they were brought along, people began striking them one after another with rifle butts. Then they were ordered to “Lie down” in the stream flowing nearby. I could see their entire bodies trembling violently. They insisted that they absolutely were not demonstrators. They said they worked at a nearby briquette factory. From what I could see, that seemed true. But their excuses were useless.

As I sat on the hillside watching this scene, before I knew it two Cobra helicopters — famous from the Vietnam War — were circling overhead. Up to then the gunfire had continued, and apparently they had neither been able to sit down nor locate the demonstrators who had attacked.

When I went toward the front, it was truly a land of death. Burning vehicles, seven or eight corpses, shattered armored vehicles, commanders severely wounded, men crying out that all their subordinates were dying while requesting reinforcements, and a commander, grievously wounded, clutching a radio and rolling on the ground in agony while shouting, “Armed helicopter support! Armed helicopter support!” … It pained my heart terribly. The Infantry School blocking force at the front had already fled before our overwhelming firepower.

Helicopters landed and began loading bodies. One captain in particular had been struck in the abdomen by a rocket round and his body had been torn in half, so they wrapped him in a blanket before loading him aboard. There was no expression for it except: “Hell, it was hell itself.” Generals including the Special Warfare Command commander and the brigade commander descended one after another from the helicopters. But the situation had already passed beyond remedy, and there was nothing that could be done.

Around the time the helicopters had transported nearly all the casualties and the twenty or thirty wounded men, a farmer was brought from the rear on a handcart pulled by his daughter. He had been working in the rice paddies when he was struck by gunfire, and his daughter was so terrified she could not even cry. What crime had there been in simply working in the fields… Since nearly all the vehicles had burned up, I returned again toward the rear where our unit was, and they told us to prepare for withdrawal.

Up to that moment, the two young men who had earlier been captured were still lying face down. Then a certain officer said, “Hey — execute them.” “Yes, sir,” someone replied, and after releasing the safety on his M16, he fired three shots — bang, bang, bang — into the young man in front, and then fired three shots into the young man behind him. Their bodies trembled in the water. Human life was so insignificant and miserable.

Then another sergeant fired additional shots into the dead youths to make sure they were dead. I felt as if I were inside a dream. Everything unfolding before my eyes seemed unreal. But the misery was real. Leaving the bodies where they lay, we divided ourselves among several vehicles and arrived at Songjeong-ri Airfield. We began living inside the airport hangars. Lavish food — beef, chicken, and so on — was served. We said among ourselves that they must be giving us so much meat because so many people had died, and we hardly ate it. Instead we spent the time thinking painfully about our dead comrades and the comrades who had been wounded up to then.

We arrived at the airfield on May 24 and spent three days there maintaining equipment and the like. On the morning of the 26th, the personnel clerk (a senior sergeant) wrote down our addresses, blood types, home telephone numbers, and so forth. Even when we asked what it was for, there was no answer. But we knew. It was either for a parachute drop into the city or for an infiltration by land to seize Gwangju again.

After lunch, several senior sergeants assembled us again wearing ordinary combat uniforms rather than camouflage and carrying only light field gear. They told us that operations would begin that night and ordered us to prepare our magazines and equipment and assemble. Once again live ammunition, grenades, M203 grenade launchers, and other lethal equipment were issued, along with flak jackets.

There was a brief explanation of the operation plan. We were to depart by helicopter at 1600 hours, infiltrate the mountains behind Chosun University, and proceed on foot toward the Tourist Hotel as our objective. There was also ideological instruction from senior commanders. In addition, they explained the current situation inside the city. According to the explanation, securing the city was only a matter of time. However, there were said to be about four tons of TNT in the basement of the Provincial Office. They said special intelligence personnel had successfully infiltrated and removed the detonators, but that detonators had been obtained somewhere else, and if the explosives were set off when the martial law forces entered, not only we but everything within three kilometers around the Provincial Office would be destroyed. In one sense, this frightened me. But having endured those hellish days so far without any injury, I thought perhaps this time too I might somehow survive.

At 1800 hours we boarded helicopters. Then, with all radio communication cut off, we landed in the mountains behind Chosun University. Our operational team consisted of thirty men divided into seven groups. A drizzle was falling, and apart from the occasional whining sound of fire engines, Gwangju city was relatively quiet.

However, once daylight came, infiltration by land became impossible. We decided to wait in the rain until darkness fell again. Once more we loaded live ammunition into our rifles and prepared grenades and the like for immediate use.

Around midnight, as we followed the side of Chosun University and bypassed the Provincial Office, approaching the Geumnam-ro area, vehicles equipped with loudspeakers and microphones drove around shouting: “The martial law forces have invaded! Citizens of Gwangju, take up your guns and gather at the Provincial Office!” Almost simultaneously, the .50 caliber machine gun installed on the roof of the Provincial Office began spraying gunfire randomly throughout the city. We lay prone in alleys between buildings while countless live rounds poured over our heads. But it was clear they had not discovered us and were simply firing indiscriminately. [59]

Then, just as the weapons sergeant was crossing Geumnam-ro and passing beside the Tourist Hotel in order for part of our force to move around to the rear, a mobile strike unit of demonstrators suddenly advanced toward us, leading with a jeep and carrying demonstrators in four vehicles behind it. We all held our breath and lay flat on the ground, and they failed to notice us and simply passed by.

Two groups of twelve men secured the alleys behind the Tourist Hotel, while we attempted to destroy the shuttered front entrance using M203 launchers. At that moment thousands of gunshots began ringing out from the Provincial Office and elsewhere. At times we could also hear grenades and M203 rounds exploding.

In front of the Tourist Hotel, two M203 launchers first fired toward the main entrance, then seven or eight rounds were fired at lit areas from the first floor upward. After that, two grenades were thrown into the entrance, and we rushed inside firing our M16s wildly. Unexpectedly, however, only a few people were there. In several rooms rifles and liquor bottles lay scattered about in disorder. The personnel who had entered from the rear said the same thing.

From this point we began radio communications again. It was around 4 a.m. Meanwhile, fierce fighting was reportedly underway at the Provincial Office, which the 3rd Airborne Brigade had been assigned to secure, so we were ordered to proceed there and enter the Provincial Office by way of the tax office.

When we arrived at the Provincial Office, gunfire continued to be directed at us from the building. It seemed that much of it was not aimed fire but warning fire. Supporting one another over the wall one by one, we repeatedly announced over a microphone: “Surrender.” A few demonstrators came out with their hands raised. But most still refused to yield.

The 3rd Airborne Brigade forces broke through the main gate of the Provincial Office, entered through the lobby, searched the first floor, and dragged out many demonstrators. All of them were remarkably brave. The demonstrators were brave, and the martial law troops were brave as well.

It was around 4 a.m. The Provincial Office was now completely secured. However, at 5 a.m. we were scheduled to rendezvous with forces from the 20th Division, hand over the Provincial Office to them, and then withdraw. One sergeant from our team had been shot in the chest despite wearing a flak jacket, so I loaded him into a civilian vehicle and drove toward the Gwangju Integrated Hospital. But as we passed in front of the Asia Theater, concentrated gunfire suddenly began pouring at us from both sides of the road and from buildings. Bullets rained onto the vehicle as if in a storm. The driver and I threw ourselves down in the front of the vehicle.

When the firing stopped, I looked at the driver and saw that he had already died. Carefully peering outside over the vehicle, I could make out figures in the dawn light — they were soldiers. Seeing a civilian vehicle speeding along, the 20th Division troops, who had already secured the area, must have mistaken us for demonstrators and opened concentrated fire. But when I tried to open the car door and get out, I was too frightened to move. Everyone around the buildings and the road was clearly focused on my vehicle, and if they realized someone inside was still alive, they would surely think I was a demonstrator and fire again.

I decided to wait until daylight, when they could clearly see me. I called to the badly wounded sergeant in the back seat, but there was no answer. He appeared already dead. Blood was continuing to flow into my boot from my right calf, soaking it completely.

Beside me, the dead driver remained leaning against me with his eyes open. It had all happened in barely five or six minutes. Yet it felt like endless hours passing by.

Then came the sound of footsteps — heavy military boots. They were coming to confirm whether we had been killed. Thousands of thoughts crossed my mind. What if they saw me lying there and fired again to make sure I was dead? Perhaps I too had been struck somewhere else and was slowly dying. What would the world after death be like? The smell of blood and gunpowder filled my nose.

Finally, three men came right up beside the car and slightly opened the front door. I suddenly sprang up and shouted, “Hey, don’t shoot! Martial law forces!” A captain, apparently the company commander, asked, “Are you hurt?” I explained everything that had happened and asked, “Whose order was it to fire?” He replied that up to then they had been fighting demonstrators and had thought we were demonstrators. In short, it was friendly fire.

I rode in a 20th Division ambulance to the Integrated Hospital, where even outside the building patients overflowed everywhere like a marketplace. Fortunately, the bullet had merely penetrated the metal body of the vehicle and lodged in my leg. After removing the bullet and stopping the bleeding, they sent me back to the airfield. The sergeant being transported with me had been struck by six additional bullets during the friendly-fire incident, but they said his life was not in danger.

Everything was over.

I again reported back to my unit. Our team had two wounded men. But the gunshot wound in my leg began hurting more and more. I returned to the Integrated Hospital and was admitted there. The hospital was overflowing with patients — people whose hands or arms had been severed, people whose legs had been amputated, people with penetrating abdominal wounds, and countless others.

After remaining at the Integrated Hospital for two days, I was transferred again to the Integrated Hospital in Seoul, where I received inpatient treatment for two weeks before rejoining my main unit at Kyung Hee University.

K, what I have written until now about the Gwangju Incident consists of the things I personally felt, witnessed, and did. I spoke with many comrades, and the suppression of the incident was much the same for them as it was for me.

Thinking about it now, I believe the only solution is to clear the citizens of the false label of “rioters,” for those who were central figures at the time to reveal everything and apologize, and for the martial law troops who were deployed in suppressing the incident and the citizens to meet again and create an opportunity for reconciliation. This is because both the citizens and the martial law troops are now victims.

The Gwangju Incident was ignited by the initial excessive suppression and merciless beatings, and because the citizens’ demands continued to be ignored and met only with proclamations without any apology from those in high positions, the citizens did not lay down their weapons and the situation was ultimately suppressed by force.

Even now, to the citizens of Gwangju who suffered from this tragedy and remain filled with resentment, I write these words with deep reflection and apology.

November 25, 1987

* * * * * * *

I've previously noted the differences between the 3rd Brigade and 11th Brigade accounts, including the differences in degree of contrition (higher among the 11th Brigade veterans, lower among those of the 3rd Brigade), and another point to consider is that both of the 11th Brigade veterans who wrote accounts were wounded in friendly fire incidents, which no doubt contributes to them feeling conflicted or remorseful about the events of May 1980.

His statement that the officers at the Provincial Office were considering using grenade launchers on the crowds... rather horribly makes the 'mere' use of rifle fire seem moderate in comparison. The fact that retreat from the Provincial Office would be difficult amid the surging, angry crowds and - more importantly - was forbidden by their superiors clearly contributed to the the fatal decision to open fire, but it doesn't feel like much insight into that decision is on offer above.

That said, a lot of the details surrounding the shooting in front of the Provincial Office differ from other sources, but that's not entirely surprising considering how chaotic it was. He says, for example, that the shooting happened before 2 soldiers were run over by an APC, while most accounts agree that this happened before the shooting. As well, it is generally considered that it was a tracked military APC that ran over the two soldiers (one of whom died immediately) - something stated in the account of the other 11th Brigade paratrooper - when it reversed to avoid being hit by a four-wheeled APC commandeered by protesters that had charged suddenly at the military lines. The incident involving the vehicle that charged the soldiers, was fired on, and crashed into the fountain also, according to a number of sources, occurred before the mass shooting. It’s interesting that he remembers the mass shooting being an angry response to the two soldiers being run over, when my understanding is that orders had been given allowing for firing upon charging vehicles (such as the vehicle that was shot and crashed into the fountain) but that the order to open fire en masse was a specific, newly-given order. This account says otherwise, that they fired without orders. It seems that even today the exact facts of the matter aren't entirely clear.

He also describes a protester firing at them from a rooftop with a rifle soon after the mass firing began, and describes citizens firing a machine gun at them from the top of a hospital. This was described in 죽음을 넘어 시대의 어둠을 넘어 : 광주 5월 민중항쟁의 기록, an account of the uprising published in 1985 and published in translation as Kwangju Diary (1999), but a footnote in the translation read:

There are conflicting accounts as to whether the rebels actually fired the machine guns on the roof of the hospital. Now it seems certain that the militia did not fire the L.M.G.s. In his book Sibilkan ui ch’wijae such’ op (A reporter’s diary of ten days), Kim Yŏng-t’aek, who covered the uprising for Korea’s prestigious Dong A Il Bo, later wrote: “There were several young men-who appeared to be students-working on something on the top of the twelve-story Chŏnnam University Hospital. ... For a while they were busy at work, then the barrels of two L.M.G.s came into view ... The installation of these two machine guns was of great importance. The militia, now armed with automatic weapons, was threatening the soldiers on the roof of Province Hall ... However, the students would not attack soldiers [with machine guns] at the price of the innocent citizens... The machine guns were never fired. Indeed they [the students] were wise ... (Before they finally decided to withdraw from the city, the military considered sending in a strike team to remove the L.M.G.s[from the hospital].” (Quoted in O il p’ al ku sam kwa ch’ugum ui kirok [May 18: the record of life and death] (Seoul: P’ulpit, 1996),(452.)

If it is now agreed they didn't fire the machine gun, one wonders if the veteran who authored the above account may have read the 1985 book and been influenced by it. The timing in his account is also confusing because in the space of a page he goes from the mass shooting that takes place around 1:00 p.m. to withdrawal at 5:00 p.m.. 

A machine gun makes another appearance at the end of his account during the final assault on the Provincial Office, when he writes "Almost simultaneously, the .50 caliber machine gun installed on the roof of the Provincial Office began spraying gunfire randomly throughout the city." I've never heard of a .50 caliber machine gun being installed on the roof of the Provincial Office, and find the idea that they were "spraying gunfire randomly throughout the city" - and thereby putting citizens living in the area at risk - to be rather unlikely. 

I hadn't known about the Tourist Hotel being a target of the final assault, and am not sure why it was. 

He also provides accounts of the friendly fire incident that killed so many 11th Brigade soldiers and the shooting of minibus survivors (he doesn't make it clear that the high school girl survived).

It's been stated for decades (see this post from 2009) that at least some paratroopers could be considered to be victims in regard to events in Gwangju in 1980; at the very least they were (mis)used by Chun Doo-hwan's new military group to guarantee their coup succeeded. Hopefully this series of paratrooper accounts helps to show how the more simplistic narratives of "blameless citizens" and "evil martial law troops" conceal a much more complex reality. If only there was an account by a 7th Brigade veteran (the brigade that set off the uprising on May 18) to help shed light on what set everything in motion.