The March 1945 revolt of Korean forced labourers against Japanese on Mili Atoll

[Update at bottom, June 16.]

Recent news reports have brought up forced mobilization of Koreans in the South Pacific during WWII, with Yasuto Takeuchi, a Japanese expert on the topic, giving a talk in Gwangju in which he said most sent to the Marshall Islands (635 of the 640) were from Jeollanam-do. (This differs from numbers he gave a week earlier, as reported in the Hankyoreh.) What most caught my eye was this reference to Mili Atoll:

Mili Atoll is where the Japanese military forcibly mobilized 800 Koreans as military personnel in 1942 to build military bases, including an airfield. Takeuchi said last year that 213 of 218 Koreans who died in Mili Atoll at that time were residents of South Jeolla.

Not mentioned in that Korea Times article (but described in the Hankyoreh article) is something reported much earlier in the Korea Times. In 2010, an ROK government committee announced the results of its three-year probe of Japan's forced mobilization of Koreans during WWII which found that "As many as 100 Koreans, who were forcibly mobilized by Japan to build military facilities on the Marshall Islands, were indiscriminately killed in a rebellion that appears to have started after they were forced to eat human flesh" which had been "disguised as ‘whale meat' after the Japanese forces ran out of food."

My ears perked up as I read this because the name sounded familiar, and a search through materials I scanned while doing my MA proved me right. At that time, I scanned a few pages of the fascinating newspaper (or newsletter) “The Voice of Korea” which was published in Washington DC during WWII (and after) and reprinted and collected into a bound book at the UW library. The full, 2-page story of the Korean rebellion on Mili Atoll, and the attempts by the US military to rescue islanders and Koreans from the grip of the Japanese is a fascinating one, complete with photos of the rescue operation. (Note that there are no mentions of cannibalism, perhaps because it was considered to 'strong' a topic for readers at the time.) 

Worth noting is the fact that if not for the US Marines' timing, there might have been no survivors.

The following is from The Voice of Korea, Nov. 5, 1945:

KOREANS BATTLED JAPS ON MILLE

By Technical Sergeant Theron J. Rice, U.S.M.C. Combat Correspondent

WASHINGTON, DC, August 31-(Delayed) They were a pitiful lot who struggled through the pounding surf, straining for that last hit of energy which would mean safety at long last.

In pairs they helped each other swim when the tiny rubber boats sent in for them were filled. Then with death-like grips they grasped outstretched hands ex tended to hoist them aboard the LCI.

Their muddy brown skin, racked by disease, was stretched taut over fleshless bones. Their eyes shone deep in their glistening skulls. Their necks were drawn tight, giving them a gaunt appearance. And their hair, stiff and dry, was like that of some dead animal.

They were the 67 survivors of the only recorded revolt by Korean laborers against the Japanese in the annals of the Pacific war.

The story they had to tell of life under the rule of hopelessly cut-off Jap troops on Mille Atoll was one of oppression, humiliation and starvation. Until the final surrender it could not be told, for the sake of the safety of Korean laborers at various bypassed outposts.

But the formal capitulation of Mille to the destroyer escort Levy on August 22 (east longitude time) has lifted the veil of secrecy on one of the strangest stories to come out of the Pacific war.

Mili Atoll is at bottom right, and is over 500 km from Kwajalein at top left.

Mille Bypassed Early in War

As the southernmost of four Jap outposts in the Marshalls, Mille was heavily reinforced in November, 1943, following the fall of Tarawa and Makin.

But Marine amphibious troops, in the first of seven operations that swept them across the Pacific, next landed at Kwajalein instead. From that time forward, Mille joined Wotje, Jaluit and Maloelap as bypassed atolls instead of formidable barriers on the road to Tokyo.

The Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing was assigned the tedious and painstaking job of pulverizing these enemy bases. Seventh Air Force bombers also helped blast the Jap positions before moving on to forward bases and more important targets. Soon, cameras showed the islands to be little more than pitted chalky earth, twisted guns, gutted blockhouses and fire blackened remnants of enemy aircraft. Stripped of the camouflage and protection of thousands of palm trees, now shredded and torn from their roots, the Jap garrisons were going underground.

In June, 1944, naval vessels under cover of darkness, slipped into the lagoon at Wotje, where nearly 700 Marshallese natives quietly climbed aboard outriggers, attached them to the rescue vessels, and were towed ten miles across the lagoon to Erikub Island and safety.

In January of this year, after repeated Jap threats to exterminate them, 450 Marshallese were taken off Maloelap Atoll while Fourth Wing planes bombed and strafed enemy positions on either side of the narrow evacuation beach.

Next on the list was Mille Atoll, so Military Government officers began sending in Marshallese scouts by night to gather information and to plan, under the very noses of the Japanese, the evacuation of natives and Koreans trapped with them.

Half a dozen natives, carefully chosen for their intelligence and ability to speak several languages, were given these assignments, and spent countless hours memorizing their instructions. 

First Operation Failed

Despite the elaborate plans and perfect timing, the operation was unsuccessful. When LCIs beached several minutes after dawn, no one was waiting to come aboard. Only at Knox Atoll, two miles off the southeast tip of Mille, did the evacuation go as planned. Natives there had jumped their guards during the night, driven them off, and seized one prisoner.

The lone Jap spoke some English and told crew members he was 19 years old and drove a taxicab in Yokohama before the war. When given a cigarette, he smoked it until it burned his fingers. "This is the first real cigarette I've had in more than two years," he said.

During the week that followed the abortive evacuation, Military Government officers tried to figure out a way in which they might still remove the natives and Koreans from Mille before it was too late. While they were doing so, a Corsair pilot returned from a patrol flight and excitedly told how a large group of persons had frantically waved many improvised white flags at him when be swooped low over the atoll. Just what this signified – possibly a desire to surrender after all – was not known, but two LCIs with heavily armed crews were dispatched to the scene immediately.

Shortly before dawn on Sunday, March 18, the rescue vessels made their way along the southern side of the atoll. While one of the boats stopped to take aboard a number of natives who came out to meet it, the other, directed by a patrol plane, proceeded to Chiribun Island where a large group awaited rescue.

From the first few Koreans taken aboard, native interpreters learned the full details of the entire week of momentous developments. The Japs had sensed that the first evacuation attempt was imminent, and doubled their guard to prevent its success. Thus, when the LCIs beached, it meant almost certain death for anyone who heeded the call of loudspeakers to, "Come on out and we'll cover you."

Brutal Jap Retaliation

In retaliation for the attempted escape, a firing squad of five Japanese troops blindfolded eight native men and three women, stabbed them and then shot them with revolvers. One of the women, the 24-year-old wife of one of the few natives who managed to escape, was accused – in company with the others – of concealing a plot against the Japanese.

All conversation between the natives and Koreans was forbidden. Violation of that order meant punishment through starvation. But the Japs had made their big mistake in executing the 11 Marshallese.

That act of brutality aroused the resentment of the already bitter Marshallese and Koreans, so a group of the latter who had long planned to escape at the first opportunity made hasty final preparations for a full scale revolt.

During the early morning hours of March 17, figures moved silently through the darkness on Chiribun. Then out of the night came the revengeful cries of the Koreans as they jumped the 13-man Jap garrison there. Seizing their rifles, the Koreans killed a number of the enemy, but several [Japanese] managed to make their way across a reef toward Lukonor Island, where the main Jap garrison force lived.

As soon as the action ended, more than 150 Koreans gathered from their hiding places. Hand grenades and dynamite, pro-cured from the Japs ostensibly for fishing or in trade for food, appeared from countless places of concealment. Some of the explosives had been hoarded for more than six months in preparation for the inevitable day of revenge the Koreans knew would come.

Within a matter of minutes previously arranged plans went into effect. In a makeshift defense line, the Koreans scattered themselves across the center of the island. Then they dug in to await the certain return of heavily-armed Jap troops.

Japs Stormed Korean Positions

With the first light of dawn a force of more than 300 Japs was spotted heading toward Chiribun, armed with rifles, light machine guns, and hand grenades. In suicidal fashion they stormed the Korean positions, despite a shower of grenades, and the fighting soon became hand-to-hand.

The Koreans resisted valiantly and killed an undetermined number of Japs. But the odds against them were overwhelming and they soon were forced to give ground. Adopting guerilla tactics, they were able to harass the Japs throughout the day. It was during this stage of the battle that the Corsair patrol plans had appeared overhead, and their frantic flag waving was for help.

Between 20 and 30 Koreans and many natives were killed outright by the first Japanese onslaught. In accordance with a prearranged plan, which involved suicide rather than sub-mitting to capture by the Japs, an estimated 100 wounded Koreans killed themselves with hand grenades or dynamite. To save ammunition, most of which was used to hold off the Japs, three or four wounded would gather in a tiny circle and destroy themselves with one grenade.

Meanwhile, the Japanese, having spotted the Corsair, feared an ambush after dark or the return of more planes, so they seized a number of hostages and hurriedly returned to Lukonor. Those natives and Koreans who had survived fled to nearby islets to hide until help came.

Of approximately 190 Koreans who took part in the revolt, only 67 survived to be rescued by the American vessels. Indicative of their anxiety to leave the island was the fact that 13 persons piled into a seven-passenger rubber boat for one of the shore to ship trips.

Three Japs on tiny islets near Chiribun decided they had had enough, and heeded a promise of "good food and fair treatment" from the LCI. Stripped of their tattered clothes before coming aboard, they were in far worse physical condition than that of any Korean or native.

After a hearty meal of white rice – the first they had eaten in more than two years – the Koreans were given medical attention and then questioned.

Jap Garrison Was Starving

They revealed that the remnants of the Japanese garrison on Mille had been starving to death at the rate of as many as ten a day during recent weeks. Of an original garrison of five to seven thousand men, they estimated about 1,500 remained. (Approximately 2,400 troops were on the island when it surrendered to the USS Levy.) Their testimony disputed the widely-circulated contention that the Japanese were able to bear hardships on a par with the native population.

The Koreans cited the heavy Nipponese death rate, as compared to the few if any losses from malnutrition suffered by the Marshallese, as sufficient evidence of that fact. This they attributed to their more adaptable constitutions, a better mental attitude, and a willingness to share what little they had for the good of all.

Intelligence officers also learned that not only had rice, salmon and other Japanese food supplies been used up, but even native staples such as coconut, breadfruit and taro were practically exhausted.

So desperate was the food situation that groups of famished Japanese were sent out regularly to search for whatever food they could find. Acute malnutrition caused the death of many of these men, who often dropped in their tracks while at some far corner of the atoll. When they were fortunate enough to find food, they fought among themselves for it.

They even traded grenades or dynamite to the Koreans for anything edible. In this manner the Koreans were able to build up a supply of explosives with which to stage their revolt. They were compelled to furnish the Japs with a certain amount of food each week, but natives, fishing in their primitive style, fulfilled that requirement for them.

Blockade Kept Out Supplies

Medicine was a thing of the past and the supply of sake had long since disappeared. However, the Japs would sacrifice almost anything for "jukru", a powerful native Marshallese drink made from coconut tree sap.

Loin cloths had replaced practically all uniforms and most of the troops lived in dusty bomb craters or thatched huts. The commanding officer of the Jap garrison was said to be living in a deluxe dugout, furnished with items stolen from anyone and everyone, but was described as "short, fat and hungry just like us."

No mail had reached the island since December, 1943, and no planes nor ships nor submarines had dared the air blockade to bring them supplies since early in 1944.

Bombing and strafing attacks were said to have killed many of the enemy, but severe malnutrition had been the leading cause of death during the past six months.

During their long stay on Mille-since the spring of 1942-the Koreans were paid an average of six dollars monthly. But they were abused even more than were the Marshallese, and they had little use for the money they earned.

-----------------

[Update] 

One study is summarized here. On this site about forced labourers, there are two US Government photos related to this (one of which is above). The other can be seen more clearly at Reddit here:

"A group from the 68 survivors of an original 193 Korean slave labors who revolted against Japanese on Mille Atoll are shown here consuming Yank K-rations aboard an LCI off Majuro Atoll, Marshall Is. They are Navy prisoners of War."

RAS Korea lecture and excursion this week

With the "reboot" of Royal Asiatic Society Korea I've been tasked with organizing lectures and excursions, and am thankful to people like Jacco Zwetsloot, Olga Fedorenko, and Jack Greenberg who stepped up and quickly agreed to give lectures. As this Korea Times article notes, short notice and scheduling snafus made it difficult to find a lecturer for June, so I've stepped up to give this talk today (speaking of short notice):

I'll also be leading this excursion this weekend, which is essentially a sequel to last year's Sindang-dong excursion:

More excursions for June and July can be read about here.

It's great that RAS Korea was able to secure funding to continue its operations after a hiatus, though it's operating as a skeleton crew at the moment. Anyone willing to volunteer to help out should feel free to contact us!

"Tiger Season: A Novel of Korea," by Gojan Nikolich

My latest Korea Times article is a review of "Tiger Season: A Novel of Korea," as well as an interview with the author, Gojan Nikolich, who was kind enough to answer a series of questions. I really enjoyed the novel. There have been a small number of novels by former US soldiers about the world of US base camp towns in Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, but Tiger Season stands out above the others. Another I remember was an engaging-enough story, if featuring too much of the 'soldier and sex worker with a heart of gold' for my tastes, but ultimately was incredibly disappointing due to its abrupt ending. That's most certainly not the case for Tiger Season, which is very carefully constructed, as I note in my article.

Below are the (lightly-edited) original responses to my questions. Many thanks to Gojan Nikolich for allowing me to post these:

"When I Was There:

I served my Korea tour as an E5 Sergeant with the 2nd Infantry Division in 1970-71 at Camp Howze (Bongilchon) and Camp Casey (Dongducheon), where I worked as a military journalist/public affairs specialist and as editor of the 2nd ID newspaper. I traveled frequently on army reporting assignments and also as a stringer for the Tokyo office of Pacific Stars & Stripes, where the division newspaper was composed and printed. I wrote about and attended meetings at Panmunjom as part of my public affairs job, so that’s where I gathered some of my personal impressions for the book. This was during a busy period of DMZ/North Korean activity following the 1968 release of the Pueblo crew.

Personal Experience:

It wasn’t difficult to take advantage of my own history for a book like this, but I hope it’s been adequately disguised. The fiction of probability is often truer than the truth.

In 1970 I was involved in a patrol jeep incident along the DMZ that was similar to the one depicted in the book — both the crash off the cliff and the injuries of the main character.  After spending several months in hospitals in Seoul and Busan, I too searched for the mystery farmer/guardian angel who mysteriously happened to call in a rescue helicopter. Sadly, I was never able to thank him. I’ve had a big soft spot in my heart for Koreans ever since. 

During my hospital rehab, with nothing else to do, I scribbled my thoughts about Korea’s strange camp town world into a notebook that ended up packed away and forgotten for 50+ years in a box that I didn’t discover until a few years ago when I was cleaning out my garage. Those notes sparked memories, so I used the fictional vehicle of Eddie Profar, Jia the courtesan, Yevgeny Lee and the tiger to tell the story. 

I’m glad I was an old geezer before I wrote about Korea. The younger version of me couldn’t have done it properly.

Research:

My research for this project was selective and based on what would drive the narrative and the plot, so a scholar I am not. I used creative license to put certain historical facts into perspective and tried to be aware of Korea’s evolving attitude regarding the history of US military camp towns. Until a few years ago, the subject of sanctioned post-war brothels along the DMZ was largely ignored by the US public and media, although the Korea Times has written about the military border town controversy quite extensively. Much of my research was to get a sense of Korea’s refugee crisis during those early months of the war and to explain how this was affected by the US Army’s “Pusan Perimeter” during the late summer of 1950. This is the time when Jia and her family attempted to flee south from their village.

Why 1968:

I set the book in 1968 because that was the height of the so-called “Little Korean War” (1966-69), and this seemed to provide me with all the ingredients needed to introduce the reader to the neglected tension of those times. This was also the height of Korea’s camp town era. I wanted to tell that tale and relate it to the controversial (and under-reported) Cold War aftermath of the Korean War itself. I also felt that someone should talk about the refugee and orphan history of many of the women who were recruited involuntarily into the kijichon world.

True Or Not:

• To my knowledge, nobody who negotiated at Panmunjom ever wore a catheter, although many of us discussed how this might offer a certain advantage during long summer arguments with the North Koreans, who always seemed reluctant to get up and use the bathroom during their marathon Panmunjom meetings.

• Yep, I once attended a mandatory lecture and graphic slide show during which we were told about the consequences of catching VD. 

• The outdoor DMZ propaganda broadcasts were introduced by the Park Chung Hee government and the DJs at AFKN did occasionally contribute parody musical stunts, though this wasn’t encouraged and didn’t happen with the frequency that I suggest in the book. 

• Soldiers on duty at night on the DMZ loved to bullshit each other, so I’d heard about ghost-story talk of a roaming tiger loose out on the ice of the Imjin River. I imagined how this would put a little extra jump in your step while working at night along the fence. 

* The vibe at the camp’s nightclub was as described in the book. 

* The train trip from Busan to Seoul, including the Korean family that shows kindness to Eddie and gives him food…that was true and I made the same trip after I was released from the hospital.

Writers I Like:

I’ll read anything from the most trashy, pulpy thriller or cowboy western to the best of all the 19th century Russians to Faulkner and Hemingway. Charles Portis is a favorite. Anything by Cormac McCarthy, Vonnegut and Don DeLillo. Murakami is another. I actually read much more non-fiction than fiction and keep re-reading the writers I’ve always liked."

As a follow-up to his answers I asked about a few more topics, and wondered if the 2ID newspaper he worked for was the Indianhead, to which he answered, Yes, and included some clippings, "along with the Indianhead newspaper masthead, just to give you a sense of the general vibe of what was being  written at the time":

"The Army brass pretty much left us alone, though they would occasionally insist on a positive PR twist to a story that might favor official military policy. This was to be expected. However, being in our early twenties, we’d play a cat and mouse game and sneak in reporting with subtle references that GIs would fully understand. For some unknown reason, they allowed me to write a free-form opinion column (“Smoke Signals”) that sometimes got me into trouble. I once mocked the 2nd Div commanding general for building an expensive duck pond and pet duck shelter behind the HQ building. The company CO called me on the carpet and ripped into me to never write something like that again…or else. 

"A few months later they gave me a medal for writing exactly that kind of stuff, much of it pretty amateurish in hindsight. The US Army operates in mysterious ways.

I recall that there was a cooperative back-and-forth story pickup arrangement with Stars & Stripes in which some soldiers were attached as staffers out of Tokyo or 8th Army in Yongsan. My stringer stuff got used, bylined and not, and sometimes the Indianhead would contribute reporting as part of a S&S compilation story. The wire services and Army Times would also use our material, especially photos.  I’d re-write and edit certain reporting to submit to S&S while I was in Tokyo every two weeks to lay out and print the division newspaper.

Regarding The 1971 Race Riot:

Yes, I remember that event but was traveling out of the area when it happened. I went into the hospital in late January 1971 following my injury, so was out of the entire news loop for a few months. 

Yes, the GI clubs seemed to be generally divided based on the category of music they played, by race, and according to the unwritten rules and preferences of the “business women” and the bar owners. There were many exceptions, however. Some clubs catered to older NCOs, some skewed toward officers. Some to African Americans. I remember one club that only played country music and so attracted those customers accordingly. 

The Army often put clubs off-limits for a variety of reasons, including for discriminating against black soldiers.  Mostly it was because a club had too many drug use reports from the MPs or if their bar workers exceeded accepted VD rates. The newspaper would announce off-limit clubs. I remember a general feeling of underlying tension that prevailed some nights in the village outside of Camp Casey — Tongduchon, known as “TDC” and now spelled “Dongducheon.” TDC was the largest camp town along the DMZ at that time. Most of the streets were barely paved. This was the tail-end of the 1960s civil rights era in the US, so most everyone was aware of the racial issues at hand since we’d already experienced the same unrest back home, especially if you came from a large city.  On a one-on-one basis, I had the sense that the races worked together routinely well on the DMZ itself (at guard posts, together on patrols, etc) and I don’t recall individual conflicts other than when there were organized public events like the Yongiugol “rally.” Again, that’s my general memory of things. I think if something dramatically stood out that I would recall it with more clarity. 

Regarding Marijuana:

I don’t remember anything ever tightening up regarding the smoking of weed, though it was officially verboten.  You could easily get a big fat paper bag of grass for about $10 from any number of sources: a Korean houseboy at the barracks, a shop owner outside the front gate at Camp Casey or directly from one of the girls at a club, who would expect a tip for the convenient middle man service. The main hard drugs used at the time seemed to be Meth and Seconal. 

Itaewon:

I personally never visited Itaewon, which was a long and inconvenient bus ride away. The DMZ area, though only about 40 miles from Seoul, was considered to be in the boonies and anyone stationed in or near Yongsan was thought to have a cushy Korea tour assignment. Whatever I knew of Itaewon came from someone else’s stories. I do remember it being considered more expensive than the local village club district.  I believe that all the camp town club districts operated under similar un-written rules of conduct for GIs. The camp town culture was similar everywhere and had been honed and perfected since the 1950s.

Below is an answer to a question for those who have read the book, since it's certainly a spoiler.

Eddie’s Final Phone Call:

Yes, the young woman who return’s Eddie’s call was his daughter. I kept it vague and left it up to the reader to speculate if he realized this or not as he stood in front of the bathroom mirror having his heart attack while the phone rang. I like to believe that yes, he knew…but it was too late, of course. His daughter is among the visitors at the hospice.

When Park Chung-hee and the US Ambassador visited Gayang-dong for Farming Encouragement Day

For over a decade I've done tours for the RAS of western Seoul, particularly the area around Gaehwasan and Gungsan / Yangcheon Hyanggyo. I was visiting the area with friends on the weekend and walked by a section of street (across from the Botanical Garden in Magok) with posts marking the sights of the 'history and culture street' that had a stone monument I'd never seen (Kakao Map street view tells me it wasn't there a year ago). I had no idea what 권농일 was and we were on the move, so I snapped a photo to look it up later.

As it turns out, it's a monument to the 17th National Farming Encouragement Day (권농일), when in 1965 Park Chung-hee (and others, as we'll see below) held a commemorative ceremony at Yangcheon Elementary School. This school was established in 1900, which makes it rather old (I was made aware of this when I taught a student who attended the school in 2005, and she told me it was her school's 105th anniversary). Since the president was there, I figured it must have been covered in the news, and indeed, the June 10, 1965 Kyunghyang Shinmun even has a photo of Park planting rice:

Industrialization Must Be Preceded by Agricultural Modernization – Emphasized in President Park’s Address

On the Occasion of the 17th National Farming Encouragement Day

June 10 marked the 17th National Farming Encouragement Day (권농일), and with a severe drought — the worst in 60 years — both farmers and city dwellers met the day with uncharacteristically somber expressions.

The Meteorological Office forecasted that it was unlikely to rain before the end of June, when rice transplanting would be at its peak. Authorities responded by establishing emergency drought countermeasures, aiming to uphold the significance of this year’s Farming Encouragement Day.

At 10 a.m. that day, a commemorative ceremony for the 17th Farming Encouragement Day was held at Yangcheon Elementary School along the Yeongdeungpo–Gimpo road, with many domestic and foreign dignitaries in attendance. These included President Park Chung Hee, Chairman Kwon of the National Assembly’s Agriculture and Forestry Committee, Minister of Agriculture Cha; other government ministers, U.S. Ambassador Brown; and members of the diplomatic corps.

Following a commemorative speech by Mr. Go, president of the National Agricultural Federation, President Park delivered an address in which he emphasized that “Farming Encouragement Day must not be limited to merely encouraging agriculture, but should become a new opportunity for the entire nation to revere agriculture and value farmers.”

He further stated, “We must abandon the dangerous mindset that national modernization refers only to urban-centered industrialization. The modernization of agricultural production, which can resolve the rice problem, must be achieved before industrialization.”

After the ceremony, the three branches of government and the diplomatic corps participated in a symbolic rice planting with the farmers.

◇After the Farming Encouragement Day Ceremony, President Park and other guests are planting rice seedlings. (In Gimpo)

I was surprised to learn the American ambassador was there. Unlike the photo caption above, the Dong-A Ilbo that day reported that the planting took place near the school (perhaps the Kyunghyang Shinmun had forgotten the area - formerly part of Gimpo - had been incorporated into Seoul in 1963):

Commemorative Rice Planting by President Park in Gayang-dong, Yeongdeungpo

On the morning of June 10, at 10 a.m., the 17th National Farming Encouragement Day commemorative event was held in Gayang-dong, Yeongdeungpo District, Seoul. The ceremony took place in the schoolyard of Yangcheon Elementary School and was attended by about 200 people, including President Park Chung Hee, government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, and officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Seoul city government.

In his commemorative address, President Park said, “The Meteorological Office has forecast no rain for the next month, so we must anticipate continued drought through mid-July. Let the entire nation unite to overcome this drought together.”

Following the ceremony, President Park personally participated in a commemorative rice planting in a paddy field in front of the school, setting an example through action.

The event, hosted by the Land Improvement Association, was carried out under tight security unlike previous years, and as a result, local farmers were not permitted to participate in the event.

I have doubts that photo was taken that day, considering the security precautions. Why there was "tight security," I'm not sure, but the signing of the controversial ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty was less than two weeks away (June 22), so that may have been the reason.

The 45th Anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising

 Today marks the 45th anniversary of the beginning of the Gwangju Uprising. I've written about this event on this blog many times (an index is here), an RAS Transactions article ("'Tell the World what is Happening': The Americans who Witnessed the Kwangju Uprising," which can be read here), and co-authored the memoir of David Dolinger, a former Peace Corps Volunteer who was a witness to and participant in the uprising  This week he was granted Gwangju honorary citizenship for his role, along with missionary Arnold Peterson (posthumously) and Jennifer Huntley.

The Hankyoreh also covered the fascinating stories of the military officers / police officials who refused orders to fire on protesters during the uprising. I'd known the story of Police Chief Ahn Byeong-ha, but not the others. At least one of the stories shared adds evidence to the assertion that the chain of command was being violated and orders were being sent to officers on the ground directly from martial law command in Seoul.

And, of course, it wouldn't be this time of year without some conservative politician making questionable choices, in this case when the People's Power Party appointed Chung Ho-yong - who commanded Special Forces during 5.18 and was, along with Roh Tae-woo, one of Chun Doo-hwan's main co-conspirators - as a senior advisor to Kim Moon-soo’s presidential campaign, only to quickly reverse this decision amid public backlash. What were they thinking? Needless to say, he wasn't invited to any memorial ceremonies.

How Park Chung-hee exploited the fall of Saigon to justify a ban on all dissent

On this day 50 years ago, Park Chung-hee’s efforts to suppress challenges to his rule by pro-democracy clergy, students, and journalists culminated in the promulgation of Emergency Measure 9, which banned all dissent and decreed sentences ranging from one year in prison to the death penalty. The reason he felt there was a consensus supporting this authoritarian measure was due to the way he and the Yusin state exploited the fall of South Vietnam, arguing that dissent needed to be suppressed lest North Korea take advantage of the divisions in the South to launch a new war. In addition to ‘encouraging’ various groups in society to show their support for the ROK government via street demonstrations and newspaper ads, the authorities also mobilized newly-arrived refugees from Vietnam to speak to audiences, particularly students, nationwide.

This is the story my latest Korea Times article tells.

I couldn't include these in the article since they are from the Korea Herald, which was then a government-run newspaper, but it printed numerous photos of these pro-government demonstrations in early May 1975. Seen below are banners like 'Overthrow Kim Il-sung,' 'Smash the communist party,' and 'Defend Seoul to the death.'

A "massive rally" held in Yeongdeungpo, Korea Herald, May 8, 1975.

                      Rally by entertainers, "including comedians,"Korea Herald, May 6, 1975.

From the Korea Herald, May 7, 1975.

A rally by the Construction Association of Korea, Korea Herald, May 10, 1975.

Korea University rally, Korea Herald, May 10, 1975.

The rally of 1.4 million citizens in Yeouido, Korea Herald, May 11, 1975.

Beyond digging through contemporary Korea Times and Korea Herald articles (along with some Korean language newspapers and various wiki articles used to find exact dates), I also consulted Letters from South Korea, which covers the resistance against Park Chung-hee from 1973 to mid-1975, and Paul Y. Chang's Protest Dialectics State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970-1979.

Letters from South Korea is well worth reading, as it goes into great detail about the price paid by those who spoke out - and their families. It puts a human face on the suffering caused by the dictatorship, and all as it was ongoing. Various volumes were produced; the first two can be read and downloaded at Archive.org: Volume 1 ; Volume 2. Other editions were reprinted in Pyongyang and may be edited. A search here turns up various volumes. 

Another interesting story I had to leave out, regarding this paragraph: 

Its most audacious act was kidnapping Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel with the intent of throwing him from a boat into the East Sea — a fate averted by the U.S. State Department condemning the kidnapping as an “act of terrorism” and U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib offering the Park regime the face-saving understanding that a “rogue KCIA faction” had carried out the abduction.

What is left out is the story of the man at the State Department’s Korea Desk who issued the statement calling the kidnapping an “act of terrorism” – Donald Ranard, who had been the political officer at the US Embassy in Seoul during Park Chung-hee’s 1961 coup. While the CIA and USFK learned about the coup beforehand (and warned the ROK Army commander), the embassy was completely surprised by it. After trying but failing to undo the coup, charge d'affaires Marshal Green (there was no ambassador at the time) somehow came out of the incident unscathed, but the State Department wanted to punish someone at the embassy for having been so out of touch, so Ranard was chosen as the fall guy, and his career never really prospered after this. And so it was that he was at the Korea Desk in Washington in 1973 when Kim was kidnapped from Tokyo, and apparently Ranard issued the statement, with its unprecedented criticism of the ROK, without sanction from his superiors. One imagines this gave him some satisfaction. (More about that episode can be found here and here, but the 'scatological' bit contradicts Donald Gregg's memoir, Pot Shards, and since Gregg was there, and because his assertion that Habib quietly made clear that the US would accept a face-saving explanation of 'rogue KCIA elements' if Kim were set free makes more sense, I find his account more likely.)

I'm also reminded that Philip Habib sent a cable to the State Department in March 1973 about newspaper cartoons. This came just months after the advent of the Yusin constitution, and according to Habib they were about the only public source of criticism, mild as it was, of government policy at that time. Habib's cable, which was part of  a collection of such cables at the National Assembly Library website, can be read here.

Lastly, here is the 'tour de force' mentioned in my article - an appeal made by the Save the Nation Society in the Korea Times on May 11, 1975:

FOR OUR FATHERLAND AT STAKE

An Appeal to the People

May 10, 1975

Our nation is at present experiencing a grave situation. In the light of the of the unconditional surrender to the Communists of Cambodia and South Vietnam, the changing shape of international power politics, and the confrontation, complications and antagonism in our political society caused by the personal dissatisfaction, obstinacy and self-righteousness of some people, we are now in a juncture where unless we are awakened and united, the state as well as individual cannot survive any more.

World history well shows that weak nations, if they are not alert, are unwittingly deprived of their territory and sovereignty by the power politics of big nations. The already-devastated Indochinese situation is a good lesson to us and it should by no means be regarded as a mere fire across the river.

Kim Il-sung of the north Korean Communist clique, all out to invade us again, forgetting the national tragedy of the Korean War which started on June 25 1950, visited Peking to conspire and decide on a strategy to communize by force the whole of the peninsula. We, who experienced the bloody tragedy of war in 1950, cannot but worry about the maneuvers of north Korea as he is unleashing remarks and activities to fan war provocations.

We, who have lived in this beautiful land for about 5.000 years since the foundation of the nation by Tangun, have just come to the door of prosperity. But due to the ominous situation in and out of the nation, we are now compelled to make a wise and courageous decision as to what to do and how to behave ourselves to cope with this unprecedentedly difficult period.

At this time of making an important decision, we should take as a yardstick for our behavior the wisdom our forefathers have shown in time of national crisis.

1. Our forefathers during the Silla Dynasty achieved unification of three kingdoms on this peninsula through honest cultivation of national unity, wisely overcoming ceaseless threats and invasions from the Sui and Tang dynasties and Japan.

2. During the Koryo period, our ancestors continued to lay deep the foundation of the kingdom unified by the Silla Dynasty despite continuous invasions from the tribes on the northern border near Manchuria from the outset of the dynasty. But it well managed to repel all the invasions and threats and successfully maintained national sovereignty. And the Koryo Dynasty was wise enough to train 300,000 reserves called "Kwanggun" to crush any outside aggression in order to maintain national identity and sovereignty. Thanks to the establishment of the "Kwanggun" Army and self-defense spirit, the Koryo kingdom successfully kept its sovereignty from the aggression from the north including the invasion by the Mongols for more than 40 years during the 13th century. One thing we should not forget about the Koryo kingdom is that our ancestors despite the outside aggressions tenaciously cultivated the artistic sense to the extent of fashioning blue celadon, which widely commands acclaim even today for its exquisiteness. It was the Koryo Dynasty that produced the world-famous engravings of Buddhist scriptures on 80,000 wood blocks and invented metal printing type for the first time in world history.

3. But in the Yi Dynasty period, our ancestors were regrettably not so wise at the time of invasions from China and Japan as were their forefathers during the Koryo and Silla Dynasties. In restrospect, the Invasion by Japan during the 15th century was the work of Hideyoshi Toyotomi of Japan. But we had better criticize ourselves before blaming the Japanese general. The Invasion in part can be blamed on diehard factionalism during the reign of King Sonjo For instance, two emissaries were sent to Japan on the sly to glean information as to whether Japan was preparing an attack against the Yi Kingdom. One of them made a correct report saying that Hideyoshi was preparing to attack but the other made quite contradictory report Just to trap his opponent as he was from a different faction.

Such factionalism led to the disintegration of national unity and at last incurred a situation luring Japanese invasion rather than preventing it. At last the invasion occurred as we were not prepared against it and left the beautiful land devastated during the seven-year invasion,

Even after the invasion, our forefathers were not wise enough to build up national strength on the basis of firm national consensus, after making self-criticism. Regrettably, they continued to be bogged down in factional strife, irrespective of what was happening in China. This at last invited attacks from China.

The afore-mentioned historical facts well show what should be done for the buildup of national strength and what should be avoided, like a mirror. In the face of national trials before us now, it is evident what we should do and what we should avoid. Therefore, after learning historical lessons from our history, we should again follow wise and courageous determination to safeguard the national sovereignty and prosperity.

Firstly, as shown in the special statement by President Park Chung-hee on April 29, north Korea has been busy with reckless war preparations, designating this year as being most favorable to invade south Korea. This year coincides with the 30th anniversary of liberation from Japanese colonial rule. Therefore, we should first of all fortify our total security posture further on the basis of national unity irrespective of wealth and classes. Before this sublime goal, any factors no matter how small in number and weak in force should be resolutely eradicated if they are inimical to total security. This is because creatures like fleas on lions are likely to weaken the foundation of national power only to the advantage of the enemy.

Secondly, as a total security system is impossible without firm economic support, we should exert increased efforts for more production. And we should refrain from pursuing egoistic personal interests, an easy-going spirit, and whatever luxuries,

Thirdly, what the enemy hopes most is to win victory against us without a fight by causing the nation to split, availing itself of all means. Therefore we should achieve firm unity in consensus. Regrettably, there are some politicians, intellectuals and religious persons tending to disintegrate the national consensus and causing agitation about freedom, human rights, and democracy as if they were their personal belongings.

Such activities should be avoided and that immediately for the nation, which is in a virtual war situation against north Korea. It should be borne deep in mind that the brilliant culture of Rome and Greece collapsed because limitless freedom comparable to license and claims for democracy and human rights on the basis of individualism flourished wildly.

Fourthly, we should sublimate our spirits and concentrate them on winning victory against the Communists after suspending political strife, ideological debate and factional strife in religious circles in order to achieve the urgently-needed national consensus.

The outcry by some politicians, who are blind with greed for power, calling for a replacement of our embattled general cannot be taken for granted no matter how limitlessly freedom of speech is reserved for them. Politicians should refrain from uttering such reckless words as they would only result in advantages for Kim Il-sung.

Fifthly, everyone should be prudent in their words and deeds to prevent the nation from being split and to highly fortify the spirit of victory over communism. And all kinds of practices affected by vague flunkyism and just for criticism of others for criticism's sake should also be abandoned,

All of the nation should faithfully carry out their duties. And students, as main force to shoulder the fate of the nation in the near future, should be first of all concerned with their prime mission of study. More than that, they should cultivate their potentialities by arming themselves with knowledge and study ways and means of defeating Communists every time they encounter, learning the scheme and power of north Korea.

Lastly, what we should know is the stark fact that our nation excels north Korea by far in every held. On the top of it, there is no change in the policy of our friendly allies including the United States toward Korea. Therefore, it is up to the cараbility of our nation to decide on our own destiny on the basis of its own strength whether we would survive or not.

As our Adm. Yi Sun-shin earlier stated, we will invariably win if we fight with the determination to die but will surely be defeated if we fight cowardly to live. Since our nation is armed with undying courage and patience, victory is always on our side if we fight tenaciously in firm unity.

Interview with Hahn Dae Soo

For my latest Korea Times article, I interviewed Hahn Dae Soo and looked back at his life and career and his reflections on recent losses in his life, including the sudden passing of his wife. I’m honoured he reached out to me for what is his first long-form interview in four years.

Korean folk-rock pioneer Hahn Dae-soo reflects on sorrow, loss and friendship at 76   

Not everything could be included in the final, published interview, so here is much of what was left out:

In response to me asking if he’d ever met Kim Jung-ho (1952-1985), he answered:

I love Kim Jung-ho. He’s my favorite. Very sincere and very sad and also, he was very sick and tragedy was big part of his life. I was glad that he included my song, “land of happiness” in his monumental first album. No, he did not get my permission, haha. But I am glad he sang my song before he passed away. I never met him, because I was in the navy when he was active in music scene at the time. I truly wish that I had met him and had a dish of makgeolli.

As for his favorite music, he wrote, 

The only time I cry is when I listen to music. Johan Sebastian Bach made me cry with “Passacaglia And Fugue,” Wagner made me cry with his overtures, especially “Tannhauser,” and of course, my main man, Beethoven, every symphony and every concerto, and the Fifth and the last, the Ninth. Rock wise, I would have to say, I love John Lennon - every song is a therapy session. 1. Nowhere Man  2. Mother  3. Watching The Wheels  4. Woman  5. Imagine  6. Jealous Guy  7. Losing You

His favorite film directors and writers?

I love directors Stanley Kubrick, Fassbinder, Kurosawa, Coppola, many, many more. For writers, Shelly, Edgar Ellen Poe, Jack Kerouac, Samuel Beckett and my favorite, Oscar Wilde. 

What was his most memorable performance?

I would say “Fukuoka live” and “Hahn Dae Soo rebirth at L/G Arts Center”. These had really great responses and the band, the promotion staff, and sound engineers were perfect. At Fukuoka, Kim Do-kyun and Hachi were double lead guitarists, and Lee Woo-chang was the pianist, and Lee Sang-eun was my chorus (she volunteered and flew over to Japan on one day’s notice).

At the L/G concert, we had a number called, “4G” meaning 4 lead guitarists. Kim Do-kyun, Sohn Moo-hyun, Shin Dae-chul and Kim Mok-kyung. They all did the lead guitar parts on my song, “If you want me to,” and I myself was so moved that I cried during my singing. It was a song to urge the woman to love me, if she wants to, and the four guitarists just cried out their desire and emotions with their incredible guitar solos. Wow, the audience went wild, because they have never understood the power of Jimi Hendrix, Eric Clapton, Jeff Beck or Steve Vai (whom I performed with at the Busan International Rock Festival 20 years ago). 

He also listed the top five concerts he ever attended:

5. David Bowie’s Heroes tour at Madison Square Garden, around 1980? Great performance and fashion. He had the crowd so enthralled that I thought the garden was going to crash, as the mezzanine was swaying too much and I had to push my wife out the door, afraid that the whole concert hall was going to collapse. Great show and really his career climax.

4. Iggy Pop at Long Beach, California. His voice and the band just were so powerful and loud, I lost my hearing for two days. Iggy is craaazy, just completely out of control and this was what the fans want, a rock star gone berserk. Peanut butter all over his body, sticking violin bow between his legs. Leaping into the crowd and the fans lifting him up like a godly crusader. But, never mind the antics, as a musician myself, I adore his incredible, powerful baritone voice. Really great voice. And the band was just “kick ass.” That is why he is a great rocker!

3. Jean Michel Jarre at Radio City Music Hall, New York City, 2017. Mesmerizing, full synthesizer sound with digital light show, spectacular. Unlike other rock shows, he was introducing a whole new world of synthesizer sound that can rock you, almost as good as Jimi Hendrix! Wow! 

2. Paul Butterfield Blues Band at Cafe Au Go Go in New York City in 1967. It was mesmerizing. My very first blues concert, and Paul with his harmonica just blew my mind. To add to that, Mike Bloomfield's guitar was so dramatic and sad. The whole show was top notch. Paul became the first and most important white blues artist. He paved the way for Allman Bros, Eric Clapton, etc. I become nostalgic, when I think of Paul and Mike. They died early. Paul at 44 and Mike at 37. Too young, so very young.  

1. Tina Turner at Radio City Music Hall, New York City. She was powerful, she was crazy, and she was hypnotic!!! When she first stepped on the stage in high heels and a mini skirt and belted out “Proud Mary,” that was it! The crowd went wild. She suffered a lot from the abuses of her late husband, Ike, with beatings and not even giving her the fair share of their income, when she was the only singer. She came back to the rock and roll kingdom with vengeance. I consider Tina Turner as the ultimate rocker. God bless you, Tina.

Two of the worst concerts I have ever seen in my life:

2. King Crimson Town Hall, New York City, around 1989. I was a die-hard King Crimson fan, and loved their albums, but the singer, Adrian Belew, was a real poser with no substance. The leader, Robert Fripp, was sitting on his chair like a professor, with no emotion. It was the boringest one and a half hours I have ever experienced. 

1. The worst concert I have ever seen was Bob Dylan at Jones Beach around 1997. This guy was not singing but teasing us. He did not remember his lyrics and he was off tune most of the time, while the band tried so hard to keep it up. What an ass. The many hits he has, he was mocking them. You could not recognize which hit he was singing, until you found a little piece of a refrain. Terrible, Mr. Dylan. You only love your money and you think you are a legend. He took the money and ran back to Malibu.

When rock music and go-go dancing first appeared on Korean TV

For my latest Korea Times article, I drew on something I only briefly mentioned in my previous article on Larry Tressler’s time singing with the Devils in 1969 and 1970: his experience getting booked for, and performing on, the first episode of MBC’s youth-oriented music show ‘젊은 리듬’ (Young Rhythm, November 1969 – March 1970). With his memories and photos, as well as a few other photos published by 주간여성 (Weekly Woman) magazine, which the Korea Times / Hankook Ilbo have rights to, and a handful or two of articles about the show (and its competitor, TBC’s “1,2,3, Go”) in newspapers and magazines, I was able to tell the story of the first shows to bring a large number of bands that performed for the US Eighth Army Stage into Korean homes – at least until the authorities stepped in. 

Here's a shot of the 200th episode of TBC's Show Show Show being commemorated on the cover of the Weekly Joongang (the Joongang Ilbo was affiliated with TBC - and, of course, Samsung - at this time). Kim Sang-hee is in the blue dress, and next to her in the center is, I'm quite certain, Lee Mi-ja.

Larry Tressler provided me with these two shots of the Devils performing on MBC's 'Young Rhythm's first episode on November 21, 1969:

Also shared on his Devils Facebook Page is this photo, which shows Kim Sang-hee, the host, and the band performing on the second stage in the studio.

The February 25, 1970, Weekly Kyunghyang profiled "Young Rhythm" PD Lee Jae-hwi, MBC’s youngest producer.

The Maeil Gyeongje, February 25, 1970 article that castigated "Young Rhythm" and "1, 2, 3, Go" featured this photo of the teen group Top Steps performing on one of the shows. (They were reported in late 1969 to have a contract to perform in Las Vegas (the holy grail for Eighth Army Stage bands), but by June 1970 they were back performing in Seoul, so it's not clear what happened there. They would later, by 1972, be performing as the Seoul Family (no apparent relation to the 1980s group of the same name).

The only color photos I've seen of Top Steps were in the December 24,1969 issue of Weekly Woman:

The March 11, 1970 issue of Weekly Woman featured a shot of one of the programs (perhaps "1, 2, 3, Go" since the stage looks quite different than the "Young Rhythm" photos Larry Tressler took.

There aren't many photos in the media of these shows - in fact, only two - so it was lucky that Weekly Woman, which the Korea Times has rights to, published one of them, and of course, that Larry Tressler took and shared photos of the first episode of "Young Rhythm." 

I also made mention of the Seoul American High School go-go dance troupe The Rhythms, and I hope to publish something about them at some point, since I'm in contact with some of their members.

Go-go club designers and Fellini actress at the Chosun Hotel in 1970

For my latest Korea Times article I look at some interesting people who stayed at the Chosun Hotel in 1970. This grew out of a previous article (or two) about Tomorrow, the go-go club (or discotheque) in the hotel’s basement that was opened as Seoul’s swankiest club in 1971. In the last article, I mentioned Joe Policy, a man named in a full-page ad for the club taken out in the Korea Times, as the force behind the club’s creation, but was never able to find him. Months ago I was contacted by his daughter. Success! Except she wrote to tell me her father had died recently. She did, however, put me in contact with her mother, Carole, who shared both stories from that time and photos of the club once construction was complete. This wasn’t enough to account for another article, I thought, until I remembered Anita Ekberg, who had starred in the Federico Fellini film La Dolce Vita, as well as a less well-remembered film shot in Korea in the fall of 1970, ‘Northeast of Seoul.’ Alan Heyman shared memories of Ekberg (and her time at the Chosun Hotel) at a Royal Asiatic Society lecture by Jacco Zwetsloot back in 2011, so when former Korea Art Club leader Cornie Choy told me about meeting her in the elevator at the hotel, I immediately knew why she was there. These memories, along with the fact that I’d found colour photos of her in the Hankook Ilbo / Korea Times-owned Weekly Woman magazine, suggested a focus on both her and the Policys.

More photos of Anita Ekberg in Korea, from Weekly Woman magazine, October 21, 1970.

April 1980 DIA report on Chun Doo-hwan's means of maintaining loyalty

Well, this is odd. I apparently transcribed this last year and then forgot to post it. At any rate, the May 18 Archives site has uploaded what appears to be all of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports Tim Shorrock obtained through FOIA requests in the 1990s. They, and other documents, can be found here.

On April 21, 1980, the following report was sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency (one wonders if it was written by James Young). Some predictions were, perhaps, a bit off the mark, but the information on how Chun maintained loyalty, and the hints at business connections financing him, make for interesting reading.

********

Activities Of Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan- An Opposing View

R 210503Z APR 80

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

1. (U) Ctry: Republic Of Korea (KS)

2. (U) Title: Activities of Lieutenant General (Chon) Doo Hwan - An Opposing View

3. (U) Date of info: 800419/800419 

[2 Lines redacted]

6. (U) Source: [          ] Source has reported reliably for several years. By virtue of duty position, source has access to such information.

7. Summary: LtG Chon Tu Hwan insures loyalty among his subordinates by personal persuasiveness, KMA ties, carefully monitoring key assignments, and providing funds to his followers. The source of his considerable funding is not known. There is widespread but soft-spoken opposition to Chon in the Air Force, Navy, and in limited segments of the Army. His assignment as acting director, KCIA will expand his operating base but may harm his image among junior officers. Chon's appointment to the KCIA post may become a campus issue in the near future.

8A. (U) Details:

[ 3-4 lines redacted about identity of source ] He is among the most reliable sources available to this office and provided the following information concerning LtG Chon Tu Hwan during wide-ranging conversations 18 and 19 April 1980.

(A) For several years LtG Chon has had a widespread loyal following within the ROK Army which has been carefully cultivated. Among the techniques Chon uses to insure loyalty are his own persuasiveness, KMA class ties, assignment of supporters to key positions, and the payment of substantial sums of money to loyal subordinates. Source stated that while he was a subordinate commander under Chon in the 1st ROK Infantry Division, he received a minimum of 100,000 won each month for "operating expenses.” This money was received directly from then MG Chon, or from one of his trusted subordinates. All other subordinate commanders also received similar payments, with the amount dependent on their respective positions. Following the events of 12-13 December 1979, Chon reportedly authorized the payment of 500,000,000 won to members of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Capital Security Command, who he considered to have played a key role in supporting him at that time. Source was unsure where the money for these payments came from, but expressed the opinion it was from certain unspecified businessmen, who traditionally lent financial support to influential persons both within and outside of the military.

[Redacted ] the payment of "reimbursement” or “expense” funds within the ROK army is not unusual, however, the amounts involved here are substantially larger than is normally the case. LtG Chon appears to have access to seemingly unlimited funds. He reportedly has spent large amounts of money in recent months during his campaign to generate support from segments of Korean society outside the military and justify the 12 December and subsequent actions.

(B) [ Redacted ] Source [one line redacted] stated his belief that Chon had been “corrupted with power,” and that he (source) was convinced that Chon intended to put himself in a position to control, or as a minimum, greatly influence the ROK government. Following his appointment to the KCIA post, source stated there remained..."no doubt as to his ambitions.”

(C) [ Redacted ] Source further stated that all commanders in the capital area were now loyal to Chon, down to and including battalion commanders. Battalion command nominations for positions in the capital area now require the personal approval of Chon or a close associate. Two lieutenant colonel acquaintances of source who had been scheduled to receive capital area commands had recently been sent to FROKA [1st ROK Army] units instead, following their failure to exhibit the proper degree of enthusiasm for the new army leadership during the interview process. Source estimated that 100 percent of regimental commanders, and 95 percent of the battalion commanders in and around the Seoul area were loyal to Chon.

[ One line redacted ] See remarks by preparing officer at the end of this report regarding the possibility of eroding military support for Chon as a result of his appointment as acting KCIA director.

(D) ) [ Redacted ] Source stated that the DSC's power had grown enormously in the past three months, and that any officer who had been closely associated with former CSA [Chief of Staff, Army] General ((Chong)) Sung Hwa was particularly suspect and was likely to be under surveillance. An acquaintance who was a former staff assistant to Gen Chong had been taken into custody when he attempted to visit the general's wife and family at their home and questioned for several hours. The former CSA's house is reportedly under twenty-four hour guard by three DSC agents.

[ Redacted line ] growing influence, aggressiveness, and arrogance by DSC agents since 12/13 December has been confirmed by numerous sources. Gen Chong's former senior aide, an outstanding officer who was the number one KMA graduate of his class, was recently refused DSC clearance to study in the U.S. and has subsequently been reassigned to an undesirable job within SROKA [2nd ROK Army] headquarters.

(2) [ Redacted ]  in a related conversation on 18 April, a highly respected university dean stated that opposition to Chon was likely to increase on the campuses due to his appointment as acting KCIA director. He stated that the appointment was not only "immoral," but "illegal" as well, according to at least one highly respected legal scholar. This individual expected the Chon issue to become part and parcel of the ((Kim)) Jae Kyu execution issue, and stated that the faculty of his university expected the Chon appointment issue to actively surface toward the end of the week of 21-22 April. He expected the Chon appointment to eventually supersede both the dismissal of "Yushin professors" and the Student Defense Corps issues in importance and intensity.

8B. [ Redacted ] These remarks are reported primarily because of the information concerning Chon's efforts to insure a loyal following within the army by selective assignments and monetary contributions and the probability that his appointment as acting director of the KCIA will become an issue on the campuses. Perhaps more important, however, is the potential rift that Chon's appointment to the KCIA post may cause among his followers. Most observers see a greatly expanded power base for Chon as a result of his new position -- this is undoubtedly true. It must be remembered, however, the many of Chon's closest followers within the army are younger officers who tend to be more idealistic concerning his motives. A large segment of these officers have believed Chon's denials concerning political ambitions and have up to now honestly considered him to be concerned primarily with reforming the army. Acceptance of the acting  KCIA directorship, with its blatantly political overtones, seriously erodes the credibility of his image as a simple military reformist. Within the Air Force and Navy, opposition to Chon was nearly universal prior to his KCIA appointment; it can now be expected to solidify even further. There is also significant, if not outspoken, opposition to Chon among some army generals, particularly those recently retired. At the colonel and lieutenant colonel level, the actions he has already taken to insure loyalty will probably override his loss of credibility for the short term, but the seeds of disillusionment have been planted in recent days.