April 1980 DIA report on Chun Doo-hwan's means of maintaining loyalty

Well, this is odd. I apparently transcribed this last year and then forgot to post it. At any rate, the May 18 Archives site has uploaded what appears to be all of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports Tim Shorrock obtained through FOIA requests in the 1990s. They, and other documents, can be found here.

On April 21, 1980, the following report was sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency (one wonders if it was written by James Young). Some predictions were, perhaps, a bit off the mark, but the information on how Chun maintained loyalty, and the hints at business connections financing him, make for interesting reading.

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Activities Of Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan- An Opposing View

R 210503Z APR 80

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

1. (U) Ctry: Republic Of Korea (KS)

2. (U) Title: Activities of Lieutenant General (Chon) Doo Hwan - An Opposing View

3. (U) Date of info: 800419/800419 

[2 Lines redacted]

6. (U) Source: [          ] Source has reported reliably for several years. By virtue of duty position, source has access to such information.

7. Summary: LtG Chon Tu Hwan insures loyalty among his subordinates by personal persuasiveness, KMA ties, carefully monitoring key assignments, and providing funds to his followers. The source of his considerable funding is not known. There is widespread but soft-spoken opposition to Chon in the Air Force, Navy, and in limited segments of the Army. His assignment as acting director, KCIA will expand his operating base but may harm his image among junior officers. Chon's appointment to the KCIA post may become a campus issue in the near future.

8A. (U) Details:

[ 3-4 lines redacted about identity of source ] He is among the most reliable sources available to this office and provided the following information concerning LtG Chon Tu Hwan during wide-ranging conversations 18 and 19 April 1980.

(A) For several years LtG Chon has had a widespread loyal following within the ROK Army which has been carefully cultivated. Among the techniques Chon uses to insure loyalty are his own persuasiveness, KMA class ties, assignment of supporters to key positions, and the payment of substantial sums of money to loyal subordinates. Source stated that while he was a subordinate commander under Chon in the 1st ROK Infantry Division, he received a minimum of 100,000 won each month for "operating expenses.” This money was received directly from then MG Chon, or from one of his trusted subordinates. All other subordinate commanders also received similar payments, with the amount dependent on their respective positions. Following the events of 12-13 December 1979, Chon reportedly authorized the payment of 500,000,000 won to members of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Capital Security Command, who he considered to have played a key role in supporting him at that time. Source was unsure where the money for these payments came from, but expressed the opinion it was from certain unspecified businessmen, who traditionally lent financial support to influential persons both within and outside of the military.

[Redacted ] the payment of "reimbursement” or “expense” funds within the ROK army is not unusual, however, the amounts involved here are substantially larger than is normally the case. LtG Chon appears to have access to seemingly unlimited funds. He reportedly has spent large amounts of money in recent months during his campaign to generate support from segments of Korean society outside the military and justify the 12 December and subsequent actions.

(B) [ Redacted ] Source [one line redacted] stated his belief that Chon had been “corrupted with power,” and that he (source) was convinced that Chon intended to put himself in a position to control, or as a minimum, greatly influence the ROK government. Following his appointment to the KCIA post, source stated there remained..."no doubt as to his ambitions.”

(C) [ Redacted ] Source further stated that all commanders in the capital area were now loyal to Chon, down to and including battalion commanders. Battalion command nominations for positions in the capital area now require the personal approval of Chon or a close associate. Two lieutenant colonel acquaintances of source who had been scheduled to receive capital area commands had recently been sent to FROKA [1st ROK Army] units instead, following their failure to exhibit the proper degree of enthusiasm for the new army leadership during the interview process. Source estimated that 100 percent of regimental commanders, and 95 percent of the battalion commanders in and around the Seoul area were loyal to Chon.

[ One line redacted ] See remarks by preparing officer at the end of this report regarding the possibility of eroding military support for Chon as a result of his appointment as acting KCIA director.

(D) ) [ Redacted ] Source stated that the DSC's power had grown enormously in the past three months, and that any officer who had been closely associated with former CSA [Chief of Staff, Army] General ((Chong)) Sung Hwa was particularly suspect and was likely to be under surveillance. An acquaintance who was a former staff assistant to Gen Chong had been taken into custody when he attempted to visit the general's wife and family at their home and questioned for several hours. The former CSA's house is reportedly under twenty-four hour guard by three DSC agents.

[ Redacted line ] growing influence, aggressiveness, and arrogance by DSC agents since 12/13 December has been confirmed by numerous sources. Gen Chong's former senior aide, an outstanding officer who was the number one KMA graduate of his class, was recently refused DSC clearance to study in the U.S. and has subsequently been reassigned to an undesirable job within SROKA [2nd ROK Army] headquarters.

(2) [ Redacted ]  in a related conversation on 18 April, a highly respected university dean stated that opposition to Chon was likely to increase on the campuses due to his appointment as acting KCIA director. He stated that the appointment was not only "immoral," but "illegal" as well, according to at least one highly respected legal scholar. This individual expected the Chon issue to become part and parcel of the ((Kim)) Jae Kyu execution issue, and stated that the faculty of his university expected the Chon appointment issue to actively surface toward the end of the week of 21-22 April. He expected the Chon appointment to eventually supersede both the dismissal of "Yushin professors" and the Student Defense Corps issues in importance and intensity.

8B. [ Redacted ] These remarks are reported primarily because of the information concerning Chon's efforts to insure a loyal following within the army by selective assignments and monetary contributions and the probability that his appointment as acting director of the KCIA will become an issue on the campuses. Perhaps more important, however, is the potential rift that Chon's appointment to the KCIA post may cause among his followers. Most observers see a greatly expanded power base for Chon as a result of his new position -- this is undoubtedly true. It must be remembered, however, the many of Chon's closest followers within the army are younger officers who tend to be more idealistic concerning his motives. A large segment of these officers have believed Chon's denials concerning political ambitions and have up to now honestly considered him to be concerned primarily with reforming the army. Acceptance of the acting  KCIA directorship, with its blatantly political overtones, seriously erodes the credibility of his image as a simple military reformist. Within the Air Force and Navy, opposition to Chon was nearly universal prior to his KCIA appointment; it can now be expected to solidify even further. There is also significant, if not outspoken, opposition to Chon among some army generals, particularly those recently retired. At the colonel and lieutenant colonel level, the actions he has already taken to insure loyalty will probably override his loss of credibility for the short term, but the seeds of disillusionment have been planted in recent days.