MBC to the US: Have you stopped denying your responsibility for the Gwangju massacre yet?

MBC Gwangju offered this report (also here, as part of a series), during its reporting on the 44th anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising. The series draws on interviews with Robert Rich (and James Young), who appeared in this discussion.

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[Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 6 - The US, As Always, Remains Not Responsible 

(Anchor)

The United States, which is suspected of condoning and even aiding Chun Doo-hwan's new military regime's massacre of Gwangju citizens, has yet to admit responsibility.

However, Robert Rich, an author of the Cherokee Files and witness to the previously reported 'second meeting,' mentioned to reporters America's 'failure.' 

What does this ‘failure’ mean?

Press office chief Kim Chul-won continues.

(Reporter)

America's responsibility for 5.18 is still a hot potato 44 years later.

This is because there is no transparency as to why the U.S. approved the movement of the 20th Division, a South Korean military unit under the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and why the U.S. discussed the May 27, 1980 operation against the South Jeolla Provincial Office with Chun Doo-hwan's side.

There is even more controversy because the United States claims to be the guardian of justice, and human rights president Jimmy Carter was in power at the time.

The fact that the United States sided with Chun Doo-hwan and not the people of Gwangju at the time of 5.18 was a key factor in the subsequent rise of anti-American sentiment in South Korea.

For this reason, in 1988 the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Gwangju sent a letter of inquiry to the U.S. government to determine what role it played in 5.18.

However, the United States sent a response stating that it “did not become aware of the situation in Gwangju in time and that the U.S. was not responsible for a tragedy that unfolded among Koreans.”

* The late William Gleysteen, US Ambassador to Korea at the time of 5.18:

I don't think the United States had any responsibility for Gwangju. I mean, it was a Korean action, the students who were demonstrating were Koreans, not Americans, the forces that were used against them were Korean, not American.

A person involved in crafting the response was Robert Rich, then Director of Korean Affairs at the State Department, whom our reporters recently met in the United States.

During an interview with reporters, Mr. Rich suddenly brought up the word “failure” in reference to Chun Doo-hwan.

After October 26, the United States should have restrained Chun Doo-hwan until Korea regained stability with the establishment of a civilian government, but it failed to do so, and this was a “failure” on the part of the United States.

* Robert Rich, Director of Korean Affairs at the State Department in the 1980s

Chun kept pushing the other way until 12.12, [when] he quite clearly took power. I would say the US government failed in that regard.

Robert Rich drew the line at that, saying that American failure does not mean American responsibility.

He said he understood the feelings of the people of Gwangju toward the United States and regretted the tragedy in Gwangju, but was adamant that it did not mean the United States was responsible.

* Robert Rich, Director of Korean Affairs at the State Department in the 1980s

...but unfortunately, we were not in charge. [Translated as “It may be unfortunate, but we (the United States) are not responsible.”]

The U.S. government's insistence that it was not responsible for the Gwangju Massacre has been consistent over the past 44 years and seems unlikely to change.

But despite these assertions by U.S. politicians and officials, there are clear reasons why doubts persist.

* Dr. Gregg Brazinsky, Professor, Johns Hopkins University 

Was it responsible? I think that’s something that still is very much debated. But, it’s hard to say, and I think no one would argue that the US has zero responsibility, right? Because the US had so much influence in South Korea at the time. [“it’s hard to say” wasn't translated.]

U.S. President Obama is offering flowers at the La Plata River with the President of Argentina.

President Obama apologized, acknowledging that the United States turned a blind eye to Argentina's military junta, which came to power in a 1976 coup, kidnapping, torturing, and killing citizens who resisted the dictatorship before the country's transition to democracy in 1983.

The United States also promised to release additional secret documents in response to President Obama's apology.

* Former US President Obama,  March 2016 (KBS News):

I’m launching a new effort to open up additional documents from that dark period. We previously declassified thousands of records from that era. [The translation adds “(dirty war)”]

The U.S. condoned the tyranny of South American dictatorships in order to prevent the spread of communism at the time, which is similar to the reason why the United States abetted the Gwangju Massacre and supported the new military administration of Chun Doo-hwan in 1980.

44 years ago, Chun was desperate for recognition from the U.S. government and Congress, and the U.S. gave him exactly what he asked for.

That is why the citizens of Gwangju have been demanding recognition of responsibility and an apology from the United States, but the US has not responded to these demands for 44 years.

This is Kim Cheol-won from MBC News in Washington. 

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An unkind assessment of this news report would be to assert that it would take little more than substituting ‘미제 침략자’ (‘US imperialist invaders’) for ‘미국’ (‘US’) to make it sound more than a little alike to something the Korean Central News Agency would broadcast.

It should be noted that there are some errors above. For example, while Robert Rich said in the earlier interview that he (and former Ambassador Gleysteen) wholeheartedly supported the idea of the State Department responding to the Korean National Assembly's questions in 1988-89, he wasn't involved in "crafting the response" nor was he then Director of Korean Affairs at the State Department. It would also be a stretch to say that US decisions made at the time of 5.18 were "to prevent the spread of communism," unless one means preventing North Korean invasion or infiltration. Those in the Carter Administration who focused on Korea never believed communists were involved in Gwangju. Another glaring error is dealt with below.

As for the idea that there has been "no transparency as to why the U.S. approved the movement of the 20th Division," that may have been true decades ago, but with the 1989 White Paper and books by former Ambassador Gleysteen, former UN Commander Wickham, and former military attache James Young, there are numerous discussions of this (most noting that the 20th Division was removed from CFC OPCON before May 18, for one thing). Either MBC is unaware of these sources (i.e. incompetent), or it's trying to portray the US negatively. Or both. As to "why the U.S. discussed the May 27, 1980 operation against the South Jeolla Provincial Office with Chun Doo-hwan's side," Chun's side controlled the ROK Armed Forces, so who exactly were Americans supposed to speak to otherwise? [It should be noted that Chun was not directly in contact with the US at this time.] As for what their communications consisted of, Ambassador Gleysteen wrote in a cable May 26 that they were "urging that all realistic non-military options be exhausted and any military operations be carried out with the greatest care."

Moving along, “The United States... has yet to admit responsibility” for “Chun Doo-hwan’s... massacre of Gwangju citizens,” we’re told. One can’t help but notice the use of “massacre,” which is not that commonly used today when discussing 5.18. (Just to compare Google search hits, the results for different terms are as follows: "광주 민주화 운동" (Gwangju Democratization Movement), 527,000; "광주 항쟁" (Gwangju Uprising), 290,000; "광주 사태" (Gwangju incident), 207,000; "광주 학살" (Gwangju massacre), 130,000.) Hard to miss also are the all-but sarcastic references to the US, which “claims to be the guardian of justice, and human rights president Jimmy Carter.” It then uses a former US official and diplomat admitting that the US had experienced “failure” in trying to rein in Chun Doo-hwan - an admission clearly rooted in the State Department's attempts to encourage democratic development in 1979-1980 - as an opportunity to castigate the US for its lack of admissions of guilt and responsibility. It’s not really clear in what context Rich was speaking when he said, clearly mid-sentence, “but unfortunately, we were not in charge,” but the report claims he made an “adamant” denial, and translates it as “It may be unfortunate, but we (the United States) are not responsible.”

Gregg Brazinsky’s comment about determining the extent of US responsibility, that it was “hard to say,” was left out of the translation to focus on his noting of American influence upon Korea at that time, which makes it difficult to say it had “zero responsibility.” Or, as Clint Work put it during a lecture for the RAS five years ago, because of the command arrangements, there was no way the US could be uninvolved. As Donald Clark described the Combined Forces Command’s contradictions in The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows Over the Regime in South Korea (Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 

The command structure puts American officers in charge of operations. But all other signs point to a situation in which Americans bear responsibility but do not have real control. […] One […can] assume that the structure will be scrupulously honored by both sides and that it is an effective way to coordinate defense[,…or one may] see it as a snare for the American side, designed to assure U.S. support for whatever the Korean military wishes to accomplish. […T]he structure is designed to draw the American people and their Congress into whatever goes wrong with the Korean armistice. But a potentially dangerous feature of the joint defense structure is that it can be used to get U.S. support for whatever the R.O.K. military wants to accomplish, even it if is unrelated to national defense. As the Korean military has found political roles to play, the Americans have had to follow along or else oppose them openly. […This risked making] them culpable for atrocities committed by local troops whom they command but cannot possibly control. [Pgs 74,76]

In addition to the ways in which the structure of Combined Forces Command involved Americans in Korean affairs, amid the power vacuum left by Park Chung-hee’s assassination, the US Embassy found itself being sought after by many local actors. As US Ambassador William Gleysteen described the situation in a cable to Washington two days after Park’s death, 

there will be elements in Korea who wish to borrow our influence. I have already been approached by some and I expect to be approached by many more generals, dissidents, political oppositionists who want our help to pursue their own ends.

Returning to the MBC report, near the end we're told of former President Obama's visit to Argentina, during which, the report asserts, he apologized for a past administration's support of a past dictatorship there and promised to share more US documents with them. This is of course included to stand in contrast to how the US treats Korea in regard to 5.18, which the US has not only never apologized for, but has also been stingy in releasing documents.

The problem, of course, is that a key assertion above simply isn't true. As the Guardian reported in 2016, Obama "stopped short of apologizing for Washington’s initial support for the military dictatorship," making clear that MBC's implicit assertion that the US is disrespecting Korea by not doing the same for it is entirely false. It's hard to know whether this error was due to incompetence or malice. But sometimes facts don't matter when a deeper 'truth' needs to be unearthed by crusading journalists and promoted - namely, that the US must have been responsible for what happened during 5.18, because otherwise nationalists believing that Koreans are inherently good, blameless victims of history (inflicted by outsiders, of course) would have to admit an uncomfortable truth: that Koreans were capable of inflicting appalling violence upon each other that May in Gwangju.

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Below are summaries of the other six parts of MBC's series 'Open the Cherokee Files Again,' particularly in how they used quotations from Robert Rich (and James Young).

 [Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 1 - The author of the Cherokee files was found

The series begins by showing the online discussion I posted here and explaining how MBC then tracked down Robert Rich, who was Director of Korean Affairs at the State Department in 1980, and went to interview him, identifying him as the author of the "Cherokee Files," cables between Seoul and the State Department from 1979-80 unearthed by Tim Shorrock in the mid-1990s.

Rich: “I would say 90% of the cables out of the State Department were probably drafted in my office.”

Chun’s drive for power “came to our attention in Washington right after Park Chung-hee’s assassination. We all learned [at] the same time from our cables from our Embassy in Seoul.”

It seems odd to put such an emphasis on Rich, when the majority of the cables that are available originate from Korea, and not the State Department. However, to note this might reduce the value of MBC's scoop. Also, from my reading of the cables, I think the State Department was pretty slow to come around to Chun's importance, so much so that his actions on 12.12 were a surprise to them.

[Open the Cherokee files again] Part 2 - What are the Cherokee files?

This really has little in the way of interviews with Robert Rich, but explains the secret cable channel set up to deal with the aftermath of Park Chung-hee's death.

"We decided to set up a separate the communication channel because we did not want to… we wanted to keep things fairly quiet."

(Wasn’t that 'Cherokee'?)

"That's right. Cherokee." 

[Open the Cherokee Files again] Part 3 - Asking the author of the Cherokee files... Important records are still unreleased

In the final days of the uprising, the embassy and USFK tried to sift through various reports that included the lies Chun’s group had conveyed in the censored media. On May 25, a State Department cable stated that Korean news had reported that radicals had seized control inside Gwangju and, bent on establishing a revolutionary government, had set up people’s courts and executed people. In another cable that day, US Ambassador Gleysteen urged this news be treated with caution. MBC showed these cables to Rich and asked him about them, to which he replied,

"This is the information we received from Seoul."  

(From the embassy or the Korean government?)

"Some of it may have come from the government."

[Actually, the cables make it clear the sources for this information was either Korean news reports (by news organizations controlled by Martial Law Command) or Martial Law Command statements.]

Rich also speaks of another report he wrote to Richard Holbrooke after the military retook Gwangju, which he ended with the following comment:

"I said at the end what I did it because that's what I believed. I believed...if monuments were built, they would be monuments to the people of Gwangju who had suffered."

MBC then notes that this report was not among the "Cherokee Files" documents obtained by reporter Tim Shorrock or the May 18 Investigation Committee, indicating that there are more files out there. (For a discussion of as-yet unreleased documents, see the fuller interview with Rich from 2020.)

[Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 4 - More secret information, testimony of an attaché at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency

In part 4, James Young, a deputy military attache at the US Embassy in 1980, was interviewed. (His memories can be found in his excellent 2003 book, Eye on Korea.) The only part of the interview aired was this exchange:

(You were aware of Chun Doo-hwan's clique called Hanahoe.) Sure. Of course. (When?) I think I became aware of it when I became a serious Korea watcher, and that would have been...'71, maybe?

[Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 5 - Another Gwangju Countermeasures Meeting was held at the White House

This features a brief interview with Nicholas Platt, a senior aide to Defense Secretary Brown in 1980, showing him with his notes ("the Platt Memorandum" - scroll down for English) taken of the May 22 PRC [Periodic Review Committee] meeting at the White House (which had been planned more than a week in advance, and ended up being mostly focused on events in Gwangju). It then shows this exchange with Robert Rich:

There were two White House meetings in the Situation Room during that period.

(Is it another PRC meeting?)

There was another... PRC meeting...

I remember that it was chaired by [National Security Adviser] Brzezinski. It was essentially a discussion of concern that North Korea might take advantage of the situation and what we could do to deter North Korea.

I’m sure there are memoranda somewhere, but I don’t know where it is. The White House would have records, and the State Department...

Nothing is said about when it took place. From the description, it may have been a follow-up meeting on May 22, since at the recorded meeting no decision was made to send a US aircraft carrier to Korean waters, but by the end of the day on May 22, US news media were reporting that the carrier had been ordered to head to Korea. Either that, or it is a meeting that took place without any mention whatsoever in the hundreds of pages of cables from that time. At any rate, for MBC this is once again evidence that there are more documents left to be uncovered.

[Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 6 - The U.S. - As Always - Remains Not Responsible

(Translated above.)

[Open the Cherokee Files Again] Part 7 - The May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission should have met them but...

The final part of this series shows a brief interview with Robert Rich:

(Do you have any information regarding who gave the shoot to kill order in Korea?)

[Shakes his head.] "You mean earlier or later?"

His reply is translated "You mean earlier (the mass firing in front of the Provincial Capital on May 21, 1980) or later (the mass firing during the suppression of the Jeollanam-do Provincial Capital on May 27, 1980)?" Whatever the interviewer's answer to his question, or his follow-up, was, MBC didn't broadcast it.

The final chapter, however, is more concerned with criticizing the May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission for not interviewing Robert Rich and James Young (you know, like the enterprising MBC did).

Despite being a figure who holds the secrets of 5.18, Mr. Rich said that no one in South Korea has ever approached him about 5.18. 

He is a key figure in unraveling the truth about Gwangju, but even though the May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission is aware that he is alive, it concluded that there would be no information to be gained from him and did not even attempt to contact him.

[My comment: if he was such a "key figure in unraveling the truth about Gwangju," why was there really not much new that I learned from the previously-linked to long-form interview with him?] 

The report ends by stating that "there are still a lot of U.S. records about Gwangju that have yet to be released. This is why the search for truth must not stop here."

One reason for criticizing the Truth Commission is that it's about to publish its comprehensive report, and has said that after conducting a sufficient investigation, it is "impossible to find the truth" regarding who gave the order to fire on May 21. 

MBC believes that US archives or Americans who could be interviewed know the "truth" about this, which is rather unlikely if you understand that the ROK government and armed forces were going out of their way to hide the truth of what was happening in Gwangju from the Americans (even trying to prevent communication between US missionaries and Americans on Gwangju Airbase). The Platt memorandum of the May 22 PRC meeting has General Vessey (who had suggested that Chun be asked to step down) stating his belief that the ROK army was "busting their tails" to "minimize bloodshed," which was not at all true; in fact, more than 60 civilians were killed on the outskirts of Gwangju (when it was "liberated") between May 22 and May 26. The ROK army promised to airdrop leaflets printed by US authorities explaining the US position calling for calm and dialogue, but never did, instead broadcasting news reports falsely stating that General Wickham had encouraged the ROK army to move troops to Gwangu. The list goes on and on. Unless a disaffected ROK officer later passed on the origin of the firing order to an American, it's incredibly unlikely the US has such information. In other words, anyone who has looked deeply into these records and understands the context of Chun's drive for power would know well that the likelihood of the US having such information is very low.

The MBC report mentions that the Truth Commission chose to focus on documentary evidence. The specific target of MBC's criticism is the Truth Commission investigator in charge of examining American records, someone I happen to know personally, who has uncovered a large number of documents (including uncensored copies of Ambassador Gleysteen's meetings with Chun in December 1979 and May 1980), and who has struck me as being very careful when approaching evidence, and not someone who jumps to conclusions. 

Overall, if you want to learn more about Robert Rich's memories of 5.18, turning to this 4-year-old discussion of events at that time would be far more useful that wading through the snippets and fragments of an interview with him that MBC recently broadcast in multiple segments. Little new is to be gleaned from what they have broadcast. Had they made available the full interview with Rich, much like when MBC shared the full, original and translated text of the Platt Memo several years ago (which really was an incredible find), MBC's recent effort might have been more worthwhile.